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Introduction

On December 18, 2003, an award ceremony took place in
Government House in Central. The website of ESDLife (Electronic
Service Delivery Life) won the award for ‘Best e-Government Services in
Asia’ in 2003 -- a prize awarded by the Geneva-based, United
Nations-endorsed World Summit on the Information Society.

Promoting information technology has been one of the most
prominent

government

agendas

of

the

Hong

Kong

Special

Administrative Region since its establishment on July 1, 1997. The
‘digital 21IT Strategy’ (which is basically a list of self-declared
government

goals

which

include

buzzwords

like

government

leadership, sustainable e-government programme, infrastructure and
business environment, institutional review, technological development,
vibrant IT industry, human resources in a knowledge economy, bridging
the digital divide) was initiated as a government initiative to face the
(so-called) challenges brought about by information technology i .
ESDLife as a portal website through which people can gain access to a
whole range of government and business services as well as
information such as booking leisure venues, public examination
applications, appointment bookings for giving marriage notice, etc., is
a better-known part of this strategy.
1

In fact, news about the ranking exercises of various IT-related aspects
are common in this age in which information technology seems to play
an important role in our lives. We see the ranking of the ‘100 largest IT
corporations’ ii , a ‘World Knowledge Competitiveness Index’ iii ,
‘popularity of online learning’iv, ‘500 growing Hi-Tech companies in the
Asia-Pacific’v, an ‘index of popularity of digital technology’vi, the ‘most
technolo gically advanced country and region’vii, to name but a few.
Although the competitions in the IT sector are simply countless, and
critics are often questioning the standards and criteria by which the
rankings are done, the prize won by ESDLife should still be recognized
as significant enough to attract even the Chief Executive Tung
Chee-wah to come to Government House to celebrate.

However, the very same day also witnessed the arrest of a number of
senior executives of ESDLife for allegedly inflating the number of hits on
the website.viii The case in fact involved more than 30 people, staff or
ex-staff and their friends and relatives, who, according to official claims,
altogether made about 100,000 bookings (mostly of sports facilities),
which cost over HK$7,000,000, within 9 months. Those sports facilities
were in fact booked, paid, but not used.

To explain briefly, the website is run by a joint venture between
Hutchison Whampoa Limited and Hewlett-Packard HKSAR Limited. The
Hong Kong SAR Government granted the tender to the joint venture,
and one of the requirements was the number of bookings on the
2

website. The number is crucial because once online bookings exceed
a certain number (2,300,000), the government will have to pay a
monthly fee to the website. But the fact is that, not only has the
government simply not begun to pay, the number of hits was also far
from satisfactory – the website accumulated only 200,000 hits in its first
year of operation.ix

As commentator Hau Luen-kwai reminds us, there is no further
coverage of the case, x we do not know what the result of the
investigation and the judgment of the court are, whether all of them
have been found guilty, and what the punishment is. But even if all
allegations turn out to be false, this case can still function as a
miniature in which the basic nexuses at the time when information
technology is so prominent are adequately and abundantly present.
What we see here are officials and business elites celebrating
something which indeed requires far more than simple celebration; the
profiteering tendency of business meeting a government which likes to
contract out services; the government setting up empty numbers as a
criterion for measuring success; finally, the high profile and saviour-like
image of information technologies which, in fact, lack users, at a time
when optimism in regard to advanced technology has long been a
norm. As a result, what figures in this case under the guise of
information technology, or technology more generally, has to be
queried and critiqued in a series of questions from highly varying
directions, or, to put it in another way: probably no element in this case
can assume a central position, defining exclusively what this case is all
3

about.

From this perspective, this thesis seeks to capture and make visible the
manifold intentions, implications, and operations of both the business
sector and the government in the discourse of information technology;
it seeks to ask what kinds of subjects are constructed in this discourse,
to what extent they accept or even celebrate the discourse of IT, and
what this kind of acceptance and celebration is about. Finally, the
thesis will discuss how we can make sense of this discourse of IT in
relation to the conventional discourse of Hong Kong’s economic
development.

4

In terms of nothing technological as such

This essay seeks to discuss the discourses of science and technology in
terms of nothing technological as such. Science and technology are
discussed in various aspects that are different from what might appear
inside the science and computer magazines freshly issued at the
newsstands every week (although, in fact, the contents of these
magazines also vary widely, ranging from personal interviews that do
not have much to do with any technology, to the introduction of
fashionable and related accessories, to guidelines for using computers
safely and healthily, etc.). They are discussed in relation to the whole
process of the development of human ‘civilization’, in the work of a
wide range of thinkers and critics (such as those from the Frankfurt
School and Heidegger, see below for elaborate discussion), these
processes are considered to constitute either the impetus of the
(declining) human civilization all the way to its self-destruction or the
possibility of its salvation. Feminists have joined this discussion by
uncovering the gender dimension, regardless of whether science and
technology is heading towards salvation or self-destruction, feminists
argue that the contributions from women or, more generally, the
oppressed are intentionally obliterated: the cultural politics of a clean
narrative of history of European man and the determinism of science
and technology. Science and technology is also discussed by
5

historians of colonialism in order explain what the process of encounter
between the colonizers and colonized indeed was all about, what
changes these scientific and technological encounters brought to a
society, and their effects on the culture of the colony even after the
end of colonization.

The effect of science and technology in our daily life is also diversely
studied. Nowadays, our senses and feelings, and the structure of
perception itself are largely mediated by technology. For instance, the
automobile can change our very perception of the city, work and
home; the invasion of domestic technology is related to the cultural
project of cleanliness. The final section of this chapter takes issue with
the political economy of science and technology, especially in the
global and u rban context.

All these perspectives have their different aspects of science and
technology as their content, they emerge from thinkers of varying time
and place, with a view to solving different problems. Therefore putting
them together is not intended to align or measure them according to
any single particular standard or to make a comparison between them.
Similarly, putting them together does not mean to exhaust the field of
the science and technology discussion. Indeed, drawing on
Heidegger’s famous notion that ‘the essence of technology is by no
means anything technological’xi or Adorno and Horkheimer’s that
‘science

is

technical

practice… far

removed

from

reflective

consideration of its own goal’xii, I argue that in order to make sense of
6

science and technology in a particular context, no matter whether it is
in a philosophical, cultural, political, economical etc. sense, it does not
quite help to stare at the technical details of science and technology.
Instead it has to be acknowledged that all these perspectives
articulate the notion of science and technology into a wider context.

Truth and essence in technology
Noticing the disadvantage of the Greek word techne of being related
closely to the specific word ‘technology’, Michel Foucault nevertheless
found it interesting that we now consider ‘architecture, like the
practices of government and the practice of other forms of social
organization … using elements of sciences like physics, for example, or
statistics, and so on’xiii. In other words, what interests Foucault is the fact
that people considered these heterogeneous kinds of knowledge and
practice as techne of different kinds.

The meaning of the word techne is described by Foucault as ‘a
practical rationality governed by a conscious goal’xiv. By unearthing
the age-old elements in the word technology, the meaning and our
understanding of ‘technology’ immediately expand, allowing people
to understand technology not exclusively in terms of cogs or chips; and,
at the same time, open up the possibilities for people to discover the
technological moments and operations in areas that we do not usually
associate with ‘science’ as we use the term today, such as social
sciences or humanities. A parallel effort to unearth the etymological
elements of the word ‘techno logy’ can be found in Raymond
7

Williams’s work. According to his explanation, the root word of
technology is tekhne, a Greek word meaning an art or craft.
Technology as ‘a systematic study of the arts’ can be dated back to
the 17th century, specialized to the meaning of ‘practical arts’ in the
19th century, and within the terms ‘practical arts’, the element of
‘mechanical arts’ had already been emphasized since the 18th
century.x v

What might be surprising to many readers is the proximity of
technology in the course of the development of its meaning from
techne , to ‘arts’, instead of science, especially when we all now are
too familiar with the (apparent) connection between science and
technology. As we can see spatially, for instance, in Hong Kong, the
two major science parks, the Hong Kong Science and Technology Park
and Cyberport, are located next to the Chinese University of Hong
Kong and The University of Hong Kong respectively, where research of
‘pure’ sciences are supposed to carry out. The basic concept is
ultimately that these facilities, which blend research and application,
would be more appropriately situated next to academies that
produce ivory tower scientific knowledge. However, Williams tells us
that until late 17 th century, ‘art’ ‘was widely applied, without
predominant specialization … in matters as various as mathematics,
medicine and angling’xvi , whereas, when introduced into English in the
14th century, the meaning of science is simply knowledge as such. Our
contemporary sense of science, as th e theoretical and methodical
study of nature with the quality of ‘objectiveness’, became significant
8

only after the early 19 th century xvii. The specialization of the meaning of
art to skills of painting, sculpture, drawing, and the distinction of
science and arts as ‘contrasted areas of human skill and effort, with
fundamentally different methods and purposes’, was not fully
established until the mid- or even late 19 century.xviii As a result, the
sense of science as we know it today indeed has a rather short history,
and overlooking this point might lead to strange and far-fetched
appropriations. (The discussion of the symbolism of the Innovation and
Technology Commission in chapter 3 will demonstrate this.)

Williams’s explanation regarding the separation of these two
long-intermingled realms of art and science as knowledge and
practice is the historical change of the practical division of labour and
the ‘practical definitions of the purposes of the exercise of skill’. xix That
is to say, this separation is the result of a ‘defensive specialization’ on
the side of the arts and humanities whose forms of use and purposes
are not to be determined by capitalist commodity production and
immediate exchanges.x x This is also the point of separation of ‘fine arts’
and ‘useful a rts’, which latter acquired the new word of ‘technology’.

Alongside Williams’ etymological investigation, Martin Heidegger’s
philosophical reflection on the essence of technology may also shed
light on the possible scope of studying technology. Heidegger’s inquiry
of technology is inseparable from his analysis of modern industrial
society. According to Heidegger, the essence of modern technology is
what he called ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stell), meaning ‘that unconcealment
9

comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern
technology reveals the real as standing-reserve’. More specifically,
Enframing ‘is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon
which set upon man and puts him in a position to reveal the real, in the
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.’xxi Hence Heidegger asserts
that ‘the essence of technology is nothing technological’. xxii

Modern technology, he argues, increasingly summons and ‘sets upon’
(in another word, ‘reveals’ in a particular way) nature and human alike
to become standing-reserve, mainly as stored-up energy and
exploitable productions. Nature and the human even ‘lose their
character

as

objects

when

they

are

caught

up

in

the

standing-reserve’xxiii, which is then pathetically nothing more than what
the modern technology needs them for.

While Heidegger recognizes in this situation of modern industrial society
the decline of the west, he considers this decline to originate twenty
five hundred years ago, ‘with the dawn of metaphysics at the hands of
Plato.’xxiv According to Michael E. Zimmerman’s study of Heidegger’s
thought, in the Greek tradition ‘to produce’ had 2 meanings, one of it is
‘“actualizing” or “effecting” a thing, in the sense of causing it to be
present’; the other is being ‘as a “letting be” or a “freeing” which
enabled an entity to come into presence, to show itself, to emerge.’xxv
The former is closer to the philosophical tradition since Plato and
Aristotle, and is called a ‘productionist metaphysic’ by Zimmerman,
while the latter belongs more to the pre-platonic tradition.
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According to Heidegger, this productionist metaphysics, underlined by
concepts such as the form-matter distinction, four causes xxvi , etc.
paved the way for the rise of the enlightenment as well as modernity,
which, above all and almost exclusively emphasize a particular kind of
rationality, science and technology, summoning and revealing nature
and human being alike into a system of modern society as
standing-reserve.

Combining this long philosophical tradition with the social and political
situation of Germany in the 1920s and 30s, when Heidegger was hugely
frustrated by the idle everydayness and inauthenticity, Heidegger
believed German people at that time were uprooted and homeless.
Mass culture freed ‘the “anyone self” from having to understand
anything in a genuine, original way’xxvii . Indeed, he determines that
both the theoretical stances of liberalism and socialism could shed no
light or provide no answer to the problem, precisely because both of
them are fundamentally the products of the problem, namely
modernity.xxviii

This is the philosophical and social context in which Heidegger seeks art,
the highest form of techne, as the remedy for the crisis of the West. This
is also how the quotation of the line of German poet Hölderlin ‘But
where danger is, grows The saving power also ’xxix is intelligible. As
mentioned above, art, among the 2 meanings, is ‘“letting be” or a
“freeing” which enabled an entity to come into presence, to show
11

itself, to emerge’. He believes it is precisely being in the reign of
Enframing which tries to, but ultimately cannot, block all illuminations of
every revealing, all appearances of truth, that the human being needs
to recover the elements of art -- letting-be, freeing – in technology. In
order to allow human beings to see the real opening, a break with this
particular version of modern industrial society is necessary.xxx And this
break may at the first instance seem to be against the will of the
people enjoying themselves as the anyone self, however, to Heidegger,
‘the essence of freedom is originally not connected to the will or even
the causality with human willing.’xxxi Unfortunately, he did not quite
explain under which conditions and how human beings might be able
to realize the importance of the manifesting, revealing effect of art,
especially when human beings have already been summoned into the
Enframing since the Greek antiquity.

The whole body of Heidegger’s philosophy is of course notoriously
difficult to grasp. If his philosophy of technology is too abstract and
far-fetched, juxtaposing his philosophy with Slavoj Žižek’s inspirational
appropriation of Heidegger’s thought on the topic of biogenetics and
bioethics

may

provide

a

more

focused

and

‘applicable’

understanding. Engaging with the debate between bioethics and
science, Žižek thinks that the problem lies in an observation by Francis
Fukuyama that ‘the notion of humanity relies on the belief that we
possess an essentially inherited “human nature”, that we are born with
an unfathomable dimension of ourselves.’xxxii Habermas’s position on
the problem, which extends from Fukuyama’s thesis, namely
12

biogenetic intervention, is straightforward. In a talk given in 2001, he
states 2 reasons to oppose biogenetic intervention. Firstly, it will blur the
borderline between what is made a nd what is spontaneous. Secondly,
if human characters can be manipulated, probably some individuals
will be more privileged, like those who can manipulate and those who
are favourably manipulatedxxxiii.

Žižek considers this position as an obstacle to the potential
conversation between bioethics and science, as it unreasonably splits
bioethics and science into two separate and discrete regions, ‘a split
which already prevents us from seeing the way these new conditions
compel us to transform and reinvent the notions of freedom, autonomy
and ethical responsibility.’ And the consequence is that, if human
integrity and dignity are to be maintained, scientific inquiry into the
human being should better be curtailed. Žižek suggests that ‘every
advance in knowledge has to be earned in a painful struggle against
our spontaneous propensity from ignorance’, and the implication of
Habermas’s position embraces ignorance but leaves the problem of
knowledge advancement untouched. This insight can also be referred
back to Heidegger’s observation about the ‘homeless and uprooted’
Germans after the Great War: avoiding understanding anything in a
genuine, original way. Habermas’s position, as a result, would not be
able to answer the questions revealed by the advancement of
science and technology even regarding our essentially inherited
‘human nature’, before we make our decision of whether to support it
or be against it.
13

Consider an example raised by Žižek. In a quiz in which I take part, I am
driven by self-esteem to win. The stake of winning is to memorize as
much as possible the relevant data. Žižek asks: does it matter morally if I
take drugs to strengthen my memory? Or stepping back a bit, if I take
drugs which strengthen my self-esteem, so I would want more
desperately to win the quiz, especially when scientists found that the
level of self-esteem is controlled by a chemical in the brain called
‘serotonin’? xxxiv Which questions would be revealed once we know
that

what

we

have

always

regarded

as

‘natural’

talents,

incomprehensible and given, as it were, are indeed manipulable by
adjusting a certain chemical in the brain? Does it still make sense to
hold on to the assumption of an integrated and given ‘s elf’, on which
the whole debate of science and bioethics is built? Or should the
advance of knowledge in biogenetics still be understood as infringing
on the dignity and freedom of the self? Or does it rather tell us that ‘we
never had them in the first place’?

These considerations bring us back to Heidegger’s unanswered
question regarding the saving power against the destructive reign of
Enframing. If Žižek’s position to the debate of bioethics vs. science is to
ask: what questions does scientific advancement pose, and how do
these questions fundamentally confront our basic categories in
considering the debates? Then we can also rethink Heidegger’s secret
saving power along the same path. Žižek’s position though might lead
to the charge of conformism, accepting everything technology brings
14

us as a layer of the truth confronting us. However, this seems to suggest
precisely that we are required not to conc lude the discussion too soon.

Enlightenment reason, science, self -destruction?
Another classic text that discusses the relation between western
civilization and science and technology, in quite a different tone,
however, is certainly the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Written by Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School after witnessing
the atrocities and catastrophes caused by the Nazis, the text seeks to
discuss the failure of Enlightenment to turn mankind into ‘a truly human
condition’, creating a new kind of barbarism’ instead. xxxv

Enlightenment is commonly understood as a radical break from the
previous superstitious and religious worldview, and is the emergence of
rational man from his ‘self-incurred immaturity’, which means the
‘inability to use one’s understanding without the guidance of another
person’, according to the founding figure of the Enlightenment,
Immanuel Kantxxxvi . Drawing widely on Nietzsche, Sade, and even
Homer, the analysis of Dialectic reveals the striking similarities between
Enlightenment and myth to such an extent that myth becomes
enlightenment, and vice versa. Since myth is what Enlightenment seeks
to overcome, this dialectic of Enlightenment simply leads to
self-destruction.

(a) Myth as Enlightenment
Through the interpretation of Homer’s Odyssey, which Adorno and
15

Horkheimer consider the ‘basic text of European civilization’, the
authors argue that one can identify traces of the ‘prototype of the
bourgeois individual’xxxvii. The authors cite the same poem by Hölderlin
that was cited by Heidegger: ‘But where there is danger, there
salvation grows too’, to elaborate the moment of the birth of the
bourgeois individual: informed beforehand by Circe about the Sirens
who are going to harm Odysseus and his men by singing sweet songs
when Odysseus has to sail back to Ithaca in the well-known scene, one
can see a clear hierarchical division of labour between Odysseus and
his rowing men. While his men’s ears have to be waxed in order to
prevent them from listening to the songs of Sirens and keep them
rowing, Odysseus himself is tied tightly to the mast of the ship, so he can
enjoy the song of the Sirens without risking reacting in any dangerous
and harmful way. To Adorno and Horkheimer, this is precisely an
indication that ‘throughout the many mortal perils he has had to
endure, the unity of his own life, the identity of the individual, has been
confirmed for him’

xxxviii.

And through the way the bourgeois individual

finds his prototype in Homer’s Odysseus is exactly through ‘cunning,
rational

calculation,

deceit,

and

above

all,

self-restraint

and

renunciation’, ‘he confirms his own identity and integrity through
confronting and enduring challenges and danger’. xxxix

(b) Enlightenment as myth
Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue, is the attempt of reason
to extend from the principle of perception to the objects of perception
in a harmonious and unitary system. When facing the previously
16

untamable nature, if reason fails to structure our perception in
accordance with the understanding of the system, and at the same
time, if particular and factual knowledge cannot be derived from
principles of the unitary system, the system fails to constitute the ‘a
priori assumption of judgment’. As a result, reason either fails to
self-preserve or it successfully reaches a state in which ‘the conceptual
apparatus determines the senses, even before perception occurs; a
priori, the citizen sees the world as the matter from which he himself
manufactures it.’xl

Science, consisting of mathematical abstraction, is the system in
question for the Enlightenment. On the one hand, having been
equated with truth by the Enlightenment, and being ‘unable to
question or determine the ends it serves, reason loses its critical
dimension and becomes a tool for affirming and reproducing existing
reality.’xli On the other hand, in terms of the contents of this system,
‘moral forces are no less neutral impulses and modes of behaviors than
the immoral forces.’xlii This equation of science with truth and hence
the instrumentalisation of reason render reason purposively purposeless,
as well as Enlightenment as myth. Values fail to effect any negative
power to query or change this unitary and harmonious system, all
negative powers are readily tamed as they are compartmentalized in
an orderly way.

As mentioned before, Kant considers man to be immature if he is
unable to use his understanding without the guidance of another
17

person, and the Enlightenment is the advent of the opposite situation.
Indeed, this phenomenon is relevant to the auth ors of Dialectic
because they think this phenomenon has already been elevated from
the level of the person to the level of an organizing principle of society,
no matter whether this occurs in Nazi Germany or in the culture industry
they experienced in America. Just like science has to structure our
perception and adjust the world so as to fit it into perception, the
individual in the culture industry, the authors argue, is also deceived so
that the ‘individual is an illusion not merely because of the
standardization of the means of production. He is tolerated only so
long

as

his

complete

identification

with

the

generality

is

unquestioned.’xliii Mediated by the culture industry, the authors point
out, individuals can live well in a very orderly manner, even if they are
living under total control, such as those of the Nazi era or the
American-style capitalist society. The culture industry is such a concept
that ‘emptied subject and totality immobilize each. The world appears
frozen in the nightmare.’xliv

A text such as the Dialectic of Enlightenment certainly attracts
enormous discussion regarding different aspects. In the light of
Heidegger’s ‘The question concerning technology’, I would like to
compare and contrast it with the Dialectic in order to highlight some
points for discussion. Firstly, Heidegger’s essay, as we have seen above,
is ambiguously optimistic, while the Dialectic can be easily taken as a
closed statement of the authors’ pessimism for the future even after the
fall of Nazi Germany. One can try to justify this claim by contrasting
18

their different appropriations of Hölderlin’s poem. In the hand of
Heidegger, Hölderlin’s lines refer to the potential overcoming of the
danger of being overwhelmed by Enframing of technology, which is by
the revealing of the being conditioned by technology in the form of art.
However, in the Dialectic , these lines refer to beginnings of the
bourgeois individual of the Enlightenment, which subsequently paves
the way for the domination of Enlightenment reason and finally leads
to its self-destruction. Rather than seeing salvation in the midst of the
all-powerful domination of technology, overcoming the threat around
us for self-preservation and construction of a unitary self is the opening
of the tragedy of the self-destruction of reason.

Regarding Heidegger, it is always one option to read his philosophy of
technology closely with his political orientation: to seek the essence
and hence the liberating potential of technology against the
technological society of American capitalism and communism. It is not
my intention here to judge whether the somewhat noticeable
consistence
Heidegger

between
and

the

the

political

Heidegger

of

orientation
‘the

of

Question

the

pre-war

Concerning

Technology’, which was written in 1953, is the result of his failure to learn
from all the atrocities of the Nazi experience. In this context, it is,
however, tempting to interpret the Dialectic (written at the beginning
of the 1940s) as closed, total, elitist, as the result of their lesson learned
from the Nazis, which is in this sense a direct contrast with the case of
Heidegger.

19

Yet, juxtaposing these thinkers in respect to their political stance
towards the Nazis alone may not be the most meaningful way to grasp
their philosophies of technology. Indeed, instead of consolidating their
respective antagonistic stances, a more fruitful analysis should be
directed towards the problematization of their stances. Huyssen rightly
argues that both the attempts to bury and resurrect the authors ‘tend
to sap th e energy from a body of texts that maintain their provocation
for us.’xlv So the point is not to affirm the authors of the Dialectic as a
pair of hopeless elitists who criticize the deceived and helpless mass
from a panorama viewpoint, or otherwise to interpret them as hidden
believers in the power and potential of the mass and the proletariat.

In what follows, I would like to focus on the notion of ‘self’ in Dialectic
and Heidegger, to investigate what indeed goes wrong with science
and technology. As far as Heidegger is concerned, he observes that
understanding things in a genuine and original way by people in
Germany in the period around the Great War is avoided. In his own
words, ‘we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as the anyone self take
pleasure, we read, see, and judge about literature and art as the
anyone self see and judge… the anyone self, which is nothing definite,
and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribe the kind of being of
everydayness.’xlvi This view of the self is highly comparable to the
deceived mass in Adorno and Horkheimer’s totally administered
society, where ‘in spite of all the progress in reproduction techniques; in
controls and the specialties, and in spite of all the restless industry, the
bread the culture industry offers man is the stone of stereotype’. xlvii
20

Huyssen offers the idea of ‘ego-weakness’ or ‘ego decay’ to
supplement the observation given in the Dialectic. He argues that the
decline of the traditional paternal authority in the bourgeois family,
‘complemented by the ontogenetically subsequently invasion of the
psyche by the laws of capitalist production’, led to a change of
personality, which was originally based upon conformity to an external
standard. Therefore, ‘in Germany, Hitler could become the substitute
father, and fascist culture and propaganda provided the external
guidance for the weak, gullible ego.’xlviii

To these thinkers, modern technological society and hence its cultural
apparatus are all manoeuvred to effect ignorance, insensitivity and
conformity of the people. And yet, the very starting point of this
historical

process

is

ironically

human

fear,

the

fear

of

the

incomprehensible nature, the fear of the unknown and uncontrollable.
It is precisely this human fear that started men to demythologize,
objectivize, scientize, and finally gain mastery over nature, ‘nothing at
all may remain outside (of the comprehensible), because the mere
idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.’xlix However, what
remained unspecified are the specific historical moments w hen human
fear changed to domination, if the word ‘gradual’ (instead of
contingent, chaotic, uneven) is appropriate for a complex historical
journey. The same question can also be raised for the philosophy of
Heidegger: what exactly is the situation in which the Platonic and
Aristotelian tradition would adopt the ‘productionist metaphysics’ out
of the two quite different meanings of ‘to produce’? What is the milieu
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in which this choice was consolidated? And finally, how, in the
historical process, do all these moments inform and constitute the self,
from having a burning fear of being ignorance, and hence a will to
know, to a will or an enjoyment of the unknown?

Regarding the grand historico-philosophical projects of these thinkers,
these plural and particular moments might look trivial; they might
indeed not aim to work in this direction. Yet, without historical
specifications, we can only judge their theories by result, which is the
existing situation. In other words, we do not know, apart from abstract
rationality, what the notion ‘society’ really refers to, in what way and
when it is jeopardized. We also do not know what indeed the relations
and effects upon each other between different social and cultural
institutions, such as government officials of high and low ranks,
businesses of different sizes, etc., are. Yet, we have to convince
ourselves that we are being severely oppressed, controlled and
organized into repetitive reserves in order to be able to make sense of
their theories.

Furthermore, without the depiction and analysis of the concrete and
crucial historical, political and cultural nexus, the shift from the will to
know to ignorance of the self would remain quite incomprehensible.
Huyssen points out insightfully that ‘one does not need to resort to a
critique of the whole trajectory of Western metaphysics in order to see
that the notion of a stable “self” is historically datable and dated with
the bourgeois age’l. In fact, if the formation of a stable and unitary self
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is crucial to the transformation of the organizing principles of society
into total administration and the transformation in turn of the
constitution and orientation of the self, then what is at least equally
worthy of being depicted is the actual process ‘littered’ along this
history of Western civilization – if we are to learn from history to escape
from this cage of instrumental reason or Enframing, or if escaping is
ever possible.

Science, technology, colonialism
After

the

historico-philosophical projects dealing with western

civilization, science and technology, power and politics, the numerous
studies of the colonial experience of India can be a rich example.

There are different frameworks that try to explain the trajectory of the
development of science and technology in India, or more generally
‘backward’ colonies, some of them explicitly, some implicitly political.
A famous model is the three-phase linear diffusionist and Eurocentric
model by George Basalla. In phase I of this model, non-European areas
are conceived of as non-scientific society, and function only as
providers of exploitable data and resources. In phase II, the colony
establishes its own community of locally born scientists, who are
dependent upon an external scientific culture, yet not ‘fully
participating me mber(s) of that culture’. li Phase III marks the beginning
of an independent colonial scientific culture.

Though admitting Basalla had made ‘the most important statement of
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the diffusionist model of Western Science’lii, David Arnold rightly points
out what is intentionally or unintentionally left out in Basalla’s simplified
and abstract model. Firstly, echoing the documentary findings of
Kumar, Arnold reminds us that rather than the colonizer’s intention to
bring scientific culture to the colony, it was a commercial drive that
provided some impetus for the original scientific practices of the
colonizers. That is why the first ‘research interests’ of the colonizers from
the East Indian Company are botany, geology and geography. Arnold
also points out that B asalla’s ignorance of the enormous difference of
the background and experience of the different colonies is what
made his model probable. Moreover, Basalla’s model fails to address
the problem of the neutrality of science. If the assumptions of science
are ‘value neutral, objective, empirically demonstrated, somehow
transcending time and thus universally valid’, liii then the spread of
Western science to the rest of the globe is both beneficial and
inevitable. And if this version of science and this spread are both
inevitable and beneficial, then what is the possibility of an
independent colonial scientific culture in phase III of Basalla’s model?
What does that independence mean then, when science ‘culture’ is
paradoxically culturally irrelevant?liv

Apart from viewing the history of science in India in terms of colonial
science, a related perspective, science as modernity, is also often
employed. From this perspective, Indians were superstitious, inferior
and backward. Europeans were subsequently superior and responsible
for civilizing and enlightening the Indians. The authority derived from
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this superiority and responsibility of Western advancement was not only
exercised by the European colonizers, but also by young Indians who
had received Western education. However, by defining the inferiority
and

backwardness

of

Indians

against

the

modernity

and

advancement of the West, Arnold argued, catching up with the West
will only be a myth, as the Indians will always find themselves
inadequate and way behind the ideal West. And this is exactly where
Partha Chartterjee’s warning comes in: how could Indians accept and
assimilate the modernity of the colonising West while at the same time
seeking to contest colonial authority and its assertion of the Indians’
inferiority?lv

Facing this premise of modernity discourse, which was built upon a
binary with one side advanced and superior and the other backward
and inferior, it is tempting for critics to fall also into a binary, equating
Europeans to oppressors and Indians to the oppressed. To Gyan
Prakash, this kind of response just ‘does not unravel the narrative’lvi,
and sacrifices the detailed operation and position of science, the
dominated subjects and knowledge for revealing the ‘colonizing
impulse’ of modernity. Along this line of thought, what Prakesh wants to
seek is the process of negotiation between the ‘colonizing’ science
and the subordinated subjects and knowledge.

This kind of ambivalence is common and yet important for us to
actually understand how the working of science and technology
involves both colonizer and colonized. Deepak Kumar is certainly right
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to point out that the history and material of the discursive conflicts
between conquerors and natives is too dense to permit ‘a genuinely
confused spectacle’, in which natives do share or possess colonial
power.lvii However, pointing out that Indian historians do not easily
permit the claim that ‘natives do share or possess colonial power’ is
different from implying that there is no role for natives to play, or that
the role of the natives is only something to be passively acted upon.
Another implication may also be that the position of relying solely on
the antagonism between colonizer and colonized as such is openly
called into question.

Let us consider two cases, one provided by Prakesh and one by Kumar.
Being coherent with his thesis that Indians were the oppressed, Kumar
recognizes that in the history of colonial India, racial discrimination was
a very serious problem. Although in the late 19th century there were
already laws in India to secure posts in medical and engineering
services for the Indians, the terms regarding paid leave, pensions etc.
were simply different and far worse than those offered to Europeans.
Many distinguished Indian scientists, Kumar recorded, even graduated
from prestigious British universities, and yet, when they came back to
India, the positions and terms offered to them were just unreasonably
bad and unacceptable compared to their European counterparts.lviii

Apart from the discrimination of Indians by Europeans as such, Kumar
also offers cases with greater complexity within India. He documents
cases in which Western-educated Indians criticized the Hindu ethos
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severely. One such person was the founder of the Indian Association
for the Cultivation of Science in 1869, Mahebdra Lal Sarkar. He
criticized the Hindu ethos as ‘a chaotic mass of crude and undigested
and unfounded opinions on all subjects, enunciated and enforced in
the most dogmatic way imaginable.’ lix Another case happened in
1896, when young Indian western-educated elites were upset by some
of their young fellow Indians who imitated the European ideas and
habits ‘blindly’. Those elites wrote an article to defend their traditional
costume and dietary habits from a scientific point of view. They argued
that under the traditional and superstitious appearance, these habits
and ideas are indeed rational and can be accounted for
scientifically.lx

In considering the power relation in the cases mentioned above, if we
follow the line of the European/Indian distinction, complexities and
ambiguity certainly arise when we take into account that hierarchy,
structured according to the possession of scientific knowledge, exists
even within Indian society. So if claiming that ‘Indians do share or
possess colonial power’ is too naïve, the degree of naiveté might be
no less in saying ancient values and faith had been resurrected (only)
through scientific validation.

Recognition of the differentiated roles of different Indians in the
working of science and technology allows for the formation of a
tension, a tension between the assertion of colonizer/colonized
distinction and the sharing and possession of colonial power by Indians.
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This complicated tension is helpful for understanding the term ‘colonial
science’, argued Arnold paradoxically, which is ‘worth retaining and
using … to describe the various technologies in power operating within
and through a science in a colonial setting’, although the term itself
‘may be flawed’. lxi Arnold seems to suggest that the cultural politics
here may not be to search for a stance in which any one side could
possess absolute moral innocence. We have to situate ourselves in an
ambivalent and sometimes contradictory condition to keep the
dynamics of resistance alive, instead of feeling comfortable behind
any fundamental demarcation settling the boundary between who
are the oppressors and who are the oppressed. The resistance against
oppression by science and technology cannot rely solely on the most
oppressed and then morally innocent, at the same time essentializing
the ‘have’ and ‘have not’ regarding colonial power and scientific and
technological knowledge.

Yet, no matter how sophisticated those postcolonial critics are, there is
always a common-sense position against the above criticisms that
blend together science, technology, violence, and politics: pure
science is itself neutral, and the effect of pure science is subject to
application, which is technology. Moreover, the benevolent and
appropriate way to use technology is the way to solve chaotic, dirty
social and political problems. Obviously, this kind of position is
particularly popular not for justifying the colonial history of science and
technology, but for advocating the on-going development of science
and technology.
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Drawing on the post-war experience in India, the time when India had
become independent of British colonial rule after 1947, Ashis Nandy
refuses to accept the discourse that masked the inherent relation
between science, technology and power. He argues the discourse
that attributes the qualities of ‘purity’ and ‘neutrality’ to science and
‘applied’ to technology shifts the responsibility away from pure science.
On the other hand, the same discourse further defers responsibility by
purifying technology and claiming all the violence caused by
technology is just accidental, and is just the result of misuses by wicked
politicians, militarists and multinationals, again shifts all the responsibility
away from the nature and the operational logic of technology .lxii

This view of a stain-free science had become a constitutive part of the
Indian governance, or what Nandy calls ‘the reason of state’. Nandy
explicates the situation in which a legitimate, stain-free and indeed
violent scientific discourse is produced. Firstly, as did their early
European predecessors, science is posed as a cure for both
superstitious, backward, traditional Indians and the chaotic, nasty
political and social problems. The second is a somewhat circular one,
feeding back positively around the legitimacy of science and the
legitimacy of the experts giving scientific judgments about Indian
society and tradition. The third explains a miserable, or painful, as
expressed by Nandy, situation in which ‘highly visible short-term
technological performance in small areas yields nation-wide political
dividends’, lxiii as India did not have adequate resources to reach the
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consumption levels of the developed west.

Piyush Mathur’s convincing analysis of the nuclear test in India in May
1998 illustrates Nandy’s point. Citing the remark of Nandy on this test,
Mathur points out that nuclearism is one of the ‘universals’ of our time
which disallows cultural adaptation and edition.lxiv In other words, its
meaning and the way it is articulated with other forces are ‘the same in
Paris and Pokharan, Lahore and Los Alamos’lxv To Mathur, the nuclear
test is a nexus where the interests of Hindu nationalism, fundamentalism,
and masculinism coincide. The test seeks to stage a show to threaten
neighboring Pakistan. This sudden and dramatic unification of the
nation within the state around the nuclear test, Mathur argues, can be
attributed to the supposedly autonomous and democratic Indian press
who ‘found too little time and too narrow a range of choices in
covering an event that hit it with unprecedented speed and without
prior notice’. lxvi As a result, the press is not able to control their own
agenda, totally subscribes to the state project and becomes its
amplifier in trumpeting violence against both Pakistan and the
ecology.

The case of the plantation of eucalyptus in India, provided by
Vandana Shiva, may also help to illuminate the violent nature of
modern science. In response to desertification and its consequences
such as famine from the 1960s onward, institutions like the World Bank
started to prescribe Eucalyptus for various afforestation schemes, with
the official reason of its fast-growth quality. However, on drought land
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eucalyptus is notorious for its high level of water consumption, which
destroys the natural process through which soil moisture is replenished.
On fertile land, its fast growing property heavily diminishes the soil
nutrients and affects also its replenishment.

lxvii

The species of

eucalyptus is actually chosen, Shiva reveals, only for its demand by the
pulp industry, which can thus maintain a cheap supply of pulp through
the massive plantation of this otherwise useless and even destructive
species.

Modern

industry,

intriguingly

combined

with

modern

science,

maximizes its own gain, Shiva argues, and at the same time maximizes
and disregards the social and ecological costs in the production
process. lxviii Before we consider this example moralistically: if we think of
the ‘inevitability’ of the reasons for choosing eucalyptus, we may
better understand why Nandy and Shiva assert that violence is inherent
in science. Moreover, since there is no evidence that methods,
assumptions, principles, etc. changed fundamentally with the coming
of Independence in India, all these examples effectively and distantly
echo Arnold and Prakesh in regard to the complicated and
ambiguous relationship between science and Indians.

Feminists’ dissidence
Discussing more generally the approaches to account for the history of
the progress and advancement of science and technology, Sandra
Harding provides and analyses a classification including categories of
diffusionist, internalist, externialist, world system theory and postcolonial
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approaches.lxix

According to Harding, the internalist approach to the history of science
and technology refers to a kind of thought in which historical time can
be represented as a ‘tunnel of time’, where everything important, or
whatever at least happened, is accumulated and confined along the
tunnel. For the Europeans, this tunnel stretches ‘from the present back
to the Garden of Eden.’lxx Indeed every other people has their own
tunnel, but according to the most dominant version of the
understanding of the progress of human civilization, or what Harding
calls the Eurocentric account of human civilization, these other tunnels
are almost negligible. The metaphor of the tunnel also indicates that
progresses of civilizations were generated exclusively out of the
essential quality of the people inside the tunnel. And the diffusionist
approach assumes that prior to the beginning of the period of
colonialism, European science and technology had already attained
a level which is sufficient to spread over their acquired colonies and
lead their development.

The externalist approach rejects the internal, essential qualities of the
European minds and culture as the reason for development of modern
science and technology. On the contrary, this approach positively
emphasizes the effects of the social, political and economic factors at
those times. Say for instance, in the account of Boris Hessen, a Soviet
Historian, at the time around Newton’s development of his theory,
there were some unresolved problems ‘in the air’ attracting scientific
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minds to pursue, and Newton’s significance was just ‘precisely the
subsequent importance of the issue he addressed’. lxxi The externalist
approach seeks to understand the history of science and technology
in terms of the absence of human beings, scientific and technological
progresses just so happened to be realized through human beings,
who are nothing more than a nexus through which particular
trajectories intersect.

The third approach analyzed by Harding is called the world system
account; this account overcomes the shortcomings of the previous
approaches by introducing the element of European colonial
expansion

in

explaining

the

European

industrial

development.

Industrialization and the advancement of science and technology
were neither the result of the intrinsic qualities of the European minds
and culture, nor was it the sole result of the social, economic and
political demands of European societies. This approach is not satisfied
with barely identifying the different impetuses other than European
scientific qualities, it seeks to discover the dimension of power
connecting all these impetuses, and how these relationships are
situated in the space and time of European colonialism. The colonial
expansion and the contributions from other cultures indeed have a
due role to be acknowledged. And the successful side of this process is
of course the progress in European science and technology, while the
original influence and contribution from places and cultures other than
Europe and the de-development of the colonial process remain the
unmentioned side.lxxii
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The final approach is the postcolonial approach, w hich for Harding is
at the same time an anti-eurocentric approach. This approach shares
with the externalist and world system approaches that it rejects the
‘purely internal epistemological feature of modern scientific processes’
as the impetus for the pro gress of European science and technology. It
even goes further to argue that other cultures not only influence the
development of European modern science and technology, their roles
are indeed obscured, regardless of the intention, by the conventional
account. The possibilities opened up by this approach not only include
the problematization of the origin of modern European science and
technology, but also the problematization of the geographical
‘Europe’, as we knew it. According to Harding, the standard
eurocentric tunnel of time stretches from the present all the way back
to ancient Greece. However, the political and cultural boundaries of
‘Europe’ have never been the same from Aristotle’s Greece to the Holy
Roman Empire to the Present Europe. This dimension, Harding reminds
us, is particularly at stake as Aristotle’s Greece actually was ‘part of a
Mediterranean world that included the Near East and Northern Africa,
and excluded all peoples lying to the north of Greece’lxxiii

These different approaches of accounting for the progress of modern
European science and technology did not come out of a vacuum, the
same social and philosophical background. Say for instance, in a
condition in which science is conceived as ‘singular— there is one and
only one science— and its components are harmoniously integrated by
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such an internal feature’lxxiv , recognition of the presence of other
cultures and the differences between the cultures are unimportant.
And in fact, to understand different approaches to account for this
history of progress, different kinds of epistemologies may also be even
more important in allowing different accounts to emerge.

This epistemology problem, in a way, interests feminists. If non-feminists’
concern is the problem of what counts as knowledge, and scientific
knowledge in particular, the objectivity of knowledge, and so on and
so forth, feminists ask further questions of whether there is a gender
dimension in the issues above. It is impossible to describe, however
briefly, different schools of feminist epistemology in this context.
However, I will highlight some important questions regarding the zigzag
path by which the theoretical development of different feminist
epistemologies proceeds. The birth of modern science is considered as
roughly coinciding with the period of the Enlightenment, from which
the distinctions of nature vs. culture, public vs. private, rationality vs.
emotion, etc., emerge. Feminists argue that the modern science
enterprise was built upon association with the former qualities of these
binaries, therefore are masculine and hostile to its imaginative
opposites. Responding to such a conception of science, some feminists
reject those binaries by arguing that women can equally possess the
qualities possessed by men. And with the contribution of women,
‘more accurate and less androcentric’ forms of science can be
obtained. Feminists subscribed to this theoretical orientation are
generally called feminist empiricists.
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According to Harding, these feminists most closely resemble the
conventional unitary view of science, in which ‘one true story about
nature’s order’ can be told. She argues, however, that it is impossible to
conceive of any system of knowledge which ‘represent[s] no particular
set of social interests and desires, and thus exist [s] outside of societies’
power relations.’lxxv According to this assumption, she is calling for a
feminist standpoint epistemology in which ‘men’s dominating position
in social life results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas
women’s subjugated position provides the possibility of more complete
and less perverse understanding.’lxxvi Since universal objectiveness is
impossible, therefore the objectiveness of this theory is grounded in
‘the unique resources of the particular social locations.’lxxvii Through
the living situation of women, the scientific knowledge obtained will no
longer be apolitical and static, instead, it is associated with the daily
struggle of women against male supremacy as a constitutive factor,
and it can also mark changing gender relations and global political
economies.

Certainly, this approach resolves as much as it inflicts further theoretical
problems. One kind of critique points to its dangers of essentializing the
situation of women. Social locations and situations of women are not
fixed categories anyway, ‘therefore women’s subjectivity, caring,
holism and harmony, to which they (standpoint epistemology feminists)
appeal, cannot be universal aspects of women’s experience.’lxxviii
Further critique of course includes the danger of ‘epistemology
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inflation’, which is to say, women, no matter how subtle their difference,
will be entitled to their own epistemologies. However, understanding
Harding not from an either-or viewpoint, instead of encouraging an
‘everything goes’ attitude, feminist standpoint epistemology grounds
the possibility of scientific knowledge of difference, and the tension
between the differences.

Another line of critique, explicated by Helen Longino, argues that if
standpoint epistemology seeks to reject traditional empiricism, which
fundamentally assumes unconditioned knowing objects, by inserting
the conception of knowing objects at standpoints, on the one hand,
the problem would be:

if genuine or better knowledge depends on the correct or a
more correct standpoint, so cial theory is needed to ascertain
which of these locations is the epistemologically privileged one.
But in a standpoint epistemology, a standpoint is needed to
justify such a theory. What is that standpoint and how to identify
it?lxxix

On the other hand, Longino discovers that standpoint epistemology,
the traditional empiricism, and even the tradition of rationalism since
Rene Descartes, rely on an individual as knowing object, conditioned
or unconditioned. This assumption is then exactly the origin of the
inadequacy of the standpoint epistemology, even after exposing the
oppressiveness and impossibility of traditional empiricism. As a solution,
she suggests a strategy of ‘multiplying the subjects’ by attributing to a
science community, rather than an individual knowing subject, the
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basic unit of scientific knowledge production.lxxx

I would like to raise two points which I believe are crucial. First, if the
concept of ‘scientific community’ is appropriated to resolve the
problem of the singularity of an individual knowing subject, on one side
of the extremes, then how are we to guard against the temptation of
reverting back to the all-embracing, unconditioned knowing subject
which claims to represent us all? Secondly, the notion of community,
like the notion of science, knowledge and so on, is never given and
fixed. One can unearth the process of the construction of the notion of
science and technology as well as community. This point would easily
lead one to recall the fact that the right to vote, to attend schools for
girls are all very late developments. However, not to count one as a
member of the community does not only mean not allowing one to do
something, the recognition of something already done is also
important to the construction of membership. Say for instance, in the
history of technology, women indeed contributed during the industrial
era: the cotton gin, sewing machine, small electric motor, etc. are all
inventions by women. Yet, all of them are not recognized and written
into history; instead, the patent records of all these inventions are
registered with the names of their husbands, or the one who provided
the capital.lxxxi Even if the concept of community is not a project
intended to incorporate every one of us, what and who are ‘us’ is still
utterly relevant.
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Technologies of power, power of technologies
From all these historical-philosophical reflections upon science and
technology, the idea that science and technology is heavily
power-invested is manifest. This situation of our modern science and
technology is perhaps best illustrated with Foucault’s idea of the
panopticon. The panopticon works by generating self-discipline on the
part of the prisoners, who know well enough that in the darkened
chamber at the top of the central tower it is always possible to have a
watchman up there observing them. Whether the prisoners really
discipline

their

bodies

and

their

minds,

whether

they

do

it

unconsciously or pretentiously, is another important empirical problem,
however, the whole organization of the penitentiary space is intended
to make sure the prisoners know that they are being watched
constantly and that they have to behave accordingly.

With the panopticon, we can further understand the subtle relation
between power, science and technology, not only in terms of the
oppressor/oppressed distinction, no matter who the oppressors and the
oppressed are. Yet, this conception may seem suspicious enough to
resurrect the charge of neutrality regarding the nature of science and
technology: the panopticon seems to suggest a kind of political
neutrality whether the guard in the monitoring chamber is, say,
politically to the left or right. However, it is exactly this apparent
neutrality that leads Foucault to investigate the conditions and
processes by which these technologies of power work, instead of just
seeking to identify who is the ultimate agent.lxxxii And in the case of
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modern science and technology, then, that means to investigate the
conditions and ways that technologies, and the ‘technologies of
science and technologies’ as well, generate power, instead of only
who are the abused and the abusers.

Historians of science and technology also address the problem of the
extent to which technologies and techniques of various kinds effect
social change, and these changes in turn feed back into the
technologies

and

techniques:

the

thesis

of

technological

determinism. lxxxiii Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith offer a pair of
analytical tools for this thesis: hard determinism and soft determinism.
For hard determinism, ‘the power to effect change is imputed to
technology itself… thus the advance of technology leads to a situation
of inescapable necessity.’ Soft determinism, ‘instead of treating
“technology” per se as the locus of historical agency, locates
technology in a far more various and complex …

matrix.’ Manuel

Castells, however, further argues that the point is not to choose
whether ‘the momentum to effect necessary social changes lies in
technology’ or ‘different socio-politico -economico- historical factors
are

the

reason

for

scientific

and

technological

innovations’.

Comparing the history of technological and scientific advance in
Japan and China, Castells shows that the two positions in the debate
of technological determinism are both non-answers.lxxxiv

Historians have already pointed out that China before the 14th century
indeed was ahead of the world in terms of scientific and technological
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advancement. Examples include iron-casting blast furnaces, water
clocks, weaving equipment, gun powder, paper and printing
techniques, and so on and so forth. According to one historian, ‘China
came within a hair’s breadth of industrializing in the fourteenth
century.’lxxxv However, between the 14 th and 19 century, the progress
in this regard came almost to a complete stop. Quoting historian Joel
Mokyr, Castells maintains that the intervention of the state is the origin
of the sudden stagnation. Yet, state intervention does not essentially
bring negative effects to science and technological progress. This can
be illustrated in the case of Japan, where the state built the academy,
imported technique and personnel, assisted in founding firms, etc. To
Castells, therefore, understanding the relations between different
parties and changes is more important than arguing for either side of
the determin ism debate.

Nevertheless, before going so far as to say that there is no position
reasonable enough or that all the answers are non-answers in the
debate of technological determinism, it is helpful to first reconsider
some basic categories by which we think about this issue. Very often,
one of which is the notion of ‘growth’. Arnold Pacey argues that
‘growth’ is largely what a chart or graph represents, what is included
and excluded in these charts and graphs restricts and constructs our
notion of growth. As a result it is important to be aware that the
representations of ‘growth’ tend to be ‘over-selective, and lead us to
overlook the fact that improvements in one dimension are sometimes
accompanied by less desirable developments elsewhere.’lxxxvi
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If technolo gical determinism gains its convincing force solely from the
supposed connection between scientific and technological progress
on the one hand, and the general growth in productivity of all kinds on
the other, then it might be worthwhile to juxtapose the above
connection and Pacey’s insight. In the process of progress of science
and technology, we have always focused only on what positive
changes it brings to our daily life and society, and ignored the other -all too many -- operations occurring simultaneously, for instance,
changes in the organization of labour, which can be quite devastating.
Harry Braverman, in his classic work Labour and Monopoly of Capital
(1974), already analysed the changes that management and
organization of labour in terms of time and body motion bring to the
process of production.lxxxvii

As a result, we have to rethink whether the scientization and
mechanization of the production site is the trigger of social progress.
Also, it would be a mistake to ignore the simultaneous negative effects,
like de-skilling, and even massive laying off of manufacturing
workerslxxxviii brought about by the mechanization and the change of
organization of labour. After all, it is precisely the ignorance or even the
intentional oblivion of those processes that makes the connections
between progress in technology and science and positive growth of
various kinds hegemonic.

Susan J. Douglas’s study of the early development of American radio
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broadcasting by amateur operators also argues for the complexity of
relations of determination. Her study shows that amateur radio
operation was already very well developed in the early 20 th century,
and even played a crucial role in various accidents by relaying
asking-for-rescue messages, all at a time when corporations still did not
quite see the profit potential of it and were not interested in it. However,
due to the managerial discourse of government, amateur operations
were portrayed as evil. As a result, the once autonomous and
energetic development of these amateur operations became
stagnant through bureaucratic administrative intervention. Finally, they
were even almost replaced by the monopoly of corporate radio
broadcasting.lxxxix

Robin Mansell and Roger Silverstone take another routeto frame the
question of information te chnology as the question of interaction
between information technology and the users in the process of
innovation.xc They borrow the sociological concepts of structure and
agency to explain the dynamics in the technical and institutional
innovation process, to look at the interface between structure and
agency where ‘meanings are produced and values created and
enforced and so too are the material artifacts’.

xci

They cite Paul

Quintas’s study of software as an example. The politics of software
innovation is between the tendency of the software producers to
standardize and normalize the production process on the one hand,
and the increasing demand of the users to participate in determining
the operating language of organizations, institutions as well as the
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machine’ on another.xcii This approach is obviously strong in revealing
the actual constructive tension between end users and producers, and
in particular the role of users in negotiating for their own needs.
However, methodologically speaking, in focusing on the role of users,
this approach risks overlooking the various factors crossing over and
constituting the preferences of the users, and treating users as intact,
closed and given entities emitting unexplainable decisions.

Arguing that no position in the debate of technological determinism is
viable leads only to the conclusion that there is no point in insisting on
deciding whether technology determines society or vice versa. It
nevertheless does not imply that technology is effect-neutral or
effect-free. David Morley’s study on broadcasting and the construction
of the national family shows that through public broadcasting such as
national weather forecasts and the royal Christmas broadcast in the UK,
a synchronized experience is generated among the audience. By the
way the imagined audience is addressed, a sense of unity is created, a
unity of different people in the forms of family and nation. However,
Morley also argues that such a broadcasting-created unity, or a public
sphere, if it is the only single one, is a public space full of discriminations
and prejudices towards, say for instance, women and non-white
persons.

xciii

Women and non-white people nevertheless enjoy

watching or being watched (i.e. being in the show) in programmes or
even TV stations catering to them specifically, even though these
programmes are stereotypically perceived as irrational and chaotic.
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Though Morley’s project is to investigate the concept of ‘home’, to see
how the identity of people is affected by the changing meanings of
home, nation, public, private, as effected by information technology,
his general description of methodology is still relevant for the study of
science and technology. He takes TV and radio broadcasting as a
‘conceptual space through which a number of trajectories pass’, in
other words, the method is to identify and articulate the different
discourses passing through that conceptual space extended by TV
and radio broadcasting.xciv

For the methodological requirements suggested by Morley, Kristin
Ross’s excellent cultural history of the period between the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the decade prior to the full- fledged modernization of
the French -- the decade ‘after electricity but before electronics’ -- is a
more illustrative example. She seeks to explain the eme rgence of the
particular mode of French modernization: Americanized and implicitly
racial. She argues that this mode of modernization is possible due to
the cross-weaving of various discourses: the industrialization (hence the
rise of the middle-class), decolonization of Algeria (hence excluding
Algerians from the French national memory and experience), the
internal spatial rearrangement of the city of Paris (resulting in the
automobile-transported

middle-class

living

in

the

inner

area

‘surrounded by islands of immigrant communities a long RER ride
away’), the intellectual movement of structuralism and the Annales
school of historiography are all central around and catalyzed by the
important physical artifacts and imaginary of the then-advanced
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technology of automobile and domestic appliances such as the
refrigerator and washing machine, or chemical laundry detergents.xcv

One of Ross’s main arguments is the ambiguous relationship between
the French, especially the emerging middle-class, jeune cadre, and
the Algerians, especially the revolutionary cadre. While Frantz Fanon
was calling for the birth of ‘new man’ as the de -colonial revolutionary
subject in the late 50s and early 60s, the intellectual movement of
structuralism and the Annales school of historiography were trying to
proclaim ‘the death of man’ and trivialized ‘event’ for the ‘longue
duree’. Ross argues that it was precisely this intellectual atmosphere in
France that rendered the French intellectuals role-less in the process of
Algerian decolonization. Ross, however, discovers the conceptual and
historical similarities between the collusion of both the ideas of ‘new
man’ and ‘death of man’. She insightfully points out the technocratic
nature inherent in both the Algerian revolutionary cadre and the
French jeune cadre. Both are more or less middle persons responsible
for organization and management -- of the proletariats on the part of
jeune cadre, and the Algerian national on the part of revolutionary
cadre. Their jobs require high, machine-like discipline and order. While
the jeune cadre are usually working in Fordist factories, securing their
positions

by

accumulating

technically

advanced

skilled,

the

revolutionary cadre also equip themselves with all the technicalities for
organizing and mediating the bureaucratically structured revolutionary
body.
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On the other hand, a sense of complex emphasis of hygiene and
cleanliness is also noticed by Ross. We have seen in the experience of
India and elsewhere that the elements of hygiene and cleanliness both
physically and metaphysically are important in the project of scientific
and technological modernization. Ross sees no exception in her study.
Jeune cadre require a modern, hygienic, easily manipulable interior in
their homes, made possible and mediated by the domestic electrical
appliances of washing machine and refrigerator, isolating them from
the outside world. As for the revolutionary cadre , their concern is more
mental and behavioral. To Ross, therefore, the jeune cadre ‘is both the
agent and the product of capitalist modernization just as Fanon’s ‘new
man’ is both the agent and the product of decolonization’. xcvi As a
result, it is in the colluded embrace of the principle of technicality by
both the French jeune cadre and the Algerian revolutionary cadre that
French modernization is clearly demonstrated as a nexus through
which different discourses pass through. Simultaneously, this same
collusion

paradoxically

renders

the

French

and

Algerian

the

constituted factors of their own mutual exclusion in the modernized,
homogeneous and hygienic French national identity and memory.

Political economy of science and technology
Home, the common focus of Morley’s and Ross’s studies, is also, but a
bit differently, studied in relation to information technology from the
more empirically oriented perspective of political economy, in the
framework of the locale or city.
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Manuel Castells argues that aided by information technology, the
‘space of flow’ is emerging to replace the space of places. In his own
words, th is trend is ‘the deployment of the functional logic of power
holding organizations in asymmetric networks of exchanges which do
not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the
fulfillment of their fundamental goals. xcvii Once the large corporations
are able to escape from being confined to any particular place, once
they are able to take advantage of the information technology in
organizing their business around the globe, they also escape from
social, economic and political controls that are particular to any
particular place. Consequently, these place-based societies will have
to succumb to the requirements of the corporations if they are to
compete and survive. As one critic puts it, ‘for business, networked
information circuits free business clusters to choose the location of their
operational headquarters for command and control. Firms can now
circumvent government disincentives whether embodied as taxes,
rules, interest payments or capital restrictions.’xcviii

According to Castells’s observation, resistance of communities to such
forms of transformation usually takes the form of isolating and
fundamentalizing themselves, in order to affirm their local identities.
However, Castells argues that this strategy risks cutting them off from
communities that are also facing the same situation, thus rendering
themselves powerless. Consequently, ‘between a historical flow and
irreducible identities of local communities, cities and regions disappear
as socially meaningful places.’xcix In order to revert this situation,
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Castells calls for a ‘network of flows’ constituted by different
place-based communities, to share their information, to come up with
more specific bargaining agenda, to respond to the demands of
corporations’ more flexibly.

Saskia Sassen has similar observations of the current global situation
caused by the advanced information technology. She also points out
that a network linking major centers, or nodes, as she sometimes calls
them, is enabled by information technology.c These centers are more
than the sum of the headquarters of the big corporations, these
centers are also where firms such as those specializing in legal,
accounting, financial, and advertising services are concentrated. For
her, these centers, though articulated through cyberroutes or digital
highways, and scattered throughout the world, are basically detached
from the region where they are located. As a result, places outside this
net of centers and digital highways ‘are peripheralized.’ci She also sees
the paradoxon of the current global situation, a paradoxon that she
cannot account for satisfactorily.

cii

If globalization fuelled by

information technology is about expansion and dispersion beyond
what had been the confined realm of national economies and floor
trading, ‘why [do] financial centers matter at all’ciii?

This paradoxon, involving at least the entangled rhetoric and theories
of both globalization and information technology, is very important but
out of scope here. What might be of interest here is the difference
between Sassen and Castells, who have similar observations, but
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different attitudes and prescriptions. While Sassen keeps being critical
of the inequality generated by the phenomenon of global cities,
Castells sees the possibility of a win-win situation. Basically , he thinks
that what local communities, including both the local governments
and the people, should do is to equip themselves to face the dramatic
and abrupt changes brought about by advanced capitalism as a
result of the development of information technology.

John Downey argues, however, in the context of the EU, this possibility
in which everyone has the capability and easy accessibility to the
Internet provided publicly is fundamentally contradictory to the
attitude of the EU on information technology , which puts a heavy
emphasis on deregulation and privatization. The greater use of
information technology is likely to bring more benefits, he argues, but
this assumption, does not guarantee that the benefit will be distributed
equally.civ Some often-cited examples are worth mentioning again
here. Until 1999, 29 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) countries had less than 20% of the world’s
population but transmitted more than 80% of the world’s telephone
traffic (9 of them with three -quarters of all telephones) with 90% of the
world’s mobile telephone users and 95% of all computers. Almost 85%
of the world’s people have no telephones, and well over half have
never made a telephone call.cv

Inequality resulting from the uneven developme nt of information
technology certainly requires our attention, yet, the supposedly
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positive side of the information technology should not be accepted
uncritically. A team of researchers consisting of Doreen Massey, Paul
Quintas and David Wield look into the working of science parks in the
UK, examining the hierarchical social structure, the assumed model of
innovation, and the spatial arrangement unfolded in the various
science parks. They point out that the whole conception of science
parks in the industry is founded upon a linear model in which the
processes of innovation and production are strictly separated, and
upon a scientific elitism (in contrast to the actual production process)
which believes that technocrats know best. However, they argue that
this conception is neither realistic nor plausible.cvi

And indeed, even evaluating according to the official objectives,
science parks in the UK right from the establishment of the first one in
1972 until the early 1990s, they powerfully demonstrated that science
parks are far from being successful. One major objective of the
Science Park is the facilitation of R&D and technology transfer.
However, in an atmosphere of university budget cuts, the opportunities
for university staff to start up firms in the science park have been
transformed into a tactic the university adopts to live with a decreasing
budget. In extreme cases, universities redeployed staff to set up
part-time businesses, some are even set up by the universities to
‘continue the contracts which th e university department formerly
undertook!’cvii This kind of firms, nevertheless, is already part of a
start-up minority in the park --the majority of them are relocated units,
subsidiaries or branches. Contrary to this situation, promoting new
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start-ups is one of the major objectives of the parks. With the support of
the development of advanced technology by the government,
Science Parks become an outlet for the university to actualize their
academic entrepreneurship.

Conclusion
In conclusion, before we go into the particular analysis of the
governance and the discourse of both the government and business
sector on technology, we can see that the terrain extended by the
notion of science and technology is indeed quite large. Every theory or
analysis can be enormously interesting and inspiring, yet they can only
articulate a limited amount of elements in the terrain or discursive field.
What may be a more important implication from the above, precisely
because every theory or analysis can only dominate the relation and
assigning of meaning in the discursive field partially: one might argue
that the meaning and the terrain of the notion of science and
technology are still yet to be completely settled, and maybe ultimately
uncompletable, or -- from another perspective – at least none of them
can claim an almighty prominence.
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HK as a blackbox of ‘rational progress’?

Wolfgang Becker’s recent movie Goodbye, Lenin! is a film about the
efforts of Alex, the son of a mother who totally devotes herself to
socialism, to pretend in front of his mother that the socialist regime in
East Germany is perfectly normal and intact. He has to protect his
mother from emotional shocks, however slight, after she wakes up from
a ten-month coma, during which the fall of the Berlin wall, the
unification of East and West Germany and, most relevant to his mother,
the influx of the capitalist way of life into her socialist home country are
witnessed. Although this project, or lie, as some may say, does not last
forever, the film does not end with a passive adaptation to, or
acceptance of, the capitalist ‘reality’ per se .

It is seemingly tempting to read Goodbye, Lenin! in terms of a cold war
mindset, one that lures us to reach the conclusion that the film is either
anti-capitalist or anti -communist. For instance, the effort of Alex for his
mother is simply futile, and the socialist ‘reality’ created will certainly be
ruthlessly crushed by capitalist reality that is more ‘natural’ or
‘inevitable’. Yet, instead of being chained by this blackmail of choices,
which is antagonistic and mutually exclusive by design or even by
definition, it is more fruitful to read the story in terms of, say, the
meaning of faith and aspiration, their coming to terms with what is
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supposedly mutually exclusive, how this coming to terms after the
original meanings of the so -called communism and capitalism works,
the situation of people in these circumstances, and all the above in
respect to the imagination and ontological status of the state. Or from
another perspective, it can be analyzed how those abstract
categories are themselves transformed as a result of this particular story,
in that particular articulation of elements.

Owing to, and despite, all the efforts of Alex, East Germany persists only
as long as Alex keeps putting up various symbols and artifacts of the
socialist regime of East Germany. And it is precisely by putting up all
these that the socialism of Alex’s mother can remain intact. When the
ex-astronaut (who was Alex’s hero when he was still a child) dresses up
as the leader of East Germany, and proclaims the rather sympathetic
acceptance of West Germany as a result of the decision of unification,
the ‘leader’ insists on asking people to be brotherly, loving and
supportive of each other. Whether this is the case for Germans is not
our concern here, yet in any case, if this were the case, the resulting
unified Germany can no longer be comprehended by the aggressive,
and conceptual, dichotomy of capitalism and communism, and
hence an ultimate ‘defeat’ of communism by its capitalist counterpart.
After all, the request of the ‘leader’-- brotherhood, love and
support— should be ready to form some very heterogeneous and
contradictory constituents of the liberal, free market capitalism that is
supposedly based upon atomic and selfish individual subjects.
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That the nature of state is performative, and even theatrical, that is to
say, that the state exists nowhere else but in what the state does is
precisely captured by what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz termed
the ‘theatre state’. An understanding of this dimension of politics is
certainly helpful for us to reconceptualize the meaning of politics and
state. For Geertz, all the political performances, the demonstrations,
‘the pageants were not the

mere

aesthetic

embellishments,

celebrations of a domination independently existing: they were the
thing itself.’cviii According to his ethnographical studies and historical
record, Geertz observes, in other words, that the relationship between
the state, large-scale public performances of the state, and the kings is
not one of instrumentality. There is no independent state whose power
and status can be enhanced ‘externally’ by large-scale performance.
Public

performance

is

no

mere

performance,

for

it

implies

fundamentally an ability to stage such a thing; it is the ability to
‘express a view of the ultimate nature of reality and, at the same time,
to shape the existing conditions of life to be consonant with the
reality.’cix In Goodbye, Lenin!, Alexander is of course not comparable
to the king of Bali, yet the basic structure is similar, and it is even
precisely the extent to which one can mobilize reality and at the same
time lay down the standard and rules of reality that determines the
status and the magnitude of power.

In this sense, the conception of state and politics no longer relies on the
assumption of a political essence or core, which is usually assumed as
being signified by certain arbitrary political operations, events or
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symbols. And the mission of political analysis is then no longer an
exercise of decipherment. In other words, it is tempting to conclude
that the meaning of state and power, and their terrain as well, is
retroactively defined by which public performances are held, and it is
hardly likely to have any transcendental and necessary characteristic
of state and power. As a result, instead of simply sticking only to such
notions as coercive or fictitious, which may sometimes be too crass,
Geertz’s conception is insightful for the recovering of the etymological
themes originally condensed in the word ‘state’.

cx

The conceptual

tools from the theory of performative utterance can furthermore break
down and expose the significance of the different parts within political
actions and processes.

For any utterance to be performative, the utterance should not merely
be ‘a description of some action, inner or outer, prior or posterior,
occurring elsewhere than in the utterance itself.’ cxi Yet, as Timothy
Gould reminds us, the illocutionary force of a performative utterance
does not depend on whether there is a true correspondence of the
utterance to the outside world. However, it also does not mean that
the effect of the utterance, or the ‘perlocutionary force’, is irrelevant or
can be ignored by the theo ry of performative utterance. cxii And
indeed, it is Gould’s insight that the perlocutionary effect that
subsequently happens is not necessarily what a certain illocutionary
utterance desires. Nonetheless, this situation does not prevent the
utterance from being performative. To cite one example offered by
Gould: I have successfully advised you – but I have not succeeded in
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influencing you. cxiii This discrepancy is referred to by Gould as
‘illocutionary suspense’ or ‘perlocutionary delay’, and he emphasizes
that it has to be recognized.

This recognition is significant in the following sense: If a performative
utterance is defined as non-descriptive, and hence not subjected to
verification on the one hand, and not grounded in any ‘extralinguistic’
realitycxiv in any way on the other, then this over-retreated version of
performative utterance will ultimately confine itself within a little
isolated domain, debilitating itself rather severely. However, with the
recognition of the delay or suspense, performative utterance can still
be possible and confirmed even if incoherence exists between the
illocutionary intention and the perlocutionary effect.

Judith Butler’s analysis takes a step back. By calling the subject of the
utterance into question, she situates the subject back in a genealogy
of the subject of the utterance. She observes that in regard to the
illocutionary part, an uttering subject has to be assumed. This subject is
only interpellated when a certain action, and hence accountability,
has to be attributed to someone as its initiator, its origin. cxv However, it
is this very consideration of the subject that brings forth a paradoxon.
Butler points out, citing Derrida, that no performative utterance could
have succeeded if the utterance pronounced ‘in order to open a
meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable in some
way as a conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then
identifiable in some way as a “citation”’(original emphasis).cxvi In other
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words, without echoing prior actions and accumulating ‘the force of
authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative
set of practices’, cxvii the transitivity of illocutionary intention could not
possibly be effective. Butler even argues that without this historical
establishment of a model of iterability, the ‘singularity and discreteness’
of any action and utterance could not be effectively defined.
However, the paradoxon is that, should the accumulation history not
be dissimulated, no accountability and responsibility could be
established with the subject, who is exactly and only intelligible as long
as accountability and responsibility are attributed to him/her. To sum
up, the performative works only by forbidding its own constitutive
convention and model by which it is essentially made possible and
effective.

Butler’s argument is certainly inspiring in that it urges one to situate
different performatives back to their proper context, whereas the same
performative will subsequently becomes the constituting convention
for other performatives to come. And at the same time, it is then
possible for one to map out the location, level and relationship of and
between various performatives that constitute our situation. It is this
double characteristic of the performative that bring us back to Geertz.
In his study of Bali, Geertz points out that power in Bali is manifest
through the ability to physically occupy and perform the standard, the
convention in public ceremonies, which in turn invests power to the
one occupying the position. In the rituals, ‘it was in the ability to stage
productions of an eleven-roof scale, to mobilize the men, the resources,
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and not least, the expertise, that made one an eleven-roof lord.’cxviii It
might seem strange that power is exercised and manifested through
this very ‘sitting’ on the eleven-roof: a common person like me sitting
on a common seat like the one I am now sitting on does not have any
power effect. With the conception of the genealogy of the constitutive
conventions supplemented by Butler, the performative not only
becomes intelligible, new areas of research are also opened up. Say
for instance, in the case of hate speech analyzed by Butler, legal
precedents form the ground and resources by which the court judges
certain acts to constitute hate speech. A genealogy of these
precedents will reveal the basis and meaning of what Butler calls the
‘transitivity’cxix of words into injurious illocutionary force.

Introducing this theatrical and performative dimension of state and
politics is expected to elicit objections, especially when the theoretical
elaboration of this dimension is originated from the context of Bali in the
nineteen century: the problem of validity. The modern state is
conventionally characterized by its legal-bureaucratic nature, which
includes

qualities

such

as

effectiveness,

efficiency,

hierarchy,

impersonality, system, and so on. All these qualities seem to be in an
extreme

opposition

to

the

large-scale

rituals

and

religious

performance/ceremonies-orientated conception of state and politics.
Especially when aspiration, religious faith, and struggle are the main
protagonists of the latter.

According to the official version, especially before the financial crisis in
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1997, Hong Kong is well-known for possessing three major strengths that
make Hong Kong out-perform other places. Fundamentally, Hong
Kong has a solid foundation in the ‘rule of law’; we have a solid
foundation in its finance; as well as in its civil service. According to a
speech delivered by the Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, at the
sixth Annual World Economic Development Congress, the civil servants
are ‘very valuable assets’ to Hong Kong because of their locally and
internationally renowned ‘efficiency and productivity’.

cxx

Mr. Tung

even revealed in his first policy address that, after working with the civil
servants for three months, he was ‘struck by their professionalism and
continuous quest for improvement’. cxxi After the outbreak of the Asian
financial crisis, during which Hong Kong was severely tested, the
philosophy, or at least the rhetoric of the philosophy to respond to the
crisis, can be seen in the titles of the government budget. The English
names for the budget in 98-99 and 99-00 are ‘Renewing Hong Kong
Strength’ and ‘Onward with new strength’ respectively. The Chinese
titles, however may be even more explicit, the direct translations are
‘ease

the

people,

self-strengthening’

cxxii

lessen
(98-99)

the

and

difficulties,

‘strengthen

the

and

keep

foundation,

economize expenditure, and invent new strengths together’cxxiii (99-00).
Both titles function as an expression of hope to achieve what the titles
mention. We can see that even if the government before the crisis
mistakenly over-praised the foundations of the ‘success’ of Hong Kong,
it did want to show that the government officials had learned a lesson.
They want to show people that they would, as a result, be pragmatic,
and would focus on something more fundamental, more practical
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regarding its governance of the Hong Kong economy. Therefore no
more illusion, no more myth, no more bubble. In a famous statement
made by the ex-financial secretary Donald Tsang in the radio
programme ‘Letter to Hong Kong’ before delivering the budget 98-99,
this ‘be practical and no bubble attitude’ is presented no more clearly.
He said, ‘frankly speaking, it is possible to disregard the long term
interest of Hong Kong to give Hong Kong people some short term
excitement, however, I think, exchanging the tax revenue for a
moment of applause is an irresponsible, and even dangerous action of
the government.’cxxiv

As a result, for such a practical and even pragmatic government, at
least willed by the rhetoric, the theatrical and performative dimension
of politics as a valid approach of analysis must be seen as irrelevant, or
indeed as something to be avoided and even criticized and
combated. Yet, in the rest of this chapter, I am going to argue that
instead of accepting this convenient but misleading dichotomy laid
down by the government, and merely reverting the emphasis from one
extreme to another, what we can see is rather the intermingling of
these two dimensions, and the government’s non-recognition of the
very theatrical and performative dimension. One can indeed
hypothesize that the very need to combat and criticize is grounded
precisely in the need to obliterate the often less eye -catching
dimension and function, while it indeed occupies a no less important
proportion of what the government is exactly doing, hence diverting
the sight of the people from any other perspective according to which
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the governance can be judged and other things can be done. In
other words, not only in the emphasis on the practical and pragmatic
face of the government is power at work, an even more important
trace of power may be found where the emphasis is at the expense of
making invisible other dimensions. Power, echoing Foucault’s famous
analysis in his essay ‘The subject and power’, is ‘an action upon an
action, on existing action’ or more importantly, ‘on those which may
arise in the present or the future’, power functionally is th e guidance of
the ‘possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible
outcome’. cxxv

Foucault’s essay explicates how power and the project of modern
states deal mainly with the construction of the subject, which is not our
concern here. However, his analysis supplements the ideas outlined
above in that the supposedly binary opposition between the
practical/pragmatic vs. theatrical/performative is off the mark.
Whereas the construction of the subject is the purpose, it really then
does not matter whether the government is pragmatic or performative,
nor does the controversy of whether they indeed epistemologically
and ontologically exclude each other. Instead of insisting on either side
of the opposition, we have to look into the power relation embedded
in various social nexuses, through different kinds of grass-root level
institutions such as hospitals, markets, schools, and even ceremonies,
although policies about them may seem to be made ‘up there’ by the
government officials ‘at’ the moment they decide. As a result, the
question opened up then will be to locate the theatrical and
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performative moments in modern politics, at work in various institutions
embedded in the whole social nexus.

Before really going into the analysis of the Governance of Hong Kong,
a clarification needs to be made. To investigate the theatrical and
performative dimension of governance should not be mistaken for a
complete denial of the relevant institutions, policies or actions. For
instance, if a mother wants to deter her daughter from her frequent
night-life, she might say to her daughter: you know what, the number
of girls assaulted at night every single year is surprisingly blah blah
blah… We can take this statement as persuasion or even a threat, yet
in any case whether the figure here is right or wrong is not relevant. In
this context, what is worth investigating is instead how this threat or
persuasion is articulated and on what grounds the articulation transits
into an effect that might occur on the part of the daughter.

Bird flu
Hong Kong’s becoming the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) under the People’s Republic of China from a British colony was
a difficult transition for both the government and the people. During
the second half of 1997, a time when it was still a newborn baby, Asia
experienced a tremendous financial crisis, and Hong Kong inevitably
was one of the targets in jeopardy. This is not the place to elaborate
the political economy involved, but put briefly, in October 1997, Hong
Kong dollars were ‘short-sold’ by some speculators and international
hedge -funds, causing intense economic strain on the SAR Government
63

to maintain the pegged exchange rate between Hong Kong and the
U.S. dollar. As a result, interest rates between banks experienced a
huge thrust, and consequently credits became very difficult to obtain,
prices of the stock and property markets declined steeply.

Whereas the SAR Government takes seriously the degree of economic
prosperity as an important constituent of its legitimacy, the financial
crisis that struck Hong Kong turned out to erode a considerable portion
of the prestige and legitimacy of the SAR Government. Almost
simultaneously, the bird flu crisis broke out in the area of public hygiene
by the end of November 1997. The bird flu, technically known as H5N1,
was by that time unrecognizable even for the international scientific
and medical community. Within a month, 13 people were infected (a
total of 18 people were infected in the outbreak), and 6 people were
killed by the virus in less than 2 months. cxxvi Exactly a month after the
outbreak of the virus, on the same day, the government decided to
slaughter all the chickens and poultry in the wholesale markets and
retail outlets, as a result of the sudden death of chickens in a local
poultry wholesale market and the discovery of the H5 virus in a sample
taken in a local chicken farm.

This decision launched a lasting series of spectacles which arguably
have become part of the shared memory of Hong Kong people -- 1.5
millions chickenscxxvii and other poultry, weighing about 1300 tons,cxxviii
altogether were slaughtered in just about 3 day’s time. The slaughter of
this huge number of chickens and other poultry in almost 200 spots
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around Hong Kong, including wholesale markets, chicken and poultry
farms, was, however, not the most important part of the spectacle; the
most spectacular part was seen in the process of handling the
aftermath

of

the

slaughter.

In

a

way

represented

by

the

sensation-oriented practice of the local media, the city became the
great tomb of the slaughtered animals. Hong Kong people were
confronted with images of piles and piles of animal bodies at the
locations of slaughter; the heads and feet not wrapped well and
scattered around in the three designated dumping areas. Headings
such as ‘Uncollected sacks of rotting carcasses, picked apart by rats
and wild dogs, littered village roads’ and ‘Renegade chickens were still
roaming around rural farms’ cxxix

appeared in newspapers at

newsstands and were read all over Hong Kong.

One day before the government decision on the slaughter, the
government freshly reported on a study jointly done by the Hong Kong
Department of Health, the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and Prevention in Atlanta, USA. The study shows that the
anti-body to the virus is found in poultry workers and those who have
direct exposure to the virus, while no such anti-body is found in the
control of the experiment. Meanwhile the government tried to keep
Hong Kong people’s confidence with the message that ‘the main
mode of transmission of this virus is considered at this stage to be from
bird-to-man. The transmission from man-to-man, if occurring, is
considered inefficient.’cxxx If man-to-man indeed does not seem to be
the source of infection, the slaughtering of chickens and poultry in
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Hong Kong should be considered as a way to actively block the more
likely source of infection: bird-to-man. However, this deduction works
only if we, and the government, (intentionally or not) ignore the fact
that chickens are delivered daily from chicken farms in South China,
and the supply from these farms constitutes 80% of the daily
consumption of chickens in Hong Kong;cxxxi otherwise, the government
would not take their decision of slaughter as ‘an attempt to rid the
source of influenza A H5N1 virus’. cxxxii

To take this seeming mismatch of problem and solution as a mere
mistake, a wrong decision, would, however, probably undermine a
chance to investigate the working or the governance of the SAR
Government. As put amusingly enough by a critic , apart from the bird
flu, the ‘malaise’ of Hong Kong certainly includes ‘a weakened stock
market and a slowing economy’; therefore it takes ‘more than a health
department order to give Hong Kong a clean bill of health’. cxxxiii This
comment juxtaposed the images of hygienic crisis and the economic
situation in the context of Hong Kong, which is what occupies the
government’s mind and what the government keeps constructing.
Nevertheless, the comment separates the tasks of the different
departments of the government a bit too neatly, as we have always
imagined it to be. As shown above, destroying the poultry might have
been off the mark, effectively putting to the back stage some
arguably more relevant responses and measures, such as securing a
virus-free supply of chickens from China in the future, although at the
same time, the slaughter paradoxically does more than just halt the
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spread of bird flu.

SARS
Another case similar to the outbreak of bird flu is the well-known case
of the global out break of the Severe and Acute Respiratory syndrome
(SARS), which brought about a much larger scale of loss of both
human and economic resources than the bird flu. With the source of
the virus brought by a medical doctor from mainland China by the end
of February 2003, SARS broke out in Hong Kong in early March.cxxxiv The
virus spread tremendously quickly during the subsequent four months in
Hong Kong, and culminated at the end of March, with a record of 80
infected cases admitted to the hospital in one single day. Altogether,
1755 people got infected and 299 died.cxxxv During the SARS outbreak,
directly or indirectly affected by the virus, the unemployment rate rose
to a historical high of 8.6%, amounting to 300,000 of the Hong Kong
population; the World Health Organization, for the first time ever,
warned travelers to avoid traveling to Hong Kong and other high risk
areascxxxvi; the Secretary for Education and Manpower, Arthur Li, was
almost ‘forced’ to announce class suspension officially, as a result of
the tremendous public pressure and the land-sliding voluntary class
suspension of primary and secondary schools. cxxxvii The government
even issued a 10-day ‘isolation order’ to the residents in Block E of
Amoy Garden, where more than 100 residents had already been
infected by that time; and evacuated the building 2 days later,
quarantining the residents in a recreation center in Sai-kung. In
addition, the severe criticisms of government officials, especially the
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senior

health

department,

regarding

delayed

and

ill-informed

treatment on the brink of the community -wide spreading of the virus;
and the enormous recognition given to the frontline medical workers,
janitors, etc., all combined with the conditions described above to
yield the unprecedented size and scope of different types of
interactions and tensions, highly condensed in this historical four-month
period in Hong Kong.

Mechanical explanation of cause and effect, problem and response in
this incident, in the sense that goals were first laid down and the
policies and measures implemented to fulfill the goals, probably would
not take us too far to comprehend the situation in Hong Kong, and the
working of the government. When the government considered that
they began to contain SARS, Tung subsequently summoned senior
officials on a ‘cross-bureau, inter-departmental’cxxxviii basis, to form two
task forces. The one which deals with public hygiene was led by the
Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang; the other, aiming to revitalize the
economy, was led by the Financial Secretary, Henry Tang. The
common and ultimate task for both teams was to engage the whole of
Hong Kong, as soon as the WHO had lifted the above-mentioned
travel advisory, in a ‘promotion exercise’ that conveys the following
message: ‘SARS is now being contained, Hong Kong is a safe and
environmentally friendly and hygienic place and travelers, tourists and
investors should feel safe to come to Hong Kong to stay, be tourists or
to invest’. cxxxix ‘Setting’ up task forces ‘to involve’ the whole of Hong
Kong in a promotion exercise certainly falls into the category of power
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described by Foucault. To look at the actual practice and policy
suggestions made, at what both task forces have really done, with
Foucault’s notion and Geertz’s idea that ‘theatre, performative as the
domination itself’, makes possible not only a better understanding of
the power relations here in Hong Kong, but can also avoid off-the-mark
judgments and criticisms.

To the government officials, the outbreak of SARS is not a problem of
administration of health-related governmental departments (say for
instance the communication of information between health units of
different places, the implementation of urgent measures regarding a
highly contagious virus, etc.). It is also not a problem of the increasing
flow of population between Hong Kong and mainland China, and all
over the world (however, the issuing of a travel advisory by the WHO;
the locations where the carriers of the virus were staying along their
journeys; which flight they subsequently took, etc.: the government
indeed took all of these seriously, didn’t it?)cxl. Instead, they considered
it as fundamentally and essentially a matter of hygiene. As explained
by Donald Tsang, the chairman of the task force, namely Team Clean:
‘… to deal with epidemics like SARS … many fundamental things have
to be dealt with. Starting from personal hygiene, followed by
household,

environmental

hygiene,

eating

habits,

and

then

workplace… ’ cxli When Donald Tsang had to make a public
presentation on the suggestions recommended by the task force, the
relationship between hygiene and SARS was even taken one step
further: ‘we would not forget its (SARS’s) devastating Hong Kong, taking
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away the precious lives of almost 200 Hong Kong citizens … Hong Kong
is now a different Hong Kong from 3 months ago, demanding more
and more public, personal and household hygiene’. cxlii As a result,
hygiene has to be observed not because it is virtuous, not because
prevention is a merit, but because we are effectively destroying
people’s precious lives if we don’t.

Echoing the military tone of government officials, a local newspaper
understands the hygiene issue as a war, and the task force has to ‘win
the war of civilization by using rationality’. cxliii After establishing the
almost - exclusive relationship between hygiene and responsibility for
SARS, readers should not be surprised by the famous notion of a ‘zero
tolerance’ attitude, adopted by the task force, when their ‘Report on
measures to improve environmental hygiene in Hong Kong” cxliv
expressed an abstractly negative perception of, for instance, fresh
markets, which occupy quite a proportion of attention and treatment
in the report. According to the report, the fresh market has a perennial
condition of wet, dirty and slippery floors. (p.77) Market tenants litter
the ground with all kinds of rubbish, such as damaged fruit and
vegetables, plastic bags, discarded cartons, tissue papers, cigarette
butts, etc.; when they are indeed required to provide rubbish bins for
themselves, though some tenants do not even have one. (p.78)
Tenants also seldom have the initiative to clean their own stalls. The
collected dust produces an untidy look of the market. (p.78) The
description particularly given to the poultry stalls is fascinatingly
sophisticated and worthy to be reproduced in full length. ‘Poultry
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feathers block drains while dirty, poultry droppings despoil the
environment. Empty transit cages are often stacked in common parts
of the market to await collection. Dressing of poultry in the stall, and
not in the scalding room, makes the situation even worsecxlv’ (p.78)

Now let us take a close look at the basic structure of the descriptions,
or one may say accusations, in the perception of the task force of the
fresh markets and food premises. They commonly consist of highly
abstract, non-contextual adjectiv es (dirty, untidy, bad, despoiled, lack
of initiative, and so on) applied to general, unspecified subjects. The
report does not show an intention to differentiate among the fresh
markets and their tenants, the description provided also practically
ignores and even denies any improvement ever in the markets, before
the overhaul of the task force. In that case, it would be interesting to
know what then comes out of the encounter of the ‘zero tolerance’
resolution

and

such

a

general,

non -contextual, yet negative

perception of the places and practices to be disciplined.

In the presentation of what has been done so far after the formation of
the task force, the following items are mentioned. Regarding the fresh
market and food premises, according to the report, the Food and
Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) alone has inspected all the
18,000 licensed food premises, issuing 3009 verbal warnings, 111 written
warnings, 580 summonses, 264 statutory notices to keep the 6-m
surroundings clean; and seized 1220 kg of open food. And the FEHD
and Housing Department (HD) have joined forces with the police to
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organize 153 blitz operations in 15 public housing estates, during which
42 people were arrested and 280 seizures of goods recorded. Focusing
on the hygiene problem of the public housing estates, the report
explains that ‘intensive cleansing[s] of 258 hygiene black spots in 99
public housing estates’cxlvi were carried out. Among them, 239 were
‘eradicated’.

Controversial

punishment

mechanisms

were

also

introduced, among them a raise of the fixed penalty for spitting and
littering from $600 to $1500 cxlvii, repeated violations of public housing
residents resulting in the termination of tenancy.

The relationship between unhygienic conduct such as spitting/littering
and tenancy (and hence the right to do business) can certainly invite
considerable reflection on the problem between ‘crime’ conducted
and scale and scope of punishment. Time and space do not allow me
to go further into this issue. I will, however, take issue with the
compatibility between the hygienic problems as the government sees
it and the measures they suggested. And transcending this issue is a
more fundamental one: even if they are compatible, to what extent
does this compatibility refer to the eradication of SARS? What will be
the boundary of reasonable sanctions implied by this compatibility?
Critics have already made the point clear, severe punishment for those
who litter and spit, for unhygienic food premises, changing the way
food markets sell food, eradication of hygiene ‘black spots’,
renovation and restructuring of buildings, all these actions are trying to
convince us that the source of SARS is exactly somewhere inside the
markets, hawkers and buildings cxlviii – which are in effect also the
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exclusive targets of the government’s actions. Grounded in the fact
that several public housing estates have been major sites of the spread
of the virus, public housing, and their residents, immediately become a
major object for discipline, but if one does not intentionally ignore the
fact, the situation in private housing estates (which always represent an
image of modern management) in places like Chai Wan are at least
equally severe, not to mention Amoy Garden in Ngau Tau Kok.

What the government has kept doing is, however, borrowing power
and legitimacy from primitive binary oppositions of old vs. new and
civilized vs. uncivilized. cxlix

Team Clean begins the chapters on

measures towards community hygiene this way: The number of
supermarkets carrying fresh food items has increased significantly in
recent years, but public markets remain a traditional source of daily
food provisionscl (my emphasis). The word ‘but’ in the middle is
significant, it refers to a turn of tone. In fact, focusing on the effort to
maintain cleanliness and tidiness should be more fundamental than
attaching these two qualities essentially to something else, making
them seemingly mutually exclusive. Less than a month after the Team
published this report, a fish tank of a major supermarket of Hong Kong,
Park n’ Shop, was found to have choleracli, and by the end of 2003,
staff of the FEHD found in another major supermarket in Hong Kong,
Wellcome, stock of chilled pork and pork of dubious origin, the
supermarket was suspected to sell chilled meat as fresh meat. clii
Combining these two cases with the mixed major sites of SARS spread,
it would be very important to question where the borderline between
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civilized and uncivilized, modern and traditional lies, even if we do not
deem these analytical concepts impossible or simply void and
discardable.

Raising this issue is not intended to relativize all differences. The
problem is, cleaning Hong Kong at the expense of spreading the
non-constructive binary opposition does not seem to help Hong Kong’s
economy, or prevent life-devastating epidemics. As mentioned above,
paralleling the formation of Team Clean is the formation of another
task force aiming at revitalizing the Hong Kong economy. One of its
tasks is to achieve this aim by reintroducing more tourists. The 2 most
famous outdoor markets, the Lady Market and Temple Street Market,
are precisely areas where abundant street hawkers and other snack
shops make their livings. They are certainly among the victims of this
official endorsement of the binary oppositioncliii, when at the same time
Hong Kong has to get its tourism going again, probably by trumpeting
them as major tourist attractions.cliv As the historical studies of T. G.
McGee of hawkers in Hong Kong argued, hawking has been a
constituent part of the Hong Kong economy. It functioned to ease the
employment pressures of Hong Kong, at a time when the population of
Hong Kong was increasing rapidly, especially in both the 30s and 50s.
The way they did business, their location, the price of their goods, all
functioned to keep the cost of living down. The government’s effort to
allocate them to established markets, to issue licenses to them, in fact
is a source of creating additional revenue.clv Whether the historical
functions of hawkers are still valid as they were a couple of decades
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ago is certainly open to discussion; however, the process of emptying
their social meanings and stuffing in meanings like dirt-makers and
residues of a traditional way of life should not remain invisible in
discourse. In other words, it is by almost reinventing the categories of
hawker, fresh market tenants, etc., in this way with all those
characteristics and features, some of which are true and some are
certainly not, that a network of apparently coherent meanings can be
established, and that actions can be taken about them. In this case,
the way that goals that are supposed to be fulfilled remains distant
precisely as a result of the action itself, while other effects, which
subsequently

emerged,

might

illustrate

Gould’s

concept

of

illocutionary suspense/ perlocutionary delay, if we emphasize the
operations involved rather than the linguistic origin of these concepts
for the moment.

Space mania
Apart from the prolonged economic recession that has been straining
Hong Kong almost from the beginnin g of the HKSAR, and the
above-mentioned

epidemics

that

spread

both

insecurity

and

discontent towards the government’s handling, countless large and
small social and political scandals, messes and provocations such as
the Equal Opportunities Commission saga, the organization of Harbour
Fest, the Article 23 legislation debate and the resulting historical
demonstration of 500,000 people on July 1, 2003, etc., are all incidents
directing the response of the people in the same direction.

clvi

Apparently the only moment when the whole of Hong Kong seemed to
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enjoy a moment of togetherness is the period when we saw the space
launch of Shenzhou V, and the first Chinese man in space. An
understanding of this event against such a context might reveal the
operation of power, especially in the way that Geertz understands it
with the theatre state.

On the fifteenth of October, 2003, Hong Kong people witnessed the
space launch of the Shenzhou V. This space launch is considered
significant because it carried the first Chinese astronaut, Yang Liwei,
into space. Hong Kong was able to be the first to invite Yang, along
with China's first manned space mission to visit Hong Kong – the second
stop of the whole delegation, with big cities like Shanghai lining up
behind Hong Kong. Yang and the delegation finally came to Hong
Kong at the end of October. A very particular space was constructed
here in Hong Kong within which three factors were constitutive,
according to a pro-Beijing newspaper analyst: attention from the Chief
Executive,

government

engagement of society.

officials
clvii

being

responsible,

and

the

However, I will suggest one more

contribution, borrowing Piyush Mathur’s observation of the Indian
nuclear test 1998, which is the surrender of the media. Mathur argued
in the Indian case, ‘the media very likely fell vulnerable to the sheer
force of the event that had been thrust upon it, by the secretive
compulsions of the nuclear statehood, to “cover”’. clviii As a result,
universal values like science, progress, development thrust were
simultaneously appropriated by the media, reproducing hegemonic
imaginations. The whole event, driven by protagonists such as the
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government and the media, ‘through its span of immediate
effectiveness, was able to create a people as its legitimate
receptionists and representatives’.

clix

The suffocating wave of the

nuclear test, however, has the effect of voicing down discontent from
the anti-fundamentalists, the environmentalists and human right
activists. And here we can see the double meaning of the choice of
word ‘cover’ –to reveal and conceal at the same time.

In Hong Kong, it is still debatable whether this thrust was rooted in the
independently existing ‘universals’ such as science and development
or the thirsty media. Yet, what was achieved by these performances,
and the coverage of these performances, should be clear enough. A
newspaper description reads, ‘in the marches and national anthem by
the military parade, Yang Liwei stands up on the stage, salutes the
slow -rising national flag. Then he steps down from the stage and walks
to the center of the football court, to receive the welcome and
blessing from Hong Kong people, to receive the gifts from students and
people, then has a brief conversation with 3 student representatives.’clx
The leader of the delegation, Hu Shixiang, expressed that they were
immersed in the ocean of flowers, national flags and the SAR flag ever
since they arrived in Hong Kong. He also mentioned that it is ‘only in
Hong Kong that we can experience the pride of being a space
missionary, that we can experience the importance of prosperity and
strength of our mother nation’. clxi

Over the days when Yang and the delegation were in Hong Kong,
77

Hong Kong people, in the words of Yang in his letter to Hong Kong,
‘young and old, no matter days or nights, all keen to watch the
exhibition of the first manned space mission. They go to the music hall
and gymnasium to dialogue with experts, teachers, and students on
the topic of space technology.’ The impressive spectacle in which the
40, 000 people in the Hong Kong stadium, waving national and SAR
flags, sang the national anthem is also an unforgettable moment to
Yang and the delegation.clxii

In the welcome speech of the Chief Executive to the delegation, Tung
pointed out that ‘since the launch of Shenzhou V, the people of Hong
Kong have longed to see and meet Mr. Yang, who epitomises the
ambition and courage of the Chinese nation’. He also pointed out that
how this wish of the ‘Hong Kong people’ came true with his own effort,
he recalled ‘I personally conveyed to President Hu Jintao the Hong
Kong people's wish and our invitation to Yang and his colleagues to
visit Hong Kong as soon as possible. The Central Government
responded quickly and positively ... -- testament to the Central
Government's regard for the people of Hong Kong.’clxiii

All these events simply combined to form a theatrical spectacle,
resembling almost exactly the ‘making of an ‘eleven-roof lord’ in Bali,
as mentioned above: ‘it was in the ability to stage productions of an
eleven -roof scale, to mobilize the men, the resources, and not least,
the expertise, that made one an eleven-roof lord’.

clxiv

The SAR

Government is able to mobilize the ‘Hong Kong people’, at least those
78

Hong Kong people captured by all kinds of media in this event, to
stage a perfo rmance which combines the representation of the
aspirations of nationalism, progress of science and technology, social
solidarity, festivity, etc. And the most important part of the
performance is played by Tung -- as he claims the initiative to ask the
leader of the President of the PRC, with the leader giving a quick and
positive response.

This event, although almost unanimously appreciated, invited criticism.
Some argue that Hong Kong is in a milieu of deep crises, yet Tung still
puts all his attentions to inviting Yang and the delegation to come to
Hong Kong. This just shows that the crisis of the governance of Hong
Kong is just on the brink.clxv Some ironically point out that both the
media and the SAR Government engage in idolizing Yang, which
provides relief and happiness to Hong Kong – but that is alright, Hong
Kong people are bruised all over anyway.

clxvi

The discursive

appropriation and transformation of Yang’s and the delegation’s, one
might argue, is never implicit. In the welcoming ceremony in the Hong
Kong Stadium, Donald Tsang reminded Hong Kong young people to
take Yang as a role model, to learn from him and face life’s
challenges.clxvii This remark would not have been significant without
the general atmosphere of economic recession, the urge to face the
adverse and self-strengthening. As for the implication of nationalism,
nothing can be more explicit than Yang’s now famous quotations,
‘seeing

the

fellow

Hong

Kong

people,

I

got

a

feeling

of

home-coming’clxviiiand ‘my heart was beating normal in space, but is
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beating faster here in Hong Kong’. clxix In other words, both the
government and its critics indeed fully acknowledge the ways this
space mania are appropriated. The difference is only that while the
critics see the appropriation as something to blame, the government
simply appropriate the space mission without feeling the need to
disguise.

Both critics seem to have an assumption about politics. They assume
that politics has its own essential and independently existing domain,
where it is a violation of rules to solve political problems by mobilizing
and borrowing from the astronauts, to which the discourses of science
and nationalism are attached. However, insisting that politics has its
own rules and domain does not logically and empirically mean that
those rules and domain are immune from any other thing but politics
per se. The politics of the first manned space mission visit lies precisely in
whether one can articulate it with their own projects, to create and
mobilize an audience large enough, and hence support and
legitimate it in the process of the creation and mobilization of an
audience.

Yet, the creation and mobilization of an audience as a form or a
medium in which power operates could not have been a one-off and
isolated incidence, and it is only because the creation and
mobilization of a similar type previously yielded the effect of powerclxx
that the space mission’s visit can be considered successful and
important to Tung’s governance. Apart from the size and scale of the
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people involved – people which provided the basis and are
appropriated for the manifestation of power -- the element of science
and technological advance played a due and resourceful role. Tung
expressed it in his congratulation: ‘Following the successful launch and
return of this manned spacecraft which has been designed and
developed by our country, our manned spacecraft technology has
entered an important era’. He also said that the space journey of
Shenzhou V shows the increasing strength of our nation, represents the
most stable, powerful, all-rounded and successful period in the
development of contemporary China.’clxxi The media also suggested
to take this chance to stimulate more interest and passion of the
people in the area of technology. clxxii And all these emphases in
technology can in deed be referred to the government, public and
business discourses on the issue (which will be investigated in later
chapters); they provide the ‘conventions and models’ for the
government’s words and actions to be effective in this case.

Conclusion
In both the cases of the epidemics (bird flu and SARS included) and
that of the visit of the first manned space mission, we can see the
attempt to articulate an internally coherent and consistent picture,
which is ultimately quite impossible when we are able se e the
heterogeneous elements penetrating through the articulation. Yet the
different ways in which these two types of cases attempt to articulate
the picture are already revealing enough to clarify the situation in
which these articulations could be staged and appropriated. In the
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case of the epidemics, the act of attributing hygiene as the ultimate
cause is an act through which people are told to re-learn the different
features and positions and the appropriate attitude of the different
agents in society. At the same time, the social meaning and terrain of
hygiene itself is also transformed. And all of them were necessary at a
time when the government was actively looking for a ‘scapegoat’ and
wanted to refill the space opened up by the crisis of legitimacy -precisely caused by these epidemics.

In the other case, the visit of Yang and the whole first manned space
mission, while the mechanisms of articulating dissimilar elements into
the same discourse are rather similar in these two cases, the major
difference is that the launch of Shenzhou V and the subsequent visit
did not create a problem/crisis/lack of legitimacy comparable to that
in the case of the epidemics. Therefore, the staging of the launch and
visit does not in itself refer to any political problem from which they are
inevitably derived, and which they specifically constitute. On the
contrary, they are themselves contingently mobilized to alleviate/fill
the crisis/lack of legitimacy which originated somewhere else. One
can almost call this a ‘s tand-in’ quality, except that the specific
characters of a stand-in are usually negligible in terms of transforming
the role that the stand-in is supposed to play. In the case of the launch
and visit, if one is not able to figure out clearly what indeed is a
problem of legitimacy, no problem, fetch Yang and the mission to
Hong Kong, then the lack of legitimacy will, at least in part, become a
lack of national pride due to a low level of scientific advance.
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The descriptions above of events in Hong Kong after the Handover
should not be mistaken as intending to provide a comprehensive
social and political record of post-Handover Hong Kong. The events
are analyzed in the light of revealing the observation that the nature
and characteristics of the social and political operations indeed
cannot do away with a constitutively discursive and performative
dimension. As a result, a way to look at these issues is to focus on the
basis and operations of these performatives, their intended effect,
whether disclosed or not, and their subsequent effects, rather than
strictly assessing their chronology, the linear causal relationship both
within the different components of the same event and between
different events.

Regarded from this direction, the governance of Hong Kong does not
have an essential and independent core to which all effects of the
cases above are directed from the ‘outside’; the governance is also
not a long journey heading to a single and fundamental goal,
ultimately in a rational manner with different mo rphologies at different
temporal stages. Instead, the loose cluster of the discursive subject
‘government’ can be viewed as a chance-taker, adopting different
strategies at different moments regarding different problems it
confronts, without any predetermined route, but only a highly
contingent one that we retroactively grant causal relations. This view
does not deny the complex relationships between what happened in
the time and space within and outside Hong Kong, it is not trying to
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claim that ‘Hong Kong’ is indeed empty, metaphysical or even nihilistic.
All the discourses, narrations, actions and policies pursued come with
concrete material and institutions. This view, however, requires us to be
highly skeptical of Hong Kong as a black box of rational progress.

As Jessop and Sum also argued, Hong Kong can indeed be viewed as
an entrepreneurial city, in the sense that the city has its own strategies
adapted to changing circumstances, despite its long reputation of
laissez-faire .clxxiii According to them, one criterion for a city to be
entrepreneurial is that, ‘the promoters of entrepreneur cities adopt an
entrepreneurial discourse, narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and
market

them

as

entrepreneurial.’

clxxiv

I

only

differ

from

this

interpretation, instead of opposing it, in the sense that I further
acknowledge that the notion of ‘city’, and the validity of city (as a
discursive

subject)

is

possible

only

when

we

associate

the

entrepreneurial strategies with the notion itself and hence confer it the
status of a valid discursive subject.

Certainly the content of the discourse and narration almost inevitably
involves the linearity of progress or economic development; however,
what should not be overlooked is that the adoption of these discourses
and narrations is strategic and historical. The SAR Government is
entrepreneurial in the sense that it produces discourse and narrations
of this kind; the government is entrepreneurial also in the sense that
these discourses and narrations ‘are more or less explicitly formulated,
and pursued in an active, entrepreneurial fashion’clxxv – another
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criterion, according to Jessop and Sum.

One of the most important discourses and narrations produced, and
actively pursued by the SAR Government, especially during the period
when Hong Kong had to actively rebuild itself from the Asia financial
crisis, is about technology, and IT in particular. The following chapters
will explore in detail the ‘entrepreneurship’ of the government
regarding this aspect, and what kind of entrepreneur is nourished by
this very kind of entrepreneurship -- taking the building process of the
business empire of Richard Li as an example.
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What does the ITC mean by technology?

In his second policy address, Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa clearly
spelled out his ambition to develop Hong Kong as both a ‘leading city
in the world for the development and application of information
technology,

especially

in

electronic

commerce

and

software

engineering’ and ‘a regional centre for supplying professional and
technological talents and services’. clxxvi Setting these goals was a
response to the realization of the over-heated, ‘bubble’ economy of
Hong Kong and the economic recession following the Asia financial
crisis that strained Hong Kong starting from October 1997.
Recommended by the Chief Executive's Commission on Innovation
and Technology, the Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF) was
established as a statutory fund on June 30, 1999 under the Public
Finance Ordinance, with an allocation of 5 billion Hong Kong dollars.
The objective of the fund is to ‘increase the added value, productivity
and competitiveness of our economic activities.’ It also encourages
and assists Hong Kong companies ‘to upgrade their technological
level, and to introduce innovative ideas to their businesses’. clxxvii
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Example: Zi acquisition of Telecom Technology
center
Much earlier than the establishment of the Innovation and Technology
Commission, the Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC) was set up in
1967 to ‘promote increased productivity and the use of more efficient
methods throughout Hong Kong's business sectors’. Ever since at least
the mid-90s, the government had already been working under the
conception that ‘Hong Kong is transforming from a center of low -cost
production to a commercial center and a production base of
high-value-added products in the Asian-Pacific region.’clxxviii
In order to fulfill its role of channeling creative applied technology, the
HKPC ‘has invested heavily in both new technologies and in-house
training in order to upgrade the performance of its talented
workforce.’ The services provided by the HKPC cover a wide range of
product development, consultancy, training and technology transfer.
And the services are provided for both the industrial and commercial
sectors, including textile and apparel, innovative enterprises, watches
and jewellery, software and information, transport and logistics, to
name but a few.clxxix
One of the major responses of the HKPC in the mid -90s to the
apparently up-and-coming transformation to a knowledge-based
economy was the establishment of the Telecom Technology Center
Co. Ltd. (TTC). clxxx TTC was established as a result of a $83.9-million
grant of the Industrial Support Fund (ISF) in 1995. The ISF was in turn set
up in 1994 to support initiatives that were considered beneficial to
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Hong Kong's industrial or technological development. The Commerce
and Industry Bureau (CIB) and the former Industry Department were
responsible for the administration of the fund. (I will return to the ISF
later). The objective of the TTC is to enhance the competitiveness of
Hong Kong-based companies by developing building block solutions
for the next generation of telecommunications products. clxxxi In
particular, the major task of the TTC was to develop low -cost, critical,
but highly value-added components, ‘on which the economical
production

and

competitiveness

of

the

Hong

Kong

telecommunication industry depends’. clxxxii
After 5 years of operation, TTC had already accomplished 70 projects
for 29 clients, some of them even pioneering among Asia, and
examples include ISDN phone and terminal adapters, GSM handsets,
and digital VCRs. ‘(N)ow is the time for TTC to go to the next level,’ said
the executive director of the HKPC Thomas Tang. This so-called
‘going-to-the-next-level’ refers to the acquisition of TTC by Zi. And the
comment was indeed made at the acquisition ceremony of TTC by a
Nasdaq-listed Zi’ Corporation in August 2000. The agreement was
reached between Zi and HKPC at a price of $25 million, in which $22
million was injected back into the ITF and $3 million into the HKPC.
When asked to account for the financial situation of TTC, the executive
director only said that ‘the value and function of the center cannot be
measured in terms of profit’. The acting commissioner re-stated the
position of the government, ‘one cannot evaluate the effort the
government pays to support Hong Kong industries as a whole in terms
of money.’ The CIB in a later report also claimed that CIB would
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consider handing over the operation of similar government-funded
programmes to private organizations according to public interest. clxxxiii
While according to the common sense logic of privatization of public
organizations, the so -called ‘public interest’ involved in the act of
privatizing public organizations usually refers to higher profitability and
efficiency, etc. regarding government revenues or other public
resources, the CIB report claimed that ‘...privatization would add value
to the services of TTC with commercial strengths of the private
sector’. clxxxiv In this case of privatization, the notion of ‘public interest’ is
less than obvious. The public gains interest, of course, through the
injection of HK$ 22 million and HK$ 3 million respectively into the ITF and
HKPC, which will continue to provide support and funding for
prospective units. However, how is public interest involved in the
operation of the ITC itself caused by privatization? In other word, how,
by privatizing ITC itself, can the improved efficiency of the ITC count as
public interest?
Now let us recall the policy direction of the HKSAR in the ’97 policy
address. The government wants to develop Hong Kong into the
‘leading city in the world for the development and application of
information technology’, and ‘a regional center for supplying
professional and technological talents and services’. And indeed, by
finishing 70 projects for 29 clients in 5 years, the executive director of
HKPC believed that TTC had already reached this goal. Moreover, the
government’s wishes and efforts are not to be measured in terms of
money, as the statements of the government officials quoted above
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seem to indicate. So if the government is so keen on developing
innovation and technology, and ifthe TTC was working well in terms of
technological advancement according to the standards of the
government officials, instead of simply dismissing it as hypocrisy, it
would be interesting to find out for what reason the Hong Kong
Productivity Council decided to sell the TTC, and what rationale is
implied.
As revealed further by a previous Financial Committee document
prepared also by the former Trade and Industry Branch in June 94clxxxv,
the $83.9 million grant from the ISF was only intended for the setting-up
and operation during the first 3 years. The HKPC expected ‘the center
to become self-financing in its sixth year of operation’, and as a result, it
was estimated that, starting from 94-95, the center would require a
total amount of $112.3 million. It was initially stated in the document
that before the end of the first 3 years of operation, HKPC would
undergo a management review, on which further funding would
depend.
Well until the acquisition, the recurrent income of the center was only
$10 million per annum, which only covers half of the recurrent costs.
And in addition, at least one local company with a similar business
nature began to compete with the TTC after 1999. As a result, the CIB
estimated that the center ‘would only be self-sufficient by 2004-05 at
the earliest’. And since $83.9 million, the initially capped amount for the
first 3 years, has already been disbursed, the CIB deemed it ‘highly
undesirable’ to continue TTC as a public entity by ITF. clxxxvi
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While no one ever expects endless subsidies from the ISF, and later ITF,
to TTC, it is quite obvious that the privatization of TTC cannot be
attributed, in a negative sense, to the insufficiency of its level of
technological advancement, at least according to the standard of
the government. At the same time, in a positive sense, it also seems
that the privatization cannot be attributed to reasons such as a simple
drive for improving the performance of TTC for the sake of public
interest. Apart from that, on the one hand, the center is increasingly
facing competition in the industry, on the other, the recurrent income
of the center barely compensates for its recurrent cost. Indeed,
according to the report of the CIB, the privatization of the TTC may well
be explained by the unwillingness of the ITF to be burdened by the
grant to TTC. All these elements tell a story of an unrewarding
investment. Therefore in the CIB report, the untold, but major principle
guiding

the

policy

implementation

is

indeed

‘expelling

the

unrewarding investment!’. The government’s action of privatizing the
TTC simply cannot be understood if we do not take that major principle
into

consideration,

and

if

we

only

take

into

consideration

high-sounding principles like ‘developing Hong Kong into every center
possible’ and ‘the government is willing to spend money to promote
innovation and technology’.

Connecting the truth
We have just seen how the discourse of privatizing TTC appeals to the
public common sense advantages of higher profitability and efficiency,
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as if these are the unanimous interest of the people as such. On the
other hand, the more general development of innovation and
technology is also constantly appealed to, and indeed needs to
appeal to an ultimate ‘truth’ for legitimation.
Truth and power are invested in each other. On the one hand, ‘true
discourse... that prophesying the future, not only foretold what would
come to pass, but participated in its coming, bringing to it men’s
acquiescence and thus weaving itself into the fabric of fate.’clxxxvii In
other words, true discourse, instead of just anticipating what would be
the future, anticipates it in the right way by paving and shaping the
path to a future already prescribed by the discourse. This explains the
way in which discourse has the implication of action and the effect of
power. ‘On the other hand, no power can be exercised without the
extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge’.clxxxviii
Foucault illustrates this the following example: the penal code started
out as a theory of right; then, from the time of the nineteenth century
onwards, people looked for its validation in sociological, psychological,
medical and psychiatric knowledge. It is as though the very words of
the law had no authority in our society, except insofar as they are
derived from the true discourse.clxxxix Power, to Foucault, is certainly
more than mere coercion, he finds it inadequate to define power as
repression, as something that ‘only weigh(s) on us as a force that says
no;’ power instead ‘traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure,
forms knowledge, produces discourse’.

cxc

Therefore power has to

produce truth, which in turn acts as its source of sanctioning, the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and
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false statements, and to determine the status of those who are in
charge of saying what counts as true.
In elaborating the subtle nexus between power and truth, one
characteristic of the nexus mentioned by Foucault is that truth is largely
‘centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which
produced it’. cxci He asserts that the important problems ‘of the status,
of the conditions of exercise, functioning and institutionalization of
scientific discourses’ remain more or less unanswered.cxcii For him, the
importance of studying discourse is to see how disciplines came to call
themselves sciences, disguised themselves as sciences, for the power
inherited in the truth claim. However, what the study of discourse, as a
method to investigate this problem, seeks to do is to look at the
condition of emergence, insertion and functioning, and how all of
them transform the mode of existence of the discourse. cxciii This
intention of dealing with discourse is important and applicable for the
exercise here in Hong Kong. The point is not that science and
technology did not previously appear in Hong Kong, there was
certainly a discourse of science and technology. Yet, by looking at the
conditions under which the present discourse emerges, how it is
appropriated, to what end, in the name of which kind of truth, we may
have a better understanding of the concrete truth/power nexus in this
case.
Giving priority to innovation and technology in an era of a
knowledge -based economy is usually understood in terms such as
awakening

or

enlightenment.

According

to

Francis

Ho,

the
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commissioner for Innovation and Technology: ‘before the reign of the
HKSAR Government, Hong Kong had a severely distorted economy.
Making money is easy in the bubble economy driven by finance, real
estate and stock ... and precisely because making money is such an
easy task, people lost the cognition of technology and the interest in
pursuing advanced k nowledge.’cxciv Having such a ‘distorted’ mind, it
is not a straightforward process for Hong Kong people to be
enlightened and awakened; the implication is that we did not see the
truth (i.e. the importance of, and also the present emphasis on,
innovation and technology) because the growing economic bubbles
are too appealing to Hong Kong people.
In the opening ceremony of the Hong Kong science Park, Tung
addresses the few years of experience for Hong Kong people, ‘the
deep reflection of the community on the state of the economy in the
past few years has in fact been a much more positive process than it
appears at this moment. Amidst the bewilderment and mixed feelings,
one gratifying outcome is that there is a clearer degree of recognition,
particularly within the business community, that innovation and
technology holds the key to the future of Hong Kong. This awakening
and acceptance is important ... the need ... to promote innovation
and technology in the unique Hong Kong context has now been
undisputedly accepted.’cxcv
The Innovation and Technology Fund is thus considered by the
government and the fund’s administration itself as a ‘major policy tool
to drive innovation and technology upgrading in Hong Kong
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manufacturing and servicing industries’cxcvi, whose importance can be
demonstrated by the fact that this is one of the only two institutional
suggestions

cxcvii

made by the Commission of Innovation and

Technology in their first report. The turn to innovation and technology is
in turn one of the major initiatives of the administration of the HKSAR as
a whole.
a) The ambivalence
This production of truth within discourse is powerful. ‘Waking up’ to this
ahistorical and universal truth of innovation and technology at this very
historical moment provides the government with the necessary ground
(or excuse, some probably insist) to reduce or even dismiss any differing
opinions as immature and inappropriate. People who do not side with
the government are ‘reasonably’ dismissed as immature simply
because they are portrayed as not knowing much about innovation
and technology, because they do not know what the key to the future
is, or because they still dream of a resurrection by another wave of the
bubble economy, etc. When posing the question in this way, the
government bypasses the debate of whether the government itself
should actually participate in promoting innovation and technology.
The government also bypasses the debate of whether the way in
which the government promotes Innovation and Technology is
reasonable and beneficial for Hong Kong, and for which part of the
Hong Kong population in particular, if any. Just as Francis Ho confided
to readers in a newspaper interview, ‘... we can see that the role of the
government is changing, and the key question now is not whether the
95

Hong Kong Government should join (in promoting innovation and
technology), but under which circumstances the Hong Kong
Government should join.’cxcviii The position of criticism here is not
against government intervention as such. Freedom defined as
government intervention-free economic activity in civil society is
paradoxically a product of the government.

cxcix

When a high

government official is so affirmative in his promotion, it seems that
problems like that of allocating resources, in other words: which part of
the society is targeted by the innovation and technology policy to be
the winner, are practically off the agenda.
As a result, a line between right and wrong is drawn, and it is drawn by
claiming innovation and technology as the key to the future. Being not
supportive can be quickly considered wrong within this regime of truth.
The ‘success’ of Hong Kong is subsequently measured and constituted
by the extent to which Hong Kong people identify with and practice
this awakening and enlightenment, again, under th e assumption that
other economic options simply do not work and should be eliminated
from the very starting point.
Besides, within this regime of truth erected by government discourse,
facing it is presented as accepting the inevitable. The sacrifice of o ther
needs is considered as the inevitable bridge to the future. According
to the imperative of the truth (emphasis on innovation and technology,
and the transition to the era of knowledge -based economy) certain
groups of people in society are distantly portrayed as destined to
suffer. And it is exactly in their suffering that we see the transition under
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way. In his Policy Address in 2001, Tung announces that

‘the

transformation will be more complicated because the restructuring is
the result of several different but inter-related factors ... businesses now
require

substantially

fewer

staff

because

of

developments

in

information technology. The emphasis in the past was on a fine division
of labour, whereas today it is on multi-skilling ... if we are to preserve
our economic vitality, create greater prosperity, and maintain living
standards, economic restructuring is the only way. Our people, our
businesses and the SAR Government must have the foresight to see
changes coming, to adjust to those changes and to manage them.
We must all do our best to move up to higher value-added activities.cc
If we put this in a broader context, we can see that this ‘moving up’ is
accompanied by budgetary cuts in different areas like tertiary
education, social welfare, and housing, to name just a few. Suffering is
not exactly the result of personal misfortune (although on the other
hand, the Government always urges people to equip themselves, to
add value to themselves, as if fortune and misfortune is merely a matter
of personal initiative and responsibility). The social condition upon
which this suffering is based is never natural and objective, as it might
easily be mistaken at first glance. Suffering in this context always
appears alongside with active systematic institutional initiatives, though
usually in an apparently unrelated manner.
The objectivity of the need to change, the advantages and necessities
of quick change are all produced within the discourse of innovation
and technology, and the government in turn seems to be compelled
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to accommodate. However, if the case of innovation and technology
is juxtaposed with other cases in which there is an apparent necessity
to accommodate, the meaning of this accommodation is often
blurred and difficult to distinguish from its opposite. Take, for instance,
the property market: against the peak in 1997, overall property prices
have tumbled by over 60%. The volume of transactions also shows a
marked decline. The total volume of transactions in February 2003 is the
lowest since 1995. cci In this case, the government, urged by the
property sector ever since the collapse of 1997, responded by
introducing nine measures by the end of 2002 to stabilize the property
market, as pronounced by Michael Suen, the Secretary for the Housing,
Planning and Lands Bureau.ccii
Another example concerns the population policy. According to the
report of the Task Force on Population Policy headed by the Chief
Secretary, Donald Tsang, Hong Kong has one of the lowest fertility rates
in the world, with every Hong Kong woman on average having only 0.9
children over their lifetime. It is predicted that one quarter of our
population will be aged 65 or above by the year 2031. Among them,
those older than 85 are expected to triple from the current 67,000 to
209,000. During that period, the total population is forecast to rise 30
per cent from 6.72 million in 2001 to 8.72 million, but the labour force will
grow by only 8 per cent, from 3.43 million to 3.7 million. By then, the
report estimates that 58% of the 8-million population in Hong Kong
(about 5 million of people, including the retired and children) will be
economically inactive.cciii It is in this context, especially accompanied
by the ‘burden’ of the increasing population of dependent elderly and
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immigration from Mainla nd China, that Hong Kong seems to be in
need of developing a new direction in its population policies. When
asked, however, whether the Hong Kong Government would launch
any policies to encourage families to have more children, both Donald
Tsang and the Executive Director of the Family Planning Association of
Hong Kong, Susan Fan, demonstrated a very firm negative attitude.
Both of them maintained that in a liberal society like Hong Kong, and
regarding such personal matters as birth-giving, it is inappropriate for
the government to adopt a special policy to encourage people to
give birth.cciv
Both the cases of the collapse of the property market and of the
critically low fertility rate can be clearly discerned empirically and are
thus more visible, at least nu merically speaking, than the coming of the
knowledge -based economy. The status of Hong Kong’s need to
accommodate to the knowledge-based economy resembles a wish or
self-motivated propensity more than an inevitable compulsion.
However

the

government

is

far more

reluctant

(at

least

in

appearance), temporarily in the case of property market and in terms
of attitude in the case of fertility, to assume an active role, like the one
for information technology. If we understand the responses of the
government in these two cases as a kind of accommodation, it would
be difficult for us to comprehend the institutional practices and policy
directions regarding innovation and technology also as a kind of
accommodation, in particular regarding the accommodation to an
irreversible,

inevitable

and

clearly

definable

transition

to

a

knowledge -based economy, especially before the government has
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presented a concrete explanation of exactly what is understood as a
knowledge -based economy, and what it considers crucial in the
expected transition to it.
One can also reasonably consider the actions taken by the
government in these cases as active intervention for revitalizing the
economy: the nine measures are designed to boost, instead of stabilize,
the property market, the population policy is intended to attract
capital and specialists. However, the government demonstrates a
particularly enthusiastic and high-sounding gesture in the case of
innovation and technology against a need that is not particularly
pressing. Anyway, the poin t I would like to make is that the so-called
pressing ‘need’ to accommodate to this transition and to pick up
innovation and technology can only make sense within its own
discourse and rhetoric, or at least cannot be applied to other areas in
the same way. One of the natural consequences, at least, is the
constitutive trade -off, as suggested by Tung above, which can make
sense also only within this particular discourse.
This production of truth in discourse is also ready to dissolve
counter-discourse. As a matter of fact Hong Kong was once a home of
manufacturers, especially between the 50s and early 80s. And all
through this economic phase in Hong Kong the government kept
providing

resources

to

improve

productivity,

technological

advancement and innovation. One important example is The Hong
Kong Productivity Council that we mentioned before. Established in
1967, its aim is to ‘promote increased productivity and the use of more
100

efficient methods throughout Hong Kong's business sectors.’ And the
government indeed considered the HKPC as ‘playing the role of the
agency of the government, to assist the sector in increasing the
productivity and the transition to high value-adding production’. ccv
Besides, different funds and supporting programmes have long been
operating before the HKSAR, and probably before the staging of the
slogan of the ‘era of a knowledge-based economy,’ as the
government puts it. Take the example of the Industrial Support Fund
(ISF), which was set up in 1994 for ‘projects which may contribute to the
competitiveness

or

technological

development

of

the

local

manufacturing industry as a whole or a specific sector within it.’ccvi
Since 1994, and up until 1999, the ISF has supported 373 projects,
involving a total financial commitment of over $1.38 billion.ccvii With the
establishment of the Innovation and Technology Fund, the ISF no
longer approved any application and had itself transferred to the
Innovation and Technology Committee. The projects initially funded by
the ISF have also been shifted under the ITC, with the detailed rules and
regulations involving the approval of the application remaining largely
unchanged.ccviii All is amounts to a story in which the line dividing
innovation and technology on one side and pure labour-intensive
production on the other does not exist, or at least does not overlap
with a line beyond which lies ‘the era of knowledge-based economy’,
if there is any such thing.
However, to argue against the government’s discourse of innovation
and technology with historical facts, to contend that innovation has
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always occurred and technology has always been progressing to a
certain extent, can be unfruitful. The present discourse can easily
subsume the argument, as I will show. The present discourse can further
affirm itself by saying that people in the past few years have been
blinded by the bubble economy. It is even exactly because Hong
Kong people were indulging in the bubble economy that they did not
see the universal and global importance of innovation and technology,
as maintained above by Francis Ho. This logic of universality can clearly
be seen in the design of the ITC symbol. Although the Innovation and
Technology Committee was only established in 1999, the ITC is
symbolized by the Greek letter ‘p’ for two reasons. Firstly, the character
p is a combination of the 3 characters ‘I’, ‘T’, ‘C’; secondly, the number
p has been studied mathematically both in the eastern and western
cultures for thousands of years. According to the committee, p
symbolizes a scientific and technological orientation. It has been
important in the history of man's scientific and technological
advancement, from astronomy to probability to the physics of sound
and light’; ‘the 4,000-year search for the ultimate value of p symbolizes
the constant aim of technology to develop improved solutions to
problems’. ccix
Even if we do not doubt that advancement is a process that goes on
and on for thousands of years, it is too easy to come to the conclusion
that this history of advancement can be linked up and appropriated
linearly and teleologically according to the present mode of the
discourse of innovation and technology. We have to recognize that
historical development is not a linear process with definite origins and
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progressive stages toward a predetermined destiny. ccx What one has
to locate in the development of Hong Kong is then not the point in time
when

Hong

Kong

changed

from

labour-intensive

to

technology-intensive economic activities, because it supposes two
definite stages in a progressive sense, both heading towards a
universal Truth called ‘The Future.’ Rather, the development of
innovation and technology on the one hand, and the development of
society on the other, are not initially two discreet and independent
paths. The path of innovation and technology did not come to merge
with the path of development of society naturally, but the two have
always been invested in each other. It is too intentional to mute the
economic initiatives in the discourse of innovation and technology,
and too hasty to incorporate thousands of years of advancement into
the present development of a knowledge -based economy, especially
when we can obviously see that this awakening in fact means the
active subjection of people to suffering by our SAR Gov ernment.
b) Innovation and technology as interest?
On different occasions, government senior officials like Tung Chee-hwa
and Financial Secretary Antony Leung reinforced the importance of
education and human resources as the determining factors in
innovation and technology. ccxi

As a matter of fact, substantial

resources are being put into the promotion of innovation and
technology. The General Support Programme under the ITC aims
precisely at supporting ‘those projects that contribute to fostering an
innovation and technology culture in Hong Kong’, which include
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mainly studies, surveys, conferences, exhibitions, seminars, promotional
and training programmes. The expenditure on education has
increased from 37.9 billion in the fiscal year 96/97 to 55.3 billion in the
fiscal year 01/02. Tung is satisfied with the achievement Hong Kong
attained regarding education and human resources, and he gave
some examples: ‘the best of the world’, like Paul Chu at the Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, Tsui Lap-chee at the University of
Hong Kong, Simon Wong at the Applied Science and Technology
Research Institute, etc., are coming together in Hong Kong, and six
outstanding scientists were conferred the prestigious membership of
the Chinese Academy of Science in May 2002. (I will return to this
conferment of membership later in this chapter)
The government introduces Innovation and Technology as a method
to cope with the ‘challenges’ of the knowledge-based economy.
However, in regard to education, the government seems to suggest
that innovation and technology are still more a means to develop
interest and potential than a vehicle oriented merely towards profit.
The second report of the Commission of Innovation and Technology
states that ‘more students must be attracted to take up courses in the
science and technology field ... pursuing graduate research studies
with a view of a career in R&D ... We urge the government and
non-government institutions to do more to inspire interest in science
and technology among young people’. ccxii If interest in innovation and
technology is not readily reducible to economic interest, or indeed
does not equal economic interest yet, then it should be logical to
expect innovation and technology on the one hand and economic
104

interest on the other to be conceptually separated. Although they do
not have to be distinct and totally independent, stimulation of interest
in innovation and technology through education should not be a mere
vehicle of economic interest.
However, if one takes a closer look at the operations of ITC, which are
those of institution- and regulation-confined research, one can see
what this mode of research and interest in science and technology
might really mean. This is where one can find out ‘on the ground’ if
interest in science and technology really keeps an irreducible distance
from economic interest.
One year after the establishment of the ITC, Francis Ho, the
Commissioner of Innovation and Technology commented in a report
to the LegCo panel on trade and industry that ‘the quality of the ITC
applications in the general categories, namely Innovation and
Technology

Support

programme

(ITSP)

and

General

Support

Programme (GSP), is declining, which means ‘a lack of focus in
research programmes’ and that the ideas of local researchers are
‘drying up’. ccxiii As a result, the ITF started to solicit proposals in the
category of ITSP, according to clear project objectives decided on by
the ITF, with the hope that this would ‘increase the collaboration and
competition among research institu tions and enable projects initiators
to think and plan their projects in a more focused manner.’ccxiv As
Francis Ho puts it, ‘the operation of the fund has changed from
‘bottom-up’ to ‘top-down’, which means that the ITC would decide
several major themes and directions and then solicit proposals from the
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academies or research institutions’. ccxv Examples of solicited themes
include, ‘Industrial Applications of Micro-Electro - Mechanical Systems’
and ‘Innovative Product Development for Textiles, Clothing and
Footwear

Industry’

in

2001,

and

industrial

applications

of

micro-electro -mechanical systems; development and application of
biosensor technologies; advanced surface coating technologies and
applied genomics in 2002.
The act of solicitation of ITC can of course be viewed as a responsible
response to the need for better fund management. My interest here,
however, is not to know whether it succeeded in improving the quality
and quantity of the applications, but what the government considers
to be innovation and technology in this problem-solving situation. Let
interest in science and technology still be an irreducible factor in all the
considerations concerning the operation of the fund, and an interview
with Francis Ho reveals how the focus is heavily balanced in fav our of
economic interest. He recalled that in 1996, when he visited South
Korea, companies like Samsung and LG were all but invisible in the
fields of plasma TV and CDMA mobile phones, and after 6 years, they
have all become bright and shining in the world. He commented that
‘due to its different economic system, it is difficult for Hong Kong to
resemble

South

Korea’.

ccxvi

Nevertheless,

the

Commission

of

Innovation and technology would become more and more focused,
as is the investment made by the ITC. This ‘mo re-and-more-focused’
approach includes at least the project-solicitation strategy.
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Drawing on the difference between South Korea and Hong Kong, the
utterance of the commissioner demonstrates a lack of forcefulness. His
pledge to make the ITC and ITF ‘more and more focused’ further
demonstrates that his idea of innovation and technology indeed has
less to do with an ‘interest’ in science and technology. Never mind
whether the ‘different system’ noted by Francis Ho is the liberal
economy per se (when referring to the economic process of South
Korea, the state of South Korea is usually recognized as a
developmental state, in which the state is considered to be assuming
an entrepreneurial role).ccxvii Never mind also whether he is referring to
the apparent contrast between the ‘liberal economy’ in Hong Kong
and the developmental state in South Korea. For Francis Ho, the
problem and weakness of Hong Kong is that Hong Kong is not focused
enough, that each company is doing its own research, and ‘small
companies are facing difficulties in ‘growing up’, and very often abort
before maturation.’ccxviii After he sighed over this different system,
which made Hong Kong less competitive than South Korea, he
suggested to tackle this situation by making the research, and
investments as well, more focused, to invest money thematically.
Conceptually the tension between an interest in science and
technology on the one hand and the return of money invested by the
fund on the other, is elided, it becomes just a matter of which aspect to
emphasize more, or which to sacrifice more. In the hands of the
commission, the space necessary for different levels of innovation and
technology in different areas has to give way to a more focused and
thematic organization of researches. The task is not to let the success of
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innovation and technology, and hence the smooth transition to the
knowledge -based economy, be eroded by a diffused and confused
scenario, anyway. If this is really the basic position of the government
officials, it just effectively demonstrates the second meaning of our
common usage of the word – interest is curiosity, and it is also
advantage.

Structure and circulation
Just as we do not relate every statement possible to every discourse
possible, and just as we understand that the commentaries of Ulysses,
are produced out of, or in relation to, the work Ulysses, but not, say,
arguments against the legislation of national security 5 years after the
Handover of Hong Kong, ‘in every society the production of discourse
is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according
to a certain number of procedures’. ccxix And in the discourse of
innovation and technology here in Hong Kong, it is possible for us to
recognize certain criteria for elements allowed in the discourse, a
structured mode (not necessarily ‘logic’ per se ) of inference, as the
rules and procedures for the regulated production of the discourse.
When evaluating the ITF, Henry Tang, the Secretary for Commerce,
Industry and Technology said that, ‘The business community is putting
increasing emphasis on the commodification of the product of
scientific and technological research and technological transfer, and
the collaboration with the universities is also becoming more and more
frequent.’ccxx What he meant by this, and under w hich conditions, is
revealed in his following elaboration: ‘Say for instance, having
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received the subsidy from the ITF, a herbal medicine company is now
collaborating with two Universities in Hong Kong. Drawing on the
knowledge and resources from the universities, the company is
developing

new

Chinese

medicine

through

advanced

pharmaceutical science and clinical tests. The company is now listed
in the ‘Growth Enterprise Market’. ccxxi
In this elaboration of what he understands as a successful example of
the collaboration between the business community and the universities,
he barely includes information on the technological accomplishment
that he explicitly recognized. In other words, what exactly, or at least
generally, describes of this collaboration, or the herbal medicine
remains unsaid. He does not tell the audience what kind of medicine it
is, what its function is, what specific advancement this collaboration
achieved, etc. All the audience learns is an expression of a formal
structure

in

which

anonymous

parties

are

collaborating;

the

knowledge and resources of the universities are utilized, and
something – what, we supposedly need not to know from this
expression -- is developed out of it. In short, the Secretary of Commerce
wants to convey a message of recognition and acknowledgement
through putting forward a formal structure, with the object of his
discussion left vacant throughout. Above all, and quite abruptly
indeed, the company is listed in the ‘Growth Enterprise Market’, ‘a fund
raising venue with a strong identity to foster the development of
technology industries in Hong Kong and the region’; a market catering
to the ‘alternative of investing in ‘high growth, high risk’ businesses’. ccxxii
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It seems that the example quoted here is not even intended to give
the audience any specific and substantial information, except that the
company is now listed in the Growth Enterprise Market. Nevertheless, it
is suggested that certain elements are required for a particular
instance to be considered noteworthy or remarkable by a government
official, almost like entering name and amount in a legally authorized
lease contract, to make it legally binding and effective. As a result, if
one is to sort out the criteria the government is using to measure the
effectiveness of the ITF, the level of technological advancement would
not seem to acquire a plausible position on this list. As in the case
mentioned above, whether certain innovative and technological
products are considered significant, and how significant the product is,
can readily be reduced to the function of the market, and even further
to the stock market; evaluating an innovative or technological
product in the name of technological advancement is unfortunately
‘insufficient’.
Apart from the criterion of being listed in the stock market, we can also
recognize other elements by which the government constructs the
formulation of their version of the success of Hong Kong. In a speech in
a forum, CE Tung said, ‘to evaluate the development of innovation
and technology, one has to see if the people are actively adopting
innovation and technology to improve their living standard, to see if
the companies are adopting innovation and technology to improve
their productivity, to provide services and products of better
quality.’ccxxiii
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With these criteria, Tung believed that Hong Kong began to flourish.
This is illustrated by
 Hong Kong households’ increasing possession of PC from 35% in
1998 to 61% in 2001
 the increasing rate of household penetration of the Internet,
from 12% in 1998 to 50% in 2001
 the increasing broadband coverage in Hong Kong, from 50% in
1998 to 95% in 2001.
 the increasing number of electronic currency smart cards from
4.8 million in 1998 to 7.8 million in 2001.
Simply speaking, with all these soaring numbers, people in Hong Kong
are ‘actively’ adopting innovation and technology, and have their
living standard improved as well – disregarding the fact that
accessibility and living standard is not in a transparent, causal relation.
However, even within other dominant discourses in Hong Kong, like the
discourse on youth, sex, and personal relationships etc., immediate
access to a PC and the Internet are not unproblematically considered
an improvement in life at all. Young people are criticized for spending
too much time surfing the web, playing online games etc.ccxxiv People
are also supposedly becoming more and more ‘alienated’ when they
are making more virtual than actual friendsccxxv, abusing the web by
spreading or reading pornography ccxxvi, etc. Those are all common
sense drawbac ks of technology. Young people and even adults who
are considered to be engaging too heavily in online games and virtual
communication are usually accused of being dishonest. They are also
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considered

unsociable,

lacking

communication

skills,

violently

emotional, and even vulnerable to nutritional disorder. A social worker
even attributed the increase in child sexual abuse to the persistent
spreading of net pornographyccxxvii .
Nevertheless, not only the media trumpets the negative impact of the
increasing penetration of science and technology, the government
even took action to halt people’s access to computers, or at least
acted as though it knew for certain that increasing access is
problematic. LegCo approved The Occupational Safety and Health
(Display Screen E quipment) Regulation on 24 April, 2002 to protect the
safety and health of employees who use display screen equipment at
work for prolonged periods of time. And the Occupational Safety and
Health Council issued the newsletter ‘Sedentary Workers Safety and
Health Bulletin’, to advise on the selection and arrangement of
computer workstations in offices.ccxxviii
I am not suggesting here that we need to accept all these
‘drawbacks;’ but they nevertheless prevail in Hong Kong, and within
the government, as significantly negative consequences of the
penetration of innovation and technology.
Francis Ho clearly stated in an interview that education, alongside with
and ranked first among, a favourable business environment and
economic freedom, are the major premises for the success of the
development of innovation and technology.

ccxxix

On another

occasion Tung spoke of the achievements of Hong Kong in the
development of innovation and technology, specifically the aspect of
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fostering local talents. He mentioned that six scientists from Hong Kong
were recently conferred the prestigious membership of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, as evidence for what Hong Kong has
achieved.ccxxx
However, what is perhaps ambiguous here is the meaning of ‘local
talents’ and the ‘fostering’ of local talents. All of them are indeed
working now at universities in Hong Kong, and studied in institutions in
Hong Kong a long time ago. If one cannot leave out and deny the
effect and influence of postgraduate training in the process of
‘fostering’, among other factors, then it would be noteworthy that all of
them received their professional qualifications from overseas institutions,
and only one from the University of Hong Kong.ccxxxi It is one thing that it
is important for Hong Kong to foster local talents in order to develop
innovation and technology, but whether the evidence presented by
Tung confirmed the achievements of Hong Kong in this respect is quite
another. This is of course not meant to denounce these scientists. The
problem is just to what extent their conferment can be attributed to
being ‘fostered by Hong Kong,’ and hence be counted as Hong Kong
achievement. The government officials seem to fail to recognize
‘fostering’ as a timely process, and are hasty to explain all the
achievements in terms of their own efforts. In explaining why the
Austrian/Czech scientist of genetics, ‘Mendel spoke the truth, but he
was not within the truth...’ in his often quoted inaugural speech,
Foucault told us that the objects of Mendel’s studies, his methodology,
the theore tical perspective in which he situated himself, ‘was simply
not along the line in which objects and biological concepts were
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formed (before Mendel).’ccxxxii Taking this insight into another direction,
one could say that our sense of conviction and acceptance exa ctly
does not rest on the substances of the argument, but more on the fact
that these substances are situated within commonly accepting
frameworks, in which the presence of experts or authoritative
figureheads usually plays a prominent role.
Foucault’s point is strikingly valid in both Tung’s and Henry Tang’s
arguments and elaborations. Let us put aside first the validity and truth
content in their arguments and elaborations (although those are also
highly questionable if we look at them in detail, as I have
demonstrated above). What I want to highlight is the positioning of
these statements as valid arguments and elaborations according to
the standard of the government officials and the media who cover
them so that we can find out within what kind of ‘truth’ we are in this
case.

114

Does it matter, to you?
--PCCW and Narratives of technology and the market

locating the focus
This chapter is about the story of Richard Li, Tzar-kai, and his company,
Pacific Century CyberWorks -- Hong Kong Telecom. The company
witnessed, and was undoubtedly one of the most active protagonists
in, the years during which Hong Kong was most enthusiastic about
information technology. But before turning to the story of Richard Li
and his PCCW empire, let us spend some time on an excellent
example given by Daniel Miller in his recent book, The dialectics of
shopping. He analyses a story of the merger (in Britain) between a
discount grocery store, ‘Kwik-save’, which concentrates on cutting
back the costs; and a core high-street supermarket, Somerfield, which
represents itself as a ‘focal point and active member of the
community’. ccxxxiii Both of the retailers have their own market niches, so
the merger, or to be more precise, the takeover of Kwik-save by
Somerfield, is a seemingly very logical result for both of them, serving
the same market, in an atmosphere of growing competition in the
retailing industry (which we usually understand as ‘the context’). Miller,
however, provides another version of the merger, in which the real
struggle at the level of the day-to-day operation of the retail business
as the reason of merger is far less important; in which the driving force
115

of the merger lies somewhere else.

According to his version of the merger, the driving force comes,
surprisingly, from a Hong Kong-based company, Dairy Farm, which is a
retail subdivision of a long-standing Hong Kong group, Jardine
Matheson. The history of Jardine is even longer than the colonial history
of Hong Kong. It started as an opium trader, and one of their bosses,
William Jardine, had entered history for persuading the British
Government to declare war on China and seize Hong Kong.ccxxxiv As a
group of British capital based in Hong Kong, Dairy Farm started to
expand its business on a global scale in response to the impending
Handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China. Kwik -Save, initially a
company growing in an ‘organic and self-funded’ mannerccxxxv, is one
of the mismanaged items in the global portfolio of Dairy Farm, which
took over control of the former company’s management in 1987. The
shares of Kwik-Save underperformed the whole sector by almost 70
percent between 94 and 98. The merger between Kwik-Save and
Somerfield, and the subsequent sale of the shares of the merged
company by Dairy Farm, is therefore a decision made ‘quite
irrespective of its local performance or its relationship to other
supermarket competition within the British market’.

ccxxxvi

In the

atmosphere of ‘deregulation’ in the Thatcher era, the impact resulting
from this distance between the consideration from the point of view of
finance, capital reproduction and the consideration of day-to-day
operations of the retail business is even more significant. While the
primary basis of the Thatcherite governance lies in its inability and
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unwillingness to intervene in the business sphere, mega-businesses,
such as the merged Kwik -Save and Somerfield, by virtue of their
enormous market-share, will come to represent consumer interest. As
the ‘agent’ of the consumers at large, the management of merged
retailers in fact makes decisions in terms more of financial performance
than of consideration of their daily business performance, yet
legitimized in the name of the consumers. The content and reality of
consumers are exploited in this abstraction process.

Indeed, in his conclusion to Virtualism: a new political economy
co-edited with James G. Carrier,

ccxxxvii

Miller juxtaposes several

phenomena from different areas under the umbrella notion of
‘virtualism’. The phenomena include the obsession with auditing
practices in higher education, an argument made initially by Michael
Powerccxxxviii. The argument is that academics ‘may reduce their actual
teaching quality in order to spend more time demonstrating to
managers that their teaching quality has improved.’

ccxxxix

The

prevalence of management consultancies and pension funds and
their de facto domination of contemporary capitalism are also
examples of virtualism. Management consultancies, due to their
increasing size and scope of responsibility, replace the management
of the firms that consult them in the first place. Pension funds, at least in
the case of Britain by virtue of their gigantic volume, demand ‘a voice
in the companies in which they invest – for instance, a veto over board
appointments, executive compensations, and critical corporate
charter provisions’. ccxl All the interests of ‘actual consumers’ are no
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longer the only stake or even a significant consideration in the
operation of businesses and education. Instead, the major scramble
for interest has shifted to that between the auditing unit and the
academics, the management and the management consultancy, the
management of the pension funds and the shareholders of it; in other
words, ‘virtual consumers’ reign.ccxli

In such a situation, what is contestable is no longer the simple and
original accumulation of capital and exploitation of workers. The
argument that Miller wants to advance is that if consumers still
constitute an integral part of capitalism by being impoverished, they
are now impoverished by being abstracted, for the benefit of the few.
No matter whether the consumers are students who consume the
‘education services’, firms which pay for management consultancy or
people whose pension money the pension fund is investing, they are
bypassed and abstracted. People who dominate in contemporary
capitalism are not in any sense less greedy than before, but they are
now benefiting from what Alain Touraine considers the real danger:
‘the unrestricted movement of capital, which can suddenly destroy
whole economies on the basis of a purely financial and short-term
calculation’. ccxlii However, it goes without saying that this unrestricted
movement of capital, though it does not, or is not patient enough to,
extract most of its profit from ‘actual consumers’, has no reason to be
benevolent.
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A clean and clear version
Here begins the story of Richard Li. The business career of Richard Li is
usually dated back to the early 1990s. He first became well-known for
his sale of Star TV (which ‘never made any money’ and was
threatened to be shut down by his fatherccxliii) to Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corp with a profit of $800 million, which is almost 8 times the
founding seed money, $125m, in 1993. ccxliv The profit was halved
between him and his father’s Hutchison Whampoa. He then founded
the Pacific Century Development, which subsequently bought a
Singapore-listed company, and got itself listed in the Singapore stock
market under the name of Pacific Century Regional Development. At
that stage, its business included insurance, hotels and some real estate.

In 1998 the Pacific Century Group formed a joint venture with Intel
called Pacific Convergence Corporation (PCC), which ‘intends to
provide high speed Internet services’. ccxlv This is one of the earliest and
most well-known IT-related businesses of the group. In the second
policy address delivered by Chief Executive Tung Chee-wah during the
same year, Tung explicitly announced his intention for the government
to participate actively in the promotion of technology, in particular
information technology. He said: ‘we need now to strengthen our
support for technological development, build up a critical mass of fine
scientists, engineers, skilled technicians and venture capitalists, and
encourage

the

development

technology-based businesses’.

ccxlvi

of

a

significant

cluster

of

In 1999, the Hong Kong SAR

Government, through a private treaty, granted the Pacific Century
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group the exclusive license to develop Cyberport, a combo of
residential and information technology infrastructure, in Pokfulam,
Hong Kong.

In order to raise money to dev elop the project, the group bought a
company called Tricom, as its listed vehicle in the Hong Kong stock
market, and eventually changed its name to Pacific Century
CyberWorks (PCCW). About half a year after the name PCCW had
replaced Tricom in the stock market, PCCW was already planning
another merger, which was seemingly quite impossible for a company
which had not yet made any significant profit. The target of the merger
this time was the Cable and Wireless Hong Kong Telecom, one of the
largest listed companies in Hong Kong. It took about a month for the
PCCW and British Cable and Wireless, and also one more competitor,
Singapore Telecom (Sing Tel), to complete the negotiations. With the
aid of a consortium led by the China Bank group, which provided a
total of HK$100bn, PCCW successfully reached an agreement with the
management of British Cable and Wireless about taking over the
Cable and Wireless HKT.

The Cable and Wireless HKT was also not PCCW’s exclusive target for
acquisition and merger, indeed by the time PCCW made the decision
to take over HKT, a significant amount of acquisition and investment
projects had already taken place. Between August 99 and February 00,
PCCW had already accumulated 19 items in its acquisition and
investment portfolio, with

the total cash invested more than
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US$273m. ccxlvii As a result of all these acquisitions, mergers and
investments, the stock price of PCCW rose from about HK$3 in early
August, 1999, to a historical high of HK$28.5 on Feb 15, 2000, in the
midst of the negotiation between PCCW and the British Cable and
Wireless. ccxlviii Despite the enormous fluctuation of the stock price of
PCCW, by the end of 1999, the HK$164bn-PCCW had become one of
the ten biggest listed companies in Hong Kong, with Richard Li
accumulating HK$50bn for himself. ccxlix By then, the story of Richard Li
was widely regarded as a legend in the history of Hong Kong.ccl

The standard interpretation of this history in Hong Kong is certainly the
discourse of technological innovation and the global trend of
liberalizatio n and deregulation of the telecommunication market,
which in itself is one facet of the neo -liberal discourse emerging from
the latter half of the 1970s. The claims are: enhancing competition,
deregulation, ‘freedom of choice, the market society, laissez-faire, and
minimal government’ccli, etc.. From this perspective, the narrative is
presented in a straightforward and exclusively positive way: the
synergy arising from the collaboration between the SAR Government
and the technologically very potent PCCW to develop the project of
Cyberport, which is the cradle of a future development of both industry
and

commerce

in

Hong

Kong;

the

deregulation

of

the

telecommunication industry resulted in more competition and the take
over of the former monopoly Cable and Wireless HKT by PCCW as one
of the promising competitors. However, following the steps of Miller, I
also would like to suggest other versions of interpreting of this story, in
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order to understand more about the underlying impetus and dynamics,
in short, what really happened?

Angle obscured 1: scrambling for ‘Hong Kong’
Telecom
To begin with, regarding Hong Kong, what is strikingly coincidental is
the historical context in which Miller’s story about the supermarket
merger in Britain and the acquisition of HKT by PCCW took place. We
mentioned the reason why Kwik-Save changed from developing in a
stable and self-funded manner to an over-developing one, and finally
merged with Somerfield. When Dairy Farm became the major
shareholder of the retailer, it mismanaged it and had to quit by selling
all its shares in the end. However, the very reason why Dairy Farm had
to go global and acquire Kwik-Save echoes that of the acquisition of
HKT by PCCW.

The competition between PCCW and Sing Tel over the control of HKT
mattered to the public in Hong Kong because the nature of
telecommunication has always had a strategic dimension and is
politically highly sensitive.cclii That is why after Sing Tel announced its
intention to acquire HKT, the secretary of Telecommunication and
Information Technology of Singapore visited Hong Kong and
proclaimed

that

it

was

not

their

intention

to

control

the

telecommunication industry through this acquisition. ccliii Moreover,
Singapore has long been one of the major competitors in Asia in
various fields. All of these amount to a widely recognized notion that
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the competition was indeed a battle to preserve something belonging
to Hong Kong.ccliv

Yet, the irony is that one has to ignore quite a lot of historical details in
order to hold on to such a notion, not to mention whether to be
grateful for Li’s triumph. A very brief history of HKT will suffice to make
this point clear. Cable and Wireless Hong Kong Telecom was the
company name after the acquisition of Hong Kong Telephone by
Hong Kong Cable and Wireless in 1987. The former was founded by
British Cable and Wireless, which itself was established back in 1873 in
Britain, and started to run the international telecommunication services
in Hong Kong in 1936. The latter, owned by the local Li Kwok Po family,
had

been

developing

as

the

exclusive

operator

of

local

telecommunication services ever since the post World War II period.
And British Cable and Wireless held more than 50 percent of the
merged company.cclv This makes it obvious that Cable and Wireless
HKT was a company founded and operated by British capital. Even
after the acquisition of the Hong-Kong -capital based Hong Kong
Telephone, and the subsequent ownership of the shares by the Hong
Kong Government after the acquisition, the notion that the company is
a valid ‘Hong Kong’ company can be defined merely by its local
operation and very recent involvement of local capital.

In this sense the notion that Richard Li’s PCCW was fighting to preserve
HKT as belonging to Hong Kong is only valid in a very narrow sense.
Moreover, and herein lies the echo to Miller’s story, the reason why
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PCCW had to compete with Sing Tel has to be attributed more to
political elements, rather than economics, much less competition. In
the middle of the 1990s, the then recently appointed managing
director of Dairy Farm stated, ‘it would be a pity if Beijing were to
believe the firm is anything less than 100 percent committed to Hong
Kong’. cclvi The background of this statement was the going global of
the company and its implied retreat from Hong Kong facing the
approaching Handover of Hong Kong. If the political dimension is
selectively purged out, it would be difficult to comprehend the validity
and relevance of the above statement, especially when the topic is
the highly calculating and rational business decisions.

This very historical background was undoubtedly intimidating HKT as
well, but we can see quite a different response from Hong Kong Cable
and Wireless. The late 70s witnessed the beginning of the negotiation
over the future status of Hong Kong between the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and the British Government. In September 1984 both
parties signed a draft text of the Joint Declaration, the main
agreement being that Hong Kong would be handed over back to the
PRC by the British Government. Well before the Handover, Cable and
Wireless HKT had already sold 10 million and 20 percent of its shares to
the Guangdong Government and a Chinese capital company, Citic
Pacific, respectively in the late 80s.cclvii Accordingly, the decision of
British Cable and Wireless to merge Hong Kong Cable and Wireless and
Hong Kong Telecom, and the following engagement of the Hong Kong
Government as a major shareholder of the company, are interpreted
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by commentators as an exercise to localize or decolourise the British
element in this highly strategic and politically sensitive business cclviii .
After all, the decision of British Cable and Wireless can be interpreted
at least equally, if not more, reasonably as a gesture to secure its own
profit out of its monopoly status in the Hong Kong telecommunication
market.

The final decision of British Cable and Wireless to exit the market and
sell Cable and Wireless HKT to PCCW can also be explained from the
angle of the decision of the colonial government to open the
telecommunication market. As a matter of fact, owing to the
emerging local pressure to stop the monopoly of HKT in the
telecommunication market in the middle and late 1980s, the colonial
government had mandated a consultancy firm, Booz Allen and
Hamilton, to assess the issue of opening up the telecommunication
market. (So it should not be surprising to recognize the relevance and
validity of Miller’s theory of virtualism – management consultancy is
indeed in a position to decide on our behalf). The suggestion of Booz
Allen and Hamilton was that the government was to issue 3 more
licenses for the operation of the local fixed telecommunication
network services (FTNS). Hutchison Global Communication, New World
Telecom and Wharf T&T were the 3 winners of the additional operation
licenses, effective from July 1, 1995. This was also the day when the
exclusive license of Cable and Wireless HKT came to an end. The
exclusive license of international telecommunication services was
likewise surrendered about 8 years earlier (late March, 1998 instead of
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2006), as a result of an agreement of the World Trade Organization
(WTO)

concerning

the

opening

up

telecommunication market back in 1996.

of

the

international

Consequently, the

cclix

telecommunication business of HKT has been declining steadily (and
somewhat enormously). For instance, a recent report of the company
stated that up until 2003, the performance of FTNS had already
dropped by almost 30 percent from its apparently total monopoly.cclx

Figure 1, situation of the operation of fixed telecommunication network
services and international telecommunication services after the Booz
Allen and Hamilton consultation
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telecommunication
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Exclusiv e license of HK Telecom ends
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In other words, the story of the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by
PCCW -- although it constitutes an important part of the ‘legendary’
business career of Richard Li and his PCCW, and represents an
apparently

incontestably

re-orientation

in

the

linear

direction

success
of

of

Hong

innovative

and

Kong

in

its

information
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technology -- is rather misleading. It can on the contrary be argued
that, even if Sing Tel had really successfully acquired Cable and
Wireless HKT, the situation was just a transfer of property and capital
from the hands of Britain to that of Singapore, especially when the
business will nevertheless be run in Hong Kong, and especially after the
Handover of Hong Kong from the British Government to the PRC. It is
not particularly sound and reasonable to assume that a British -owned
company belongs to Hong Kong.

Therefore, the story can be at least equally, if not more reasonably, be
interpreted as a story in which an emerging businessman triumphed in
taking the opportunity to make huge sums of money through the stock
market, and by the hype of its out-competing the Singapore rival, after
insatiable British capital no longer sees any profit potential in the
telecommunication business and quits. Apart from those who were
able enough, in terms of sensitive decisions and capital competence,
to make quick money in the stock market, the benefit of PCCW’s
acquisition to Hong Kong as a whole is not to be unquestionably
assumed, and has yet to be convincingly argued. So the uniqueness of
the phenomenon of technological hype in Hong Kong is yet to be
located in the actual interaction between technological artifacts and
the everyday life of people. At least as far as everything said above is
concerned,

Hong

Kong

people

as

consumers

and

users

of

technological products are by and large bypassed. Nonetheless, they
are abstracted as a rather empty reference upon which articulation of
justifications can be imposed. And this is a clear Hong Kong resonance
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of Miller’s virtualism thesis.

Angle obscured 2: how successful is the ‘success’?
The dimension of the whole phenomenon of Richard Li and his PCCW
that concerns Hong Kong people is mainly connected to financial
performance. Therefore, the third version of the story concerns the
actual business and financial activities of the biography of PCCW. As
mentioned above in the first version, the first business success of
Richard Li, even before his founding of the Pacific Century group, was
his sale of Star TV to the Australian media tycoon Rupert Murdoch. The
sale was significant because Star TV, despite its regional household
subscription of 53 millions, with its enormous operational cost, ‘is
thought to have lost more than $600m in less than a decade (both the
Li and Murdoch era included) and is still losing money’, according to a
report from the Economist in 2000. cclxi Richard Li himself earned a huge
sum and divested himself of a burdensome TV station; Murdoch paid,
in effect lost a huge sum, had to take care of a mediocre TV station,
and could not make money out of it. This asymmetry constituted the
‘legendary’ quality of the story.

This

particular

significance

is,

however,

paradoxical.

If

an

underperforming TV station sold for an unexpectedly high price is worth
celebrating, effectively, the merit derived from the practical operation
of the TV station and the merit derived from its monetary value
materialized in transaction are two matters to be considered
separately. In reality, it seems almost customary to separate these 2
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realms. However, if the remarkable moment of the whole transaction
lies precisely in this imbalance, then in other words, for this story to be
‘successful’, the two realms should be different, yet not separated: the
worse the TV station, the unreasonably higher the price paid, the more
wonderful the story. The excitement and noteworthiness generated
from other combinations, including bad operation/low price, good
operation/low price and good operation/high price, are simply
different in kind and far lower in magnitude. However, this conclusion is
just drawn from the style in which this transaction is represented,
meaning that a direct and accurate correspondence between the
words and descriptions from these media representations and what
these words and descriptions represent is not intended, and simply
does not exist. However, it is also this very intended distance between
them which constitutes the paradoxon between the discourse of
satellite TV as an innovative and information technology (and our
celebration of it, of course) and the benefit and enjoyment of the
people, or at least of its subscribers. This kind of strange logic in the
finance and business activities is nonetheless exceptional.

Another moment of the acquisition of Cable and Wireless HKT by the
PCCW that is considered highly significant is usually characterized by
the rhetoric of the ‘new economy’. It was popular to point out that one
of the reasons why Sing Tel was out-competed by PCCW is that a
merger between Sing Tel and HKT was still pretty much in the realm of
the ‘old economy’, not much synergy could be expected. Rather,
mergers between the traditional telecommunication business and
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corporations with the concept of information technology reflect an
irresistible global trend. cclxii Read literally from these words, it is difficult
to figure out what exactly the notion ‘new economy’ do means, and
what the difference between the old and the new is, except if we
simply characterize it tautologically as the acquisition of Cable and
Wireless HKT by PCCW itself. In order to understand what comes out of
this merger, it is helpful to borrow from the notion of myth according to
the classic definition of Roland Barthes.

Myth, to Roland Barthes, is constituted by at least 2 levels of
signification. The combination of a primary signifier and a primary
signified is called a sign, which in turn further constitutes the secondary
signifier of another signified. Through this process of signification, the
arbitrariness of the relationship between the signifier and the signified is
reified as a natural and essential relationship, the process through
which the secondary signifier is constituted by a match up of the pair
of primary signifier and signified is also drained out. Myth ‘has a task of
giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making
contingency appear eternal’. cclxiii Accordingly, a successful myth is
one that is ‘able to naturalize and universalize the interests of the
dominant groups as if they were the interests of all members of
society.’cclxiv Nevertheless, this naturalization and universalization of
myth does not happen under any veil, since ‘myth does not deny
things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it
purifies them, it makes them innocent, … it gives them a clarity which is
not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.’cclxv
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Referring to the story of PCCW and Richard Li, what is most frequently
talked about and has acquired the status of almost a statement of fact,
is certainly the fortune made. An interpretation of the profit from the
sale of Star TV to Murdoch is already a case in focus; the celebration of
the profit made by Richard Li naturalizes and universalizes the virtue of
the notion of profit itself, and by doing this, drains off the problems
regarding the operation of the TV station and the benefits to its
subscribers.

As mentioned in version 1, PCCW borrowed a total of HK$100bn from a
consortium led by the Bank of China. This approach is crucial, as Miller
argues, ‘the financier’s logic is that a company should take on a huge
burden of debt’, because ‘debt is seen as helpful in imposing the kind
of discipline upon a company that will force it to take the ruthless
decisions that will lead, in turn, to the most efficient use of capital’. cclxvi
Unexceptionally, the imperative of growth conditioned by the huge
amount of debt is the principal atmosphere of operation of PCCW. The
signification of this ultimate signified, this partic ular condition of growth,
can indeed be truly ruthless.

In fact, starting from mid-2001, the company had 3 redundancy
exercises within one single year, in July/August 2001, December 2001
and March 2002.cclxvii Back to the date at the end of February 2000,
when PCCW and British Cable and Wireless finally came to an
agreement about the acquisition, the decision was worrisome enough
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for the employees of HKT because of the increasing competition in the
telecommunication market and the huge burden of debt taken by the
new company. Richard Li came out and publicly proclaimed, ‘we
never thought of any layoff, we emphasized human assets!’ cclxviii
However, a quick glance over the interim report 2003 of PCCW reveals
the following in a section entitled ‘management’s discussion and
analysis’, ‘the improvement (of group EBITDA margin) was primarily due
to greater cost efficiency achieved as a result of various strategic
realignment plans and efficiency programs implemented in 2002.’cclxix
Regardless of the technical meaning of the EBITDA margin, the
sentence looks neutral and certainly acceptable, considered from the
point of view of growth and repayment of debt. Indeed, in early
September, PCCW announced a plan which should be one of the
‘strategic realignment plans and efficiency programs’. The plan
required that staff in several categories of work (such as customer
service and outdoor maintenance work) should start up their own
companies, in order to compete for the jobs previously assigned to
them in-house. The management did not promise those who failed to
join the startups that they would not be laid off. The management
promised to secure all the contract jobs to the new startups, but only
for the first year, and no promise was made concerning the second,
the third or the later years.cclxx

There are no data available to show whether, in which aspects, and to
what extent this realignment arrangement helped to improve the
quality of the services, but what we can be sure of is the cut of the
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various kinds of allowances, lengthening of working hours, and a 20
percent reduction of salary cclxxi . In other words, the notion of
‘improvement’ mentioned in the interim report or the notion of
‘efficiency’ claimed by the name ‘efficiency program’ has to be
understood not in terms of more output by the same input, but the
same output by less input – the reduction of the responsibility of the
company to its staff, and the more concrete deterioration of the terms
of employment. After all, both the ‘strategic realignment plan and
efficiency programs’ only restr ucture the production process, instead
of any de facto improvement of sale of the company, especially its
business core, the telecommunication process. It is in all of these that
we may develop a concrete understanding of the choice of word of
‘strategic’ – not for the absolute sense of improvement of quality, but
an improvement of efficiency in a negative sense.

As a matter of fact, the overall performance of PCCW also recorded a
total of two years of consecutive decline of almost HK$14bn in 2002
and 2003, which is HK$7.76bn and HK$6.1bn respectively. cclxxii In
particular, the sale and the market share of telecommunication
services of PCCW has been suffering a decline for all the four years
since

its

acquisition

of

HKT.

cclxxiii

In

other words, since the

telecommunication services of PCCW is not efficient, competitive and
attractive enough to even retain its customers, improved efficiency
can again only be understood in terms of the reduction of its
responsibility to its staff. As a result, to accept or acknowledge such a
kind of improvement as a catalyst of better performance is to accept
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or acknowledge a paradoxon on improvement without improving
either sales, or the welfare of its staff: a paradoxon that resembles that
of the sale of Star TV.

Hong Kong cultural critic Ackbar Abbas argues that the culture of
Hong Kong is a culture of disappearance. In a culture of
disappearance, according to Abbas, one does not see what is there,
but mis-recognizes it as something else; a thing does not vanish without
a trace, it simply dis-appears.

cclxxiv

Before anything about the

advantage of the ‘new economy’ over the ‘old economy’ is visible in
terms of technological content, we again see only the abstraction, the
virtual operation on the part of finance. The operation calls for a
mis-recognition of what indeed should be our focus, or at least for an
elusion of a comparable consideration of the quality of the services
provided, at the expense of the corporate responsibility to its staff at
the same time. The examples of Star TV and the discourse of efficiency
in

the

interim

report,

viewed

through

Abbas’s

concept

of

disappearance, complements Miller’s theory with a more concrete
status and function of the ‘real’ in regard of the working of the whole
story. The ‘real’, the benefits to customers, the staff of the company,
and the subscribers of satellite TV, has to be mis-recognized as
something irrelevant, or simply made invisible, in other words,
disappear, in order to render the story of PCCW and Richard Li
legendary.
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Angle obscured 3: doing businesses by (merely)
talking about them
So much for the discursive treatment of the paradoxical relationship
between the sale, redundancy and improvement of efficiency.
However, all of them are still pretty much within the realm of the old
economy – we do not have particularly convincing reasons to attribute
these subtle operations to the ‘new economy’, if this notion is to have
some positive content. In fact, all of the above concerns only the
financial operation of Cable and Wireless HKT; in the merger between
the old and the new economy, they are simply considered, and even
denounced, as elements of the latter. So how exactly can we
characterize the notion of ‘new economy’? I would suggest and argue
that the notion of ‘new economy’ is elaborated quite succinctly by a
coverage from The Economist, ‘These days businessmen are more likely
to hit newspaper headlines for thinking of doing a deal than for
actually doing one.’cclxxv

We can start with the case of Cyberport, testimony of commencing of
the Science Hub project in Hong Kong’s rival Singapore in 1998, and
based on the vocal manifestation of emphasis by the HKSAR
Government expressed in policy addresses in 1997 and 1998, in which
Tung’s administration came up with a range of innovation and
technology related policy suggestions in an urgent tone. (See the
chapter on the discourse of government innovation and technology
policy. In March 99, Mr. Donald Tsang, the then Financial Secretary, in
his second budget speech proposed the project of Cyberport, ‘the
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essential infrastructure to form a strategic cluster of information services
companies’. He further elaborated,
for Hong Kong to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, it
must adapt to the new forces of the Information age and
respond to the mega trends of technological advances which
were introducing new ways of doing business, transforming
traditional markets and altering existing competitive
advantages… Hong Kong must race against time to have a
quick and decisive response in developing its own niche in view
of the speed with which the information technology sector was
advancing and the emphatic efforts of practically all of its
competitors in trying to carve out their own corners of the
market.cclxxvi
The whole proposed Cyberport project, located in Pokfulam, aims at
providing 100,000 square meters of office space, with facilities of retail,
entertainment, education, and a hotel. The tenants already moved
into the first phase of the project in mid-2002, and the whole project is
planned to be completed by mid-2004. cclxxvii Insisting on the positive
non-intervention and free market policy of the government, Donald
Tsang points out that ‘it is the rightful role of the government to provide
an appropriate environment and suitable infrastructure to promote,
facilitate and support our manufacturing and service industries.’cclxxviii
As a result, the proposed Cyberport is to be built on the basis of a
partnership between the government and a private company.
Paradoxically, this privileged exclusive license was granted to Richard
Li’s Pacific Century Development, through a private treaty instead of
public auction, a method which in itself manifests to a certain extent
the competitiveness of the market. When the Secretary for Information
Technology and Broadcasting, K.C. Kwong, was asked about the
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rationale behind the decision of dealing with PCD through a private
treaty, he listed five reasons. First, the company has to be attractive
enough for the best IT companies worldwide to come to Hong Kong;
secondly, the company has to bear the development of the project
and also the risk of it; thirdly, the readiness of the company not to be
out-paced by other regional competitors; fourthly, whether there are
other interested developers; and finally, the company has to be
capable of managing the whole project. cclxxix It seems confusing
enough why all these reasons should not amount to the choice of
public auction. This case nevertheless sheds light on our understanding
of the notion of market competition and positive non-intervention.

What should not be surprising is that while the popular notion is that
Hong Kong is or has been practicing a Laissez-Faire governance, the
notion is indeed more assumed than critically examined. It is almost
conventional among serious academic investigations of the topic that
the extent of the Laissez-Faire is rather limited and has to be
understood in very particular terms. cclxxx Anyway, despite the fact that
PCD won the exclusive license through a private treaty, if we are to
examine whether Cyberport fulfills the goals laid down by the
government, it is necessary, as Doreen Massey, Paul Quintas and David
Wield did for the science parks in Britain, to ‘examine them in their own
terms’. cclxxxi According to their research, two major objectives of the
science parks in Britain are: promoting the formation of new firms, and
creating job opportunities. The result they found was that science parks
practically did not perform well to breed new startups, the ‘majority of
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them are relocated units and firms’, in the milieu of university budget
cuts, ‘university staff are recommended to start their own companies
as an alternative for their position in the university’. Both findings
confirm that both objectives laid down by the science parks are more
or less under-accomplished. cclxxxii These experiences in Britain are
useful for us to decide whether the proposal of Cyberport helps Hong
Kong in re-orienting itself in the direction of innovation and technology
industry or is, at the opposite extreme, promoting like a loud-speaker
the government’s emphasis, for the benefit of capital in the stock
market.cclxxxiii

Reports from various sources show that a considerable proportion of
the tenants of the Cyberport are in fact just relocating firms. Up until
early 2004, a total of 28 companies were occupying 64% of all the first
two phases of office space in Cyberport; of the 28 companies, 12,
which amounts to less than half of the total, are new startups. With the
completion of the construction work of the third phase in February 2004,
the total occupation percentage will fall to 40 percent.cclxxxiv Among
the eight major tenants that PCCW solicited in the very beginning of
the project are multinational corporations such as Microsoft, Yahoo!,
HP, all of which were renting office space in Hong Kong before the
proposal of the Cyberport project. Only 2 companies were exceptional,
one is the Pacific Convergence Corporation, which is the joint venture
formed between PCCW and Intel, the other is Softbank, a
Japan-based group.cclxxxv The lease record of Cyberport can also be
assessed indirectly from the fall of leases in other properties which also
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specialize in IT-related companies. Taikoo Place, in particular, where
the headquarter of PCCW-HKT is located, experienced a loss of
tenants as a result of the completion of Cyberport, while major tenants
like CSL and Microsoft were all moving out to rent office space in
Cyberport.

The effect of a strategic cluster is also not to be assumed, but to be
argued. Indeed, Taikoo Place, for instance, was arguably a candidate
for the ‘strategic cluster’ pursued by the government. Taikoo Place
once housed multinational tenants such as Cable and Wireless,
Microsoft, PCCW, Time -Warner, etc. It has built-in information
infrastructure connecting the 11 buildings among themselves and
facilities

connecting

to

databases

of

various

multinational

corporations. cclxxxvi If IT-related multinational corporations are the
ultimate juicy fruit for Hong Kong to alter our ‘existing competitive
advantages’, to ‘adapt to the new forces of the information age -and respond to the mega trend of technological advances’cclxxxvii ,
then it must be quite annoying for the government to acknowledge
that Hong Kong got these juicy fruits long ago, at least well before the
establishment of Cyberport. Before the government even tries to
account for the difference Cyberport and other similar private
experiments make, and the limitation of the latter, contradictions and
discrepancies remain unsettled. The spectre of promoting technology
by merely announcing it is still haunting.

At this stage, the way in whic h both the SAR Government and Li’s
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PCCW ‘hit newspaper headlines for thinking of doing a deal rather
than for actually doing one’ should already be clear enough. Indeed,
this irony echoes Sum Ngai-ling and Bob Jessop’s definition of Hong
Kong as an entrepreneurial city. According to their theorization, ‘the
promoters of entrepreneurial cities adopt an entrepreneurial discourse,
narrate

their

cities

as

entrepreneurial

and

market

them

as

entrepreneurial. This involves the articulation of diverse economic,
political

and

socio -cultural

narratives

and

complementary

nonnarrative discourses to contextualise and reinforce calls for
entrepreneurial action’cclxxxviii . While the government’s promotion of
Cyberport by articulating the context in which Cyberport is conceived
(see also chapter 3 on the discourse of government innovation and
technology policy) is certainly entrepreneurial in the sense of Sum and
Jessop, the way in which Richard Li is developing his business from Star
to PCD to PCCW and finally to PCCW-HKT was no less entrepreneurial.

As long as stock price does not have any essential relationship with the
company it represents, activities of making quick money in the stock
market are merely ‘trad[ing] on emotion and the perceptions of
emotion’.

cclxxxix

It is even due to this intentional dissociation and

abstraction of the perception and emotion from the operation of the
business that the stock price of Tricom can rocket 2270 percent, from a
mere HK$0.136 to the highest of HK$3.225, within one single day in early
March, 1999.ccxc And between the time when Tricom was renamed to
Pacific Century CyberWorks and mid-February 2000, the time when
PCCW announced its intention to acquire HKT, PCCW energetically
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invested, acquired and formed joint ventures. Some of its more
well-known counterparts included City Telecom, CMGI, Outblaze,
StarEastNet, SoftNet ccxci ; a joint venture between PCCW and the
Australian Telecom, namely Telstra, was also formed in April. During this
period, all these joint ventures, acquisitions and investments practically
alluded to technological excellence and hence profit, therefore,
‘firms… are working hard to fuel rumours that buyers are about to
pounce and unlock the value of their assets, so as to prop up sagging
share prices – even though few hard deals materialise’ ccxcii , a
commentator satirized. The commentator revealed that Richard Li
‘withdrew a mooted offer for Cable and Wireless, but not before
newspaper

headlines

worldwide

had

brightened

his

fading

image.’ccxciii Accordingly, the stock price of PCCW finally reached
HK$25.8 in February 15, 2000, even if, with the exception of particular
joint ventures, investments and acquisitions only refer to changes of
stake or financial structure, in other words, irrelevant of the sales or
operation of the business. This irrelevance was not insignificant, some
small public shareholders who have been holding the shares of HKT for
its stable dividend suffer from Li’s business style: dropping sales figures
already imply decreasing dividend, the huge sum of debt incurred by
PCCW at the time of acquisition further held the group from paying
dividend.

The craze of people over IT-related stocks did not remain without
criticism. As noted by a biographer of Li, regarding the enormous rise in
stock price of PCCW in December 1999, when people criticized Li for
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pushing the price too high, he simply responded, ‘am I really
competent enough?’ccxciv This is an interesting response that could
connect two incidences. Oei Hong Leong, the original stake holder of
Tricom, which was the shell company acquired by Pacific Century
group, sold a huge amount of Tricom shares in mid-May, before the
even larger amount of shares held by institutional investors were
allowed to enter the market. He sold 400m shares for about HK$500m.
The day then witnessed a drop of the share price by 16 percent. ccxcv
Another instance was the same thing done by those who suffered from
the sale by Oei. Cable and Wireless HK was renamed PCCW-HKT on
August 10, 2000; this was also the day when British Cable and Wireless
was allowed to sell their 1.1bn of PCCW shares. 1.1bn of share freshly
entering into the market naturally and inevitably created pressure for
the stock price to fall. Therefore, before August 10, the senior
management of PCCW, including Richard Li, collectively took a step
ahead of British Cable and Wireless, and sold more than 260m of
PCCW shares for almost HK$40bn. August 8 also witnessed a drop of
almost 12 percent.ccxcvi

The subtlety here is that Li thought that the almost irrational rise of the
stock price was not his fault, and that he did not distort the stock price
single-handedly. By the same token, if he was conscious enough when
he asked ‘am I really competent enough’, the question at the other
side of the token should be, ‘how can I fail to take this opportunity to
make a big fortune?’ And if this is the case, then what Oei did should
also not be considered as ruining the deal.ccxcvii This view does no more
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than confirm the popular conception of the market that the craze and
the collapse are merely in sync with the inevitable outside world, say
for instance the sudden surge and gradual decline of the Nasdaq in
America. However, if the premise that he did nothing to push up the
price does not stand, which means that he really anticipated and
indeed participated in pushing up the price, then it qualifies just in an
indirect way his quality as an entrepreneur, who actively articulates an
irresistible and inevitable context, in which his articulation is significantly
constitutive.

As

an

entrepreneur

who

pretentiously

denies

entrepreneurship, he is able to narrate and perform strategies that are
apparently advantageous in themselves, purifying the process through
which this irresistible and inevitable context is popularly affirmed,
reducing any alternative consideration and subordinating them under
unquestionable contexts. It is here that we clearly see the practical
‘talking’ dimension of the myth of the ‘new economy’.

Explaining our supportive attitude
One of the handful of standup comedians in Hong Kong, Wong
Chi-wah, demonstrated in one of his shows the mentality of people
engaging in the stock market by the time of the Handover and the
‘technology bubble’ in 99.

A: Chi-wah, let me tell you something reliable: 731
Chi-wah: What? Never heard of it.
A: Certainly. Strictly inside information. I have friends from the
north (Beijing)ccxcviii
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In another case

A: Chi-wah, let me tell you something reliable: 005.
Chi-wah: 005 stands for HSBC, doesn’t it? Let me tell you something
reliable instead: mothers are womenccxcix.

The concern here is not that the extent to which the profitability of
buying the stock of HSBC is as self-evident as the notion of ‘mothers are
women’. The above examples, however, humorously problematize the
characteristics of the activities in the stock market. If economics tells us
that we make a decision of buying something out of rational
calculations, the examples turn this understanding upside down:
knowing something well enough is irrelevant for our buying decisions;
perfect information is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition
for our decision to buy certain stock. On the other side of the coin,
knowing not enough does not hinder our buying decision: inside
information refers to information that we recognize or concede as such.
Basing upon inside information means giving up our active articulation
or understanding of the present situation or the tendency of the stock
market, we let the ‘inside information’ do the articulation or
understanding for us.

In Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow Up, labeled by Slavoj Žižek the ‘last
great modernist film’, Žižek juxtaposes the way in which the protagonist
Thomas

investigates

the

actually

non-existing

dead

body

he
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discovered in his own photographs, and the way he ends up
accepting to play the mimic tennis game without the physical
presence of the tennis ball. Žižek regards this juxtaposition as the ‘lesson
of modernism’, in which ‘the structure, … works as well if the Thing is
lacking, if the machine revolves around an emptiness’. ccc As a result,
what is worthy of investigation or even critique in the case of the stock
market is therefore not whether people’s decision to become involved
in the ‘technology bubble’ is made out of their perfect knowledge or
the lack of it. To cite a Marxian maxim, ‘they do not know it, but they
are doing it’. ccci It is the mechanism in which this phenomenon is
allowed or even encouraged to occur that is of interest.

As mentioned above, mysteriousness is the fundamental quality of
‘inside information’ on the tendency of the stock market. Indeed, in
the example given by Wong, the significant moment is when people
simply seem to be betting merely on ‘inside information’ as a form,
following wherever the ‘inside information’ directs them to go, without
even trying to comprehend what content or message is present in the
form. The appropriation of this recognition of non-recognition (of what
is inside the ‘inside information’) is indeed the assumed ground or even
justification for decision. In another example provided by Žižek to
explain the working of ideology, he points out that the ideology of
anti-Semitism probably depicts Jews as the incarnation of evil.
However, in everyday life, any German might easily encounter Jews
which are indeed the opposite of what propaganda teaches them.
Yet if this everyday experience is effective enough as resistance to
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ideological interpellation, then the ideology is not a successful one.
Ideology, according to Žižek, functions by turning this gap itself
(between the ideological figure and the actual everyday experience)
into the argument for anti-Semitism, and it succeeds ‘when even the
facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its
favours’. cccii

Here we can identify a parallel situation. In the case of anti-Semitism,
no matter how the anti-Semitic propaganda tries to structure our ways
of conceiving Jews, it is by our own irreconcilably confusing
interpretation of our normal and even pleasant perception of Jews
that we can see that ideology is at work. And in the case of the stock
market activities, by the same token, even if people know that they are
able to profit stably from the stock of HSBC, one of the top 3 largest
groups in the stock market, people tend to invest in something they
have not even heard of, by virtue of ‘inside information’, by virtue of
the label of Beijing, and the mysterious working of the label that follows.
If these phenomena involve the working of ideology, they work not by
completely internalizing our sense of truth as defined by ideology; it
works not by convincing us with its own rationality. Quite the opposite,
it precisely works by allowing a residual region defined by its traumatic,
senseless and contradictory quality. This region ‘far from hindering the
full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very
condition of it.’ ccciii This is what Žižek calls a ‘vicious circle of
authority’ccciv, a tautology in which we believe simply because it is the
authority, even if nothing beneficial can be gained out of it. Do we
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have to be reminded of the couple of collapses of the stock market in
1997 and 2000?

This exercise helps us to distinguish, if we refer again to the maxim: ‘they
do not know it, but they are doing it’, the sphere where investigation
and criticism are urgently needed and appropriate. It may be a bit
off-target if we focus solely on whether a certain discourse or ideology
intends to transform or successfully transforms the mind, the people’s
‘knowing’ part, it would be frustrating if we found that people know
already that everything is ‘false-consciousness’ after all, yet they still
decide to act accordingly. On the contrary, it is the ‘doing’ part that
matters. Like the practice of canned laughter in soap operas and
chorus in Greek tragedies, what are the mechanisms in which our
sensitivity and response are disregarded and trivialized to the story of
PCCW and Richard Li? And the phenomenon of the technological
hype in general? What is our understanding of these mechanisms that
enables the preservation of our traumatic, contradictory and senseless
residual region? Such that this region with all our traumas,
contradictions of the gain and loss, love and hate, the obvious and the
ambivalent will ‘start to function as arguments in its favour’?

Conclusion
Following the steps of Miller, this chapter has developed different
versions and angles of the story of Richard Li and his PCCW. It focuses
on the underlying dynamics, impetus and intentions that are actually in
operation, and tries to uncover the significance constitutive of the
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whole phenomenon. This exercise is important, as confirming the
popular notion of the linear triumph of innovation and technology that
is beneficial to the social and economic life of Hong Kong is simply
futile, even if we see technological development as in some sense
important. Undoubtedly, virtualism in the sense of abstraction appears
in different moments of the story. It is clear that unique and particular
logics of both discourse and capital are at work, and Touraine’s
critique of the popular critique of the neo-liberal view of globalization
should be an appropriate reminder here: economy, finance and
politics (one might perhaps add, society) are not a monolithic bloc.cccv
From the above analyses, it is obvious that different relations and forces
indeed constitute the story to such an extent that it would be difficult
to conceptualize it as a technological issue per se . However, we might
have unduly granted Richard Li and his PCCW too much if we
conceive of all the political, financial and economic forces and
relations as intrinsic to the story. By the same token, all of the above
might be virtual enough, yet if we still insist that all of them are just
undifferentiated operations for making profit, we will not be able to
comprehend the problem and will be rendered in many senses
inactive.

According to the analyses in this chapter, the operation of these logics
is quite indifferent to, does not regard, and sometimes works at the
expense of the counterparts that they refer to. These logics seem to
dominate the constitution of our sense of what the group is about. All
the operations described in this chapter have their own agendas, no
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matter whether financial or political, yet the social and the everyday
life dimensions are by and large absent and omitted. A commentator
talking about the ‘burst of the technology bubble’ said, ‘it is the
“investors” who are first exposed to the burst of the bubble, instead of
the “consumers”’. cccvi Let us for the moment put aside the problem of
how we can meaningfully distinguish these two kinds of people; still this
statement is interestingly coherent with Miller. To Miller, investors are of
course exposed to the burst before the consumers. However,
consumers (at least part of them) and investors do not stand opposite
each other. No matter whether the bubble bursts or expands ever after,
investors always seems to be the only ones exposed; consumers, on the
other hand, simply have never been in the game, or are replaced by
their virtual stand-ins.

To counter the interpretation of the supposedly sudden emergence of
the social and economic prevalence of information technology that
supposedly improves everything in terms of the inevitably linear process
of an actualization of rationality, one of the best critiques is to insist on
the concrete and contextual. For instance, Paschal Preston points out
that, at least in the context of Britain, the mania for information and
communication technology (ICT) did not emerge until the late 1970s,
as a result of the rise of Thatcherism and with the aim to combat and
manage acute social and economic problems. The emergence of ICT
discourse at that time, with the help of the popularization of ‘books
and magazines concerned with (and usually, enthusing over) the …
then relatively new ICTs’, had a special emphasis on its job creation
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potential.cccvii And in the context of Hong Kong, ‘it can be argued that
the technocultural imagination has created a post-crisis (Asian
financial crisis) euphoria that may be conducive towards the
rebuilding of a new form of urban governance’cccviii. Nevertheless, it is
one thing to expose the official discourse which requires us to
acknowledge

that

their

abstracted

and

ahistorical

logic

of

technological development is indeed tackling problems other than
what they claim they are handling. How we are to conceptualize the
situation in which we practically live with or paradoxically do not see
the obviously visible discrepancies arising out of this virtualism is quite
another. Especially when these discrepancies also have no reason to
be benevolent, as we see from the analyses above.

Žižek’s skilful analysis critically bridges the gap. Simply exposing the
discrepancies, irreconcilables, and senselessness seems inadequate
because it does not explain our supportive attitude. After all, if we find
people in this apparent confusion, it is simply not necessary that they
do not know about the confusion, quite the opposite, it is well probable
that the confusion, and hence the getting away of making exclusive
judgment, are precisely what they consciously identify with. cccix
Through the notions of virtualism and abstraction, Miller seems to
endorse the existence of a realm that is ‘real’ or not yet abstracted,
however, the notions are different from Žižek’s notion of the traumatic
and senseless residual region. Methodologically, Miller builds his notion
of abstraction and virtualism upon the realm that is ‘real’ and not yet
abstracted. In other words, he assumes that the level of everyday life is
150

not ill-represented and there is some method to recover somewhat
authentically this region. But for Žižek, the very traumatic and senseless
residual quality is the real stake. Without it, it would be impossible to
understand the workings of ideology, and it will have to be assumed as
an undistorted human subject at risk of being interpellated – precisely
the Miller’s starting point. If Miller is not to straightforwardly assume a
natural and real subject and develop his theory upon this assumption,
effort will have to be put into formulating an articulation between the
subject and the social and historical context of the subject. But this
effort of formulation shall inevitably be political, and is itself a contested
domain.

According to Žižek, we believe in, instead of being convinced by, the
discrepancies and contradictions in a direction towards the dominant.
One more point to add is that explaining the working principle of
ideology is far from claiming that a particular ideology can completely
dominate the whole society and its people. After all, such a claim
would inevitably be empirically inaccurate and theoretically disabling;
not only because it is far from potent enough, but also because the
very subjects (society and people) that are being referred to are
definitely not entirely clear and immediately valid subjects of ideology.
Who is to be included? What can be the benchmark of a total
interpellation? The list of questions can be expanded further, but the
implication is simple: the obstacle on the way to a better
understanding of the working of ideology and discourse is only the
nostalgic imagination that a society and its history can easily be
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conceived of as a unified whole. With this in mind, we can turn now to
the final chapter.
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Conclusion: rethinking through HK’s history

The history of Hong Kong, as many writers have noted, and of course
like the history of any place ever written, is contested terrain. This terrain
was even full of contestations at the time when Hong Kong had to be
handed over back to China from the British after one and a half
centuries of colonial rule.cccx In the context of handover politics, one
important aspect that the writings and interpretations of Hong Kong
tend to focus on is the issue of nationality: to what extent people in
Hong Kong are Chinese or Hong Kong people per se; what kind of
historical events can be mobilized to support that Hong Kong people
are anti-colonial or colonial collaborators; what the relationships
between

colonialism,

anti-colonialism,

communism,

and

anti-communism are, etc. Critics argued that this aspect of Hong Kong
history is by and large dominated by colonial scholars from Britain and
patriotic scholars from the mainland.cccxi

Another important aspect of Hong Kong history (though not
completely separable from the former, see later in this section)
concerns the impetuses and the meaning of the place’s economic
development and success. According to the textbook-style narrative
of K.Y. Nyaw, Hong Kong started out chronologically as a trading port
in 1842. Between 1842 and 1941, Hong Kong was effectively, if not
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exclusively, an entrepot and free port. Despite the suspension of
economic activities during the Second World War, the industrialization
of Hong Kong started in 1947.

cccxii

Before industrialization, the

prominent figures in Hong Kong’s economy were apparently the banks
and hongs, assisted by Chinese compradorscccxiii. While Hong Kong has
always been considered a free port, practicing the policy of
laissez-faire, practically all the changes in the economic structure
during the history of Hong Kong were due to changes in ‘external’
circumstances. For instance, the beginnings of the industrialization of
Hong Kong were the combined effects of both the embargo placed
on China by the United Nations after the former’s involvement in the
Korean War (which resulted in the loss of the entrepot status of Hong
Kong in the early 50s, and a turn to industry), and the establishment of
the Communist regime in China in 1949 (which resulted in Hong Kong
receiving the fleeing Shanghai capitalists and their capital).cccxiv

From this perspective, the significance of the Hong Kong Government
is unique. Due to the pressure of factors and influences both from inside
and outside Hong Kong, it would simply be futile for the government to
attempt in any way to intervene in the operations of the economy and
any inevitable structural shift. Paradoxically, it is precisely through the
government’s very intention and effort to limit its reach that Hong Kong
was able to float in the global economic current, accommodating
itself to whatever the circumstances required. Therefore, on the one
hand, these writers described the early economic development in
Hong Kong as a neat and clear path from trade and finance activities
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to industrialization, under the non-interventionist colonial administration.
On the other hand, even when they could not deny that
manufacturing industries were not altogether absent in Hong Kong,
Nyaw attributes their taking root in this early phase of colonial
development to factors that were quasi-inevitable, and had nothing to
do with any active determination on the part of the government
whatsoever -- for example, the free port policy (again!), the stimulation
by population growth, and the Imperial Preference granted to Hong
Kong by the home country.cccxv

Yet, this explanation of the take-off of the economic development with
respect to the development of the manufacturing industries in Hong
Kong in particular is not unanimously accepted. For those who
considered Hong Kong’s pre-War manufacturing industries to be
absent or at least insignificant, one of their most standard supporting
arguments comes from Edward Szczepanik’s The economic growth in
Hong Kong , published in 1958. Szczepanik reports that among the 1.8
million population in Hong Kong in 1940, only 30,000 workers were
working in about 800 factories.cccxvi Other sources, however, reveal the
moment

where

this

mistaken

understanding

of

the

industrial

development could have occurred. Frank Leeming argued that this
might have to do with the way ‘industry’ was defined. He argues that
well before the coming of the 20 th century, a considerable proportion
of property (around 30% between 1845 and 1847) in the Victoria area
was recorded to be in industrial use. These ‘industries’ engaged in small
businesses like bakeries and cabinet making, where factories, shops,
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and residence alike were under the same roof in those premises.
Leeming goes on to argue that most of these factories, instead of
being discrete businesses in their own right, indeed in one way or
another were the extension or continuation of the same business
started in Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta in particular.cccxvii

David Faure, through uncovering old archive material, also argues th at
pre-War, and even pre-20 th century, industries were by no means
insignificant and were already producing a whole range of products
for domestic use.cccxviii This very position is also held by Ngo Tak -wing,
who argues that ‘Hong Kong’s modern industries can be traced back
to at least the turn of the twentieth century, rather than to a sudden
spurt after the Korean War, as is commonly assumed’.

cccxix

In a

document published in the mid -1930s, it is first reported that out of the
850,000 people in Hong Kong, 110,000 engaged in the manufacturing
of different everyday life goods. The figure even exceeds that in the
sector of commerce and finance, from which the fortune of Hong
Kong was commonly believed to come. cccxx The significance of
pre-War manufacturing industries can also be inferred from their
competitive edge in respect to products from other regions. Faure
mentions that according to another document published in the late
1910s, for example, ‘the Taikoo sugar works is said to be the largest
refinery which is under one roof in the world.’cccxxi The manufacturing
sector in Hong Kong was so strong that one commentator asserted in
the mid-1930s, ‘despite the size of the country, the industrial goods from
Shanghai and Hong Kong ranked equal among the exhibits.’cccxxii Ngo
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even points out that the rubber shoes produced in Hong Kong led the
British official to admit to Hong Kong’s ‘invasion of the United Kingdom
market’, and other products such as cosmetics and leatherwear
effectively displaced imports in the domestic market by the 1920s and
1930s. cccxxiii And if this evidence apparently implies only the possibility
of the illusionary self-pride of Hong Kong industrialists, the reaction of
the overseas authority was certainly significant. Ngo reports that Hong
Kong’s exports even led the British Government and Canadian
Government to attempt to impose quotas and raise tariffs to footwear
exported from Hong Kong.cccxxiv

While the earliest industrial activities in Hong Kong were not recognized,
Faure argues, it may just be due to the fact that ‘until the 1920s, little
was manufactured for export’ cccxxv . However, as shown in the
evidence and interpretation of other writers, when Hong Kong
products began to gain a competitive edge over overseas products,
the reason for the ignorance and non-recognition may have more to
do with more complex colonial projects. On the one hand, Leeming
and H.F. Cheung cccxxvi argue that manufacturing industries were
mainly businesses run by Chinese. Even if we put aside the prejudice of
the colonial officers against Chinese people, it is still undeniable that
the evidence advanced by these writers comes mainly from local
newspapers and classified directories. On the other hand, up to this
point, the argument is still referring to the debate about the
periodization of the process of industrialization of Hong Kong. Anyway,
even if we really assume that industrialization indeed took off in the
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post-war period, the issue of another dimension, namely the role and
function of the ‘laissez-faire’government in relation to this process, still
remains unresolved.

More precisely, the problem is about our attitude towards the claim
that the colonial administration of Hong Kong has always been a
fiscally healthy, laissez-faire government, and economic success has
been the result of the decision and adaptability of the Hong Kong
economy and civil society regarding ‘external’ economic conditions,
the positive and intentional outcome of a positive non-interventionist
government. Conventional literature on Hong Kong history generally
holds a positive attitude to this version. Critics, however, argue that
‘while it is true that the government practiced a tight fiscal policy, it is
far too simplistic to explain this policy purely in terms of the ideological
commitment of the various Financial Secretaries (of Hong Kong’s
colonial administration) to fiscal conservatism.’

cccxxvii

From this

perspective, we must avoid a presumed position according to which
laissez-faire and the related fiscal conservatism were unanimously
benevolent governance options chosen intentionally to bring benefit
to each and every one in the colony, even if the interventions and
participation of the colonial administration were in fact low compared
to, say, the rest of the three ‘little dragons’. Rather, meaningful studies
of the economic development in Hong Kong must focus on the
dynamics and negotiations underlying the decision to adopt this policy
direction.
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For instance, studies of the provision of industrial land and the proposal
of establishing an industrial bank by Stephen W. K. Chiu nicely depict
this dynamic. cccxxviii The provision of concessionary industrial land and a
publicly financed industrial bank were both pressing issues in the early
1950s, when the Korean War opened up an enormous opportunity for
the Hong Kong economy to go on and develop along the path of
industrialization. That historical moment was considered as the very
opportunity of formulating something resembling an industrial policy.
However, in the case of industrial land, the commercial and financial
sectors opposed the proposal because they wanted to avoid any
possibility of raising taxes as a result of any prolonged assistance by the
government in terms of the provision of cheap land. In the case of the
industrial bank, the historical moment was the time when the industrial
sector saw the potential for development, and at the same time the
bank raised interest rates to compete for deposits. The proposal
brought up by the industrialists, while not totally rejected by the
government, was again rejected by the finance and banking sectors,
for a 2-fold reason. They did not want to take the risk of a tax increase
that a prolonged governmental input might bring; the reason was also
that the industrial bank would be their direct competitor and
effectively reduce their profit.

Alex Choi’s discussion contributes one more dimension, the dimension
of the relationship between the imperial home country and the colony,
and hence uncovers a broader context in which the apparently
fiscally healthy laissez-faire policy can be conceived and located. He
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maintained that the time when Hong Kong saw the opportunity to go
for industrialization roughly coincided with the time when Sterling crises
were threatening British imperialism. As a result, the formerly restrictive
attitude of the British to the industrialization of Hong Kong was more or
less relaxed. However, the reason for this relaxation was not that the
previously protected British industrial production no longer needed
protection, but that during that the waves of Sterling crises, Hong Kong
had become a ‘money-earning powerhouse’, which was a valuable
asset to the low currency reserve back in Britain.cccxxix That is to say, the
experiment of the industrialization of Hong Kong was then allowed, yet
definitely not with the input of government subsidy, but rather with a
strict fiscal conservatism.

In the light of these two arguments, it is almost obvious that laissez-faire
is less an ideological commitment than a mere name to embody
different responses of the government regarding the market and its
exchange,

and

hence

looks

different

according

to

different

circumstances. But after all, those are still decisions or actions taken by
the ‘government’, a rather empty notion embodying quite different,
sometimes conflicting, directions, principles, or concre te techniques of
governing. From this perspective, we are then very close to the notion
of governmentality introduced by Foucault. According to Graham
Burchell’s interpretation, civil society, understood in the sense that it
constitutes a space in which ec onomic activities are conducted out of
government’s reach, is historically an invention of the government. cccxxx
That the invention of civil society is one of the techniques of the liberal
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government is one of Foucault’s arguments in the whole project on the
genealogy of governmentality, in his lectures in 1978-79.

Foucault’s project of a genealogy of governmentality analyzes -- from
pastoral power dating back to Hebraic thought to the ‘reason of state’
in the classical period -- the notion of police in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, liberalisms since the seventeenth century, and
the contemporary, neo-liberal counterpart.cccxxxi In general terms, this
analysis is ‘an attempt to pose the question of the epistemological and
technical conditions of existence of the political, to analyse the
historical a priori by which we construct politics as a domain of thought
and action, and to analyse the instrumentation, vocabulary and forms
of reason by which this is done.’ cccxxxii Whereas every form of
governmentality has its own epistemology and problematic in regard
to the notion of politics, in general it is a ‘permanent instrument of
critique’cccxxxiii to other and previous forms of governmentality.

The genealogy of governmentality in the lectures of Foucault is too rich
in content to be discussed in full here, but insofar as it pertains to this
discussion, it is instructive to draw on the comparison between notions
of economy in different historical periods. The concept of government
before the 18th century, in a sense, referred to the governing of the
family (or household) in economic terms cccxxxiv. The emergence of the
modern state, however, is characterized by the crystallization of this
notion of the government of the household economy as a
quasi-naturalistic, autonomous level of reality, which started to acquire
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the name of political economy cccxxxv. In other words, at the moment
when modern government was founded, the idea of the government
of the economy is more or less the successor to that of the government
of the household. The sphere where individuals can freely conduct
economic activities not only has a trace that can be found in the
previous economic government of the household, it is also actively
and intentionally organized, and placed out of reach, by the state.
What is relevant about this analysis for our discussion here is that, as
Dean Mitchell precisely summarizes, ‘liberalism is an art of government
not only because it recognizes that there are limits to the role of the
state but because what it determines as falling outside the political
sphere is itself necessary to the ends of government’cccxxxvi .

The invention and protection of civil society, in which the individual is
allowed to conduct rational economic activities, does not therefore
refer to a retreat of government, but ju st to a different form of
practicing

its

governmental

techniques.

Even

in

the

shift

to

neo-liberalism, the government does not disappear altogether;
especially in the version of neo-liberalism of the German Ordoliberalen
specifically analysed by Foucault, the state is required to organize a
competitive market institutionally and juridically. For these German
liberals, market competition no longer takes on a natural character, it is
institutional and artificial instead.

cccxxxvii

Or, in a more general

formulation, the role of the state just changes to ‘actively creat[ing]
the condition within which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct is
possible.’cccxxxviii (original emphasis).
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It is precisely in civil society that we can see how the economy can be
mobilized by the state itself as a principle of philosophical critique of
‘too much government’, and at the same time, as the very
manifestation of governmental practicecccxxxix. Should this argument
lead one to confuse whether the state is indeed omnipotent or
debilitated, Foucault would probably have answered that this very
fundamental ambivalence is what should be retained. If we adhere to
the way in which Foucault poses the question of governmentality, this
ambivalence just once again re-affirms that governmentality is not
simply about being for or against something according to some
arbitrary principles, but rather about a manner of formulating a
domain of knowledge and practice that we call the political.

Therefore, going back to the argument of Chiu and Choi, their studies
not only successfully call into question, indeed by relativizing, the stagist
approach to economic development, their studies even direct our
attention to ‘the intellectual and practical techniques and inventions
via which civil society is brought into being as both distinct from
political intervention and yet potentially alignable with political
aspiration’. cccxl This approach is meaningful to avoid the mistake of
criticizing historiography while retaining its basic historical periodization;
it also prevents us from discussing terms like civil society or government
intervention in any a priori, a-historical sense.

Therefore, the picture that emerges from the history of the economic
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development of Hong Kong is far from the clear-cut narrative in which
industrialization is a distinct step-by-step process; instead, the vitality
and significance of different types of industrial activities are invisible
only when Hong Kong’s history is narrated according to conventional
literature. Moreover, the notion of laissez-faire should also be the
subject of suspicion: it is just far removed from any ideological
commitment. Historically it looks like an umbrella notion spanning
decisions and policies of huge heterogeneity. It is ironically the
outcome of the negotiation of interests between the colonial
administration, the imperial authority, finance, trade and banking
interests, and the industrialists, which, at different stages in Hong Kong’s
history, discourages as well as embraces the industrialization in Hong
Kong.

And it is here that we can draw out a performative dimension of the
rhetoric of the laissez-faire policy. In the words of Ngo, it is through the
selective interpretation that laissez-faire is rationalized, post hoc, as a
‘good policy’ that contributed to the prosperity of Hong Kong, and it is
through this post hoc rationalization that the popular legend of the
barren-rock-turned- capitalist-paradise is sanctioned cccxli , that the
identity of Hong Kong can be established. The performative dimension
here refers, by definition, precisely not to whether this understanding of
the history of Hong Kong is accurate or correct, it is by and large
irrelevant in many cases.

The performative dimension resembles

almost something like giving a simple and encompassing name to a
historical space in which we, upon closer inspection, will find
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incoherence, contradictions and inconsistence, evoking and obliging
an inevitable precondition for the future path of Hong Kong, as
informed by this very version of the Hong Kong experience.

Teleology complicated: the beginning is the end is
the beginning…
Žižek tells a joke about a conversation between a Pole and a Jew, and
the joke goes like this: in a train compartment where a Jew and a Pole
sit opposite each other, the Pole is shifting nervously and watches the
Jew all the time. Finally, he cannot restrain himself any longer and asks
how Jews succeed in extracting even the last small coin from other
people and accumulate all their wealth. The Jew agrees to tell him the
secret, but the Pole has to pay some money to the Jew first. As the
secret is being revealed by the Jew, he stops, and when the Pole asks
greedily if he can become rich simply by following what the Jew said,
the Jew demands more money from the Pole, then he would tell him
the answer. The Pole pays, and the Jew goes on to tell the rest of the
secret. He stops again and asks the Pole to pay even more before he
continues. Finally, the Pole loses his temper and shouts at the Jew, ‘You
dirty rascal, do you really think I did not notice what you were aiming at?
There is no secret at all, you simply want to extract the last small coin
from me!’ The Jew replies with resignation, ‘this is how we do it… ’cccxlii

What Žižek tries to exemplify through this joke is that the Other (the
Jew’s secret) indeed does not exclude the Pole; that the Pole is NOT
external to the Jew’s secret. The joke of the Jew is successful only by
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taking the desire of the Pole into considera tion, that is to say, how to
manipulate the ‘secret’, so that it causes our desire and at the same
time is posed retroactively by this desire. As a result, at the end of the
story, the Jew did deceive the Pole; he gets the money, and at the
same time keeps hiswords. In other words, for the secret to be effective,
the desire of the audience has to be taken into consideration. The
audience, necessarily, has to fail to know the truth in the process of the
unfolding of the secret. Therefore, it is wrong to situate the Jew’s
narrative of the secret as a path to the final revelation of the ‘secret’,
which is assumed to be external to the narrative itself; instead, the
narrative structure designates the Pole’s impossible relation to the
secretcccxliii, and that is where the secret lies, and that may be what the
Pole has to acknowledge if he is to traverse the secret, know the
secret.

From this perspective, the lesson is that it is not particularly helpful, if not
misleading, to consider any story as a path to the final revelation of a
secret, to consider the story from the final point the story reaches, as
the final arbitrator, the final reference -- which sometimes leads us to a
void. It would help to recall a story often told to people in their
childhood. Once upon a time, a King went out of his luxury palace to
come to the countryside to breathe some fresh air. When he
approached the foot of a hill, he stopped and wanted to have some
fun. He then told his followers confidently that if anyone could make
him reach the peak of the hill, that person would be awarded anything
the person would like to have. A guy nearby came up and said to the
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King: I do not know how to make you reach the peak, but I do know
how to make you go down once you have reached the top. The King
did not believe him and went up with the guy. When they all arrived at
the peak, the guy said to the King, with little regret: welcome to the
peak, my honourable King.

If Žižek’s joke functions to complicate the straightforward teleology that
every story seems to imply, this childhood story calls into question the
relevance of the power of the people with respect to the teleological
structure, it even broadens the possible referent of ‘secret’ itself. In the
Pole and Jew joke, it is still the nervous and defensive Pole who triggers
the story by asking of a supposedly deceitful and omniscient Jew (in
the view of the Pole, who is curious about the Jew) their way to make
money. And the question the Pole asks is ‘what the secret is’. The Jew,
who knows it, dominates the unfolding of the narrative structure from
this point. And in the case of the childhood story, it is the self-confident
King who triggers the story, by asking a question that he thinks no one is
able to answer, a question to which he thinks there is no ultimate
answer yet. However, it is the follower who dominates the unfolding of
the narrative. For the King, the question he asks is ‘whether there is an
answer’. So in this case, while in both cases the one who knows
dominates the unfolding of the narrative structure, using the
terminology of Žižek, even the King, who asks the question in the first
place, can assume himself in a position excluded by the secret and
external to the Other, not to mention the people who are the only
possible candidates to answer the question, when indeed all of them
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are from the very beginning part of and included in the same game.
One can also see that the desire to know can accommodate both a
conscious sense to seek the secret and a more primary and
open-ended question that does not necessarily have an answer, even
though both are ultimately unattainable. The trick here is that the sense
of both having and, paradoxically, lacking an ultimate and exclusive
answer can work equally well to trigger an inter-subjective network
that we retroactively and straightforwardly name as teleology.

The above discussion is crucial to supplement the story of Richard Li in
chapter 4. The openness of the working of desire works well with both
Richard Li, who is the one manipulating the proceeding of the story,
and other people, who are trying to make sense of the story, even if
they do not consciously know if there is an answer at all. As long as we
keep seeing the final revelation as the answer, rather than attend to
how our desire to know the unattainable secret (which is whether
Richard Li and the discourse of technology is the saviour of Hong Kong)
guides us along the ‘wrong way’, (when the desire is the answer itself)
we may still be far from approaching the contingent nature of this
particular discourse, and we will fail to see for this particular discourse
how our failure and desire are taken into consideration in
advance cccxliv. In this case, we will simply see the story and judge the
story as a one-way teleological unfolding of the secret.

One question is justified to be brought up regarding Richard Li’s story:
his empire of PCCW and he himself both eventually failed -- his
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company has shrunk back to what it is supposed to be worth, maybe
even less; he himself has now become no more than the object of a
jokecccxlv. Moreover, time and again, even during his heyday, he was
being criticized on account of his secret deals with the government,
intentions of creating a monopoly and so on. While all of those are true
and valid, they miss the point of the exercise in this thesis. In fact, those
questions seem to mix up two aspects of inquiries, which are largely
inseparable, but definitely not identical. To raise the question to what
extent the discourse of technology successfully constructs its subjects is
different from seeking to unravel the ways in which this discourse
functions to construct its subjects. The analysis undertaken in this thesis,
at the level of textual analysis, is clearly more of the latter kind. For the
first kind of inquiry, a different methodology has to be employed, and is
out of scope of the exercise in which we engaged here.

Regarding the way the discourse functions, as we have discussed
above, the teleological relation inherent in any story should not be
simply seen as a case in which the secret lies only in the final revelation,
after a whole narrative process external to the secret is gone through.
The secret as merely the point of final revelation should not be taken as
the absolute arbitrator, and is indeed far from being the most revealing.
By the same token, the audience is also never neutral, listening
indifferently to a story that reveals the answer in the last minute.
Therefore, while it is true that Richard Li and his empire have fallen now,
this alone is not adequately meaningful to be taken as the final answer
of the whole problem, assigning meanings to all elements in the
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discourse. On the contrary, all those questions justifiably raised could
actually function as attempts to put up seemingly external scapegoats
to mask the very fundamental contradictory quality and impossibility of
the discourse, even at its peak moment, or from the opposite direction,
against which ‘a pathos or nostalgia for a lost wholeness’cccxlvi can be
constructed. In this light, judging him from the perspective of the final
situation in which he turns out to be in, only defers, if not suspends, the
exposure of the mask covering the impossible unity of the discourse of
technology, and hence fails to see the impossibility of any primary
narrative or discursively constructed social space in which all these
discrepant elements and moments, in the sense defined by Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and socialist strategycccxlvii,
can be coherently articulated. Therefore, although those questions are
fully valid and could point to different directions of research, this
validity stands only insofar as they do not presuppose a primary
narrative or discursively constructed social space in which the
discourse of technology and other elements and overflows can be
properly and coherently accommodated.

Why does the government always come up with
solutions?
Referring to the discussion of the previous section, early industrialization
and the story of Richard Li, it might be interesting to postulate both the
laissez-faire and the high-technology function as the unattainable
secret in Žižek’s joke about the Pole and the Jew. Or in other words, it is
the objet a, which is ‘nothing but the rendering positive of a negative,
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of making an object out of what does not exist’. cccxlviii It is the
object-cause of our desire, when the objet a itself is the very
embodiment of the lack, and hence retroactively the desire. cccxlix
Through this perspective, the issue with the discourse of technology is
not whether it is ‘for real’, in terms of bringing economic success to
Hong Kong, or whether it has unanimously been internalized in the
minds of the people. We must, instead, pay attention to how this desire
of laissez-faire and hi-tech as the ‘(unattainable) secret’ to the
economies since the early 1950s, and at the end of 20 th century
respectively, retroactively, or borrowing the words of Ngo, post hoc,
constitute fantasy spaces, where the spaces themselves must by
definition be deemed failures. Elements constituting the fantasy space
can be various and include such as the post-handover Southeast Asia
economic crisis,

the lack of technological sophistication and

diversification for long periods of time, too much indulgence in
futureless labour -intensive and cutthroat industrial activities, threats of
globalization, etc. It is precisely against these fantasy spaces that
laissez-faire and hi-tech can be constructed effectively as the object
of desire, the magic and inevitable pills for economic development or
the revival of Hong Kong.

In order to further exemplify this mechanism, it might be instructive to
recall Žižek’s rejection of Stalinism in his postface to Lukacs’s A defense
of history and class consciousness. According to Žižek, for Stalinism, it is
impossible to have any act proper. Stalin asserts that the revolutionary
potential is written into the very ‘inner nature’ of the working class, yet it
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does not arise spontaneously, and needs ‘neutral intellectuals’ to force
the potential out of the workers. This very compulsion is ‘the Party’s
exertion of dictatorial pressure over the “empirical”, actually existing
work ers and their confused, opportunistic self-awareness, in the name
of (the Party’s correct insight into) what their true inner potentials
and/or their “true long-term interests” in fact are’. cccl

Here we have the same structure in the case of Žižek’s analysis of
Stalinism and the case of the narration of Hong Kong history. In the
case of the analysis of Stalinism, the moment of fantasy occurs when
the nature of the working class is determined as revolutionary, but only
in the form of ‘potential’, and along with this potential, they have their
own interest, conflicts, etc., among themselves. And it is against this
fantasy that (with their exclusive insight into the development of history)
the Party’s coercion becomes justifiable and even inevita ble. In the
case of the early account of the industrialization of Hong Kong by
finance and trade capitalists, hongs, Hong Kong as a fantasy space
was posed in which trade is ‘objectively’ and ‘empirically’ more
profitable, the geographical conditions and raw materials and so on
were all supposed to be unsuitable for developing industries. It is
against this scenario that the desire to create the colony exclusively as
an entrepot is posed, in the name of the ‘stability and prosperity’ of
Hong Kong. The more Hong Kong is considered unsuitable for the
development of industries, the more the development of the entrepot
business is apposite and urgent. The moment of retroactivity here is
that, by steering Hong Kong in the direction of entrepot trade, even
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the ‘objective environment’ according to which we judge the validity
of the fantasy changes in a direction favourable to the business of
trade

and

finance,

and

hence

makes

the

desire

of

the

trade-benefiting laissez-faire naturally more palatable.

The discourse o f technology is the contemporary counterpart that can
be juxtaposed to those we have just looked into. Stanley Aronowitz
provides one formulation in his book, Jobless future : ‘American’s
weakened competitive position had to be improved through
efficiency programmes such as technological change that reduced
the size of the factory labour force; mergers and acquisitions that
eliminated redundancy… and applying hatchet to “overhead” costs
such as clerical workers and middle management’. cccli The economic
recovery brought about in these ways is called ‘jobless recovery’, and
in such a situation, ‘everything, including jobs, had to be sacrificed to
make workers more productive’. ccclii Is this not the basic model of what
we have seen in the case of Richard Li’s PCCW? The basic elements
are still employees, whose characteristics are: inefficient and
redundant, whose status is again posed as the fantasy against which
trimming and restructuring are conceived as ‘authentic’ solutions to
the indeed unanswerable problem framed in terms of employees. This
play of the 2 categories is significant, since fantasy and desire are in a
relation in which fantasy creates desire which retroactively creates
fantasy. They are therefore not two independent variables for us to
measure the innocent distance between them. Our perception of any
one end of the tension necessarily involves, or indeed is constituted by,
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our change in perception from the other end. Yet, in the example of
Richard Li, this game of restructuring is played out without much
technological content, not to mention technological improvement,
even if this discussion is situated precisely in the rhetoric of the ‘new
economy’, which is highly associated with technological innovation.
Yet the closed circuit that draws us in is still that the more Hong Kong’s
industries are under-developed in terms of technologies, the more
hi-tech Hong Kong is obliged to become.

In effect, echoing Žižek’s assertion that a letter will always arrive at its
destination, we can have a glimpse at why the government always
comes up with solutions in different economic situations. The letter
always arrives at its destination because once the letter enters into the
symbolic circuit, the sender is subsequently disburdened of his
responsibility for the letter.cccliii The sense of teleology here is not the
ultimately unshakable, and objectively existing direct channel through
which a letter arrives at its destination, quite the contrary, teleology
here is merely presented as a post hoc rendering positive of the
inter-subjective network that the letter passes through. So the fact that
the government always comes up with a solution -- no matter whether
it is entrepot trade in the pre-war period, industries in the post-war, or
hi-tech by the end of the 20 th century, with th e laissez-faire policy a
constant – has less to do with the government’s ability to identify and
make sense of the problem at the very beginning, and its subsequent
ability to formulate strictly corresponding solutions. Quite on the
contrary, the teleological and causal relations involved have more to
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do with retroactive creations of ‘problems’ to be solved and the
retroactive fixing of dissimilar elements (i.e. the problems created and
the solutions taken post hoc) into meaningful sequences in the field of
discourse. As far as our desire is concerned, teleology is not a path out
there in an a priori form, the government always comes up with
solutions because we want ‘to know’, the solutions are only
articulations that occupy our lack of the answer, and the problem as
well, which is produced out of our desire ‘to know’, and are meant for
us only.

What exactly is ‘hi-tech’, then?
We have now reached a position very close to the one of Laclau and
Mouffe. In their Hegemony and socialist strategy, they revisit the
interpretation of the history of the Russian Revolution and provide an
alternative reading of the significance of that history. In orthodox
Marxist doctrine, class is an abstract category defined in terms of its
position in the process of production, and the historical development
proceeds sequentially from the revolution of the bourgeois over the
feudal lord to the revolution of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. But
the situation of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century is peculiar,
there was ‘weakness of the bourgeoisie, and urban civilization;
disproportionate growth of the State as a military-bureaucratic
apparatus becoming autonomous from classes; insertion of advanced
form of capitalism resulting from “privilege of backwardness”; freshness
of the Russian proletariat, due to the absence of tradition tying it to a
complex civil society’cccliv. Due to the immaturity of the bourgeoisie,
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they argue, the question of hegemony regarding the historical
development is designated by a space ‘dominated by the tension
between two very different relations: a) that of the hegemonized task
and its “natural” class agent; and b) that of the hegemonized task and
the class hegemonizing it’. ccclv

In other words, the question of the Russian Revolution is: how can we
grasp, as Žižek asks in a similar tone, ‘the tremendous emancipatory
potential of the Event of October’ccclvi, without falling back to strictly
observing some ambiguous law of general historical development. In
effect, this is the question of how we are to understand the Russian
proletariat’s bypassing the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Tsar: are we to
still cling to the ‘narrative of exceptionalities’ or to open up the
‘conceptualization of specificities’?

ccclvii

Despite

their

complex

argument, their answer is simple: what is important is the contingent,
historical and hegemonic articulation of dissimilar elements, and our
analysis of them, instead of their fixation back into the chain of
abstract historical necessity. That is why they assert that, ‘(h)istory,
therefore, is regarded not as an ascendant continuum of democratic
reforms, but as a discontinuous series of hegemonic articulation or
historical blocs’. ccclviii

According to this assertion, it is meaningful to borrow this insight of
Laclau and Mouffe from the reconsideration of the problem of history
to the analysis of the discourse of technology in Hong Kong, and this
has been attempted in this thesis: For both the government and the
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business sector, the issue of hi-tech is posed as a ‘logically necessary’
or at least transparent implication against an ‘objectively pressing’
situation in the post-handover year. In the first chapter, an attempt was
made to draw a rough picture in which different ways of approaching
the problems of technology are sketched out. The discussions and
debates vary hugely according to the times when they emerge, the
theoretical frameworks to which they refer, the meanings of the very
term ‘technology’ they evoke, etc., but all of them amount to drawing
the picture of a dispersion or proliferation of the discourse of
technology, in the sense of Foucault, as we can actually see there is
hardly anything unifying in the term ‘technology’ itself: notions (except
the very one of ‘technology’) such as author, style, period of time, idea,
etc. all fail to unite this huge diversity of discussions and debates

The chapter on the governance of Hong Kong further destabilizes the
idea that Hong Kong is ‘a black box of rational progress’. Through the
ways in which the vicious circle consisting of epidemics, bird flu and
SARS, and public hygiene is articulated, the strength of changing our
perspective regarding the analysis of social and political events should
have become adequately clear. In the chapter, the concept of the
performative is repeatedly discussed, and the reason should be
obvious enough now. The idea that no matter when we speak or
perform, we necessarily have objectively, externally existing referents
from which we can judge the truth or falsity of what we said, is called
into question. Instead, when we speak or perform, we constantly
re-articulate, modify, or reinvent the referents concerned. Is this not
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precisely the philosophical assumption of the theoretical discussion
above? Concepts like historical development, field of discourse should
not be assumed to have any essential, a priori core, such that other
unarticulated elements are deemed as essentially external elements,
and denied any fundamental potential for change. Thus we can see,
from a greater distance, as shown in chapter 1, the degree of
inconsistency or even conflict and chaos regarding the meaning of
the ‘master signifier’ (and the meaning assigned from it to others). And
it is in chapter 2 that we can see how every particular discourse in the
field tries to set in place and fix, albeit temporarily, a certain network of
meaning around the impossible master signifier; or in other words, how
meaning is only possible when it is fixed temporarily in a particular
discourse.

Upon the groundwork laid down in chapter 1 and 2, the 2 subsequent
chapters go on to depict the discourse (regarding both the
government and business sector -- Richard Li and his PCCW in
particular) constructed around the notion of hi-tech, as the ultimate
and constitutive inadequacy. The chapters seek to show the
mechanism of the hegemonic attempts of the SAR Government and
Richard Li’s PCCW to articulate dissimilar elements and temporarily fix
their meanings, so as to render possible a harmonious, unified discourse
of hi-tech, namely a natural teleological path for Hong Kong. At the
same time, by providing a broader global association and uncovering
the unarticulated and subversive elements which penetrate the
government and business discourse, the chapter argues for, instead of
178

a straightforward value judgment, the necessary impossibility of such
attempts.

The argument described above may better be explained with an
imaginary example. For a very fatal disease, a whole range of
treatments, medicines, and arrangements are inspired to combat it,
but the mere presence of all of them will just give the disease a
deadlier quality: if a certain simple treatment is able to cure it, that
whole range of responses is unconceivable and unnecessary.
Therefore, all of those responses, instead of successfully recognizing or
capturing the disease, only paradoxically determine the quality of the
disease as fatal. And if this example, though imaginary in nature,
sounds easily understandable, it may be due to our recent association
of something similar to it: SARS. SARS is not eliminated because medical
professions

invented

an

accurate

and

proper

treatment,

all

arrangements regarding public hygiene look more like political
gestures

than

direct

responses

to

the

disease,

its

gradual

disappearance is also out of our grasp. All of them indeed confer the
utter unattainability of the disease, yet the drive derived from this
unattainability simply articulates dissimilar elements together, which
further makes the disease mysterious. In the light of the discussion in
chapter 2, rather than just proving the necessity of an analysis in terms
of articulation, what the case of SARS shows us in this present context is
obviously the complexity of causal relations in terms of the working of
desire.

179

Referring back to our present discussion, suffice it to juxtapose the
notion of ‘hi-tech’ with the notion of ‘society’ in Laclau and Mouffe.
According to their famous discussion of the ‘impossibility of society’ as
a ‘sutured and self-defined totality’, the assertion precisely points out
that ‘there is no single underlying principle fixing – and hence
constituting – the whole field of [social] difference’. ccclix Our sense of
society as ‘a valid object of discourse’ is only an ideological nodal
point, which ‘consists precisely in those discursive forms that seek to
construct society and social agency as decidable discursive forms
within a totalizing horizon that projects on to a particular discursive
form an impossible fullness and transparency.’ccclx Or from another
angle, Laclau’s nodal point is also Žižek’s ‘quilt’, both society and
‘hi-tech’ can be conceived of as words ‘to which “things” themselves
refer

to

recognize

themselves

in

their

unity’.

ccclxi

What

this

understanding implies is that, although the words are the points to
which all moments within the discourse refer, the words do not
consequently contain the richest meaning, or are not the master
signifier assigning meaning to everything within the unity. Rather, the
very words have to be utterly empty to embody the possible relations,
and hence the meanings, that the words retroactively establish with
the ‘things’, the dissimilar elements, waiting to be articulated. So if
society exists only as a perpetual effort to construct its impossible self,
‘hi-tech’ as the nodal point, or quilt, works in a similar way. Whereas by
definition a discourse embodies the attempt to fix, at least temporarily,
the meaning of the moments within, all the references within the same
discourse will definitely make the meaning of the nodal point
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self-conflicting and senseless, hence rendering it impossible for the
nodal point to have any stable, self-defining meaning.

Conclusion
By now it should be clear that we do not criticize ideology because we
consciously have a very defined and clear-cut picture of how a
certain ideology misleads people, how ideology distorts the reality and
so on. Any reality is not to be grasped in its fullness, but is constantly in
the remaking discursively, whose master-signifier, or the nodal point, is
the ultimate inadequacy or unreachable, or in another formulation,
the real goal of any ideology ‘is (just) the consistency, is the ideological
attitude itself’. ccclxii Therefore, it is rather fruitless or incomplete simply to
point out all the cracks between actions and thoughts, between the
revealed intentions and the implicit intentions, between the reality
formulated in any specific discourse and the reality ‘as it is’; in short, the
symptoms. However, to say that it is fruitless obviously does not imply
that there is no crack or there is nothing to blame: it is only the first step,
rather than a complete process. The joke of the local stand-up
comedian already shows us that the emptiness of any crack can
paradoxically act as the ultimate support of people’s justification of
their actions or decisions. Instead, the notion of fruitlessness implies that
valid and effective criticisms do not stop where symptoms are pointed
out, or, as Žižek said, ‘the unmasking of the secret is not sufficient’ccclxiii.

What we have to attend to, therefore, is the form of ideology that
drags people in – replacing the content without traversing the form
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can not take us too far; the history of Hong Kong’s economic
development narrated by a liberal or a socialist necessarily have
differences, but not necessarily in terms of being ideological or not. If
critics would like to wake people up from the neo-liberal fantasy (unless
they in fact want to convert people to become total nihilists), what
they have to do will be to conceive of a hegemonic articulation that
does not presume any a priori master-signifier, such as laissez-faire or a
new economy based on I.T., which fixes historical meanings once and
for all. Recognizing the opening of any articulation; not trying to cover
up points where incoherence can be found; keeping openness a topic
of dialogue and debate; allowing change of articulation as the result
of the dialogue or debate – all these may be possible ways to live with
the necessity of fixing temporal meaning discursively.ccclxiv
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